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FEDERALIZING THE TAX-FREE MERGER:
TOWARD AN END TO THE ANACHRONISTIC
RELIANCE ON STATE CORPORATION LAWS
STEVEN A. BANK*
This Article examines the requirement that a merger be
"statutory," or conducted pursuant to the corporation laws of a
state, to be tax-free. Ti 'he statutory merger requirement for "A"
reorganizations is an anachronistic remnant of the 1930s belief
that state corporation laws are effective regulators of corporate
combinations and bulwarks against abuse of the tax-free
reorganization provisions. This reliance on state corporate law
standards is not only inconsistent with the recently adopted check-
the-box regulations and no longer an adequate regulator, but is
also counterproductive in that it introduces disparities of
treatment between parties based on their location. Ironically, the
statutory merger requirement could conceivably prevent de facto
mergers and mergers involving single-member limited liability
companies, but permit mergers under nouveau corporate law
statutes that do not require the parties to "merge" under any
conventional sense of the word. Form is elevated above
substance. In light of the failed efforts to remove the A
reorganization from the Internal Revenue Code altogether, this
Article concludes that the statutory merger requirement should be
eliminated from the A reorganization so that a more uniform
standard can be applied by the courts and the Internal Revenue
Service.
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INTRODUCTION
For over eighty years, Congress has permitted taxpayers to defer
the recognition of income realized on the receipt of stock or other
securities in certain types of business combinations and
readjustments.' As currently described in the Internal Revenue
1. The federal tax system is structured so that gains or losses on property held by
taxpayers are not "recognized," and therefore not taxed or deducted, until those gains or
losses are "realized" through a tax-triggering transaction such as a sale or other
disposition. Even realized gains or losses may be deferred pursuant to specific statutory
nonrecognition rules. They are deferred rather than waived completely through an
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Code,2 participants in transactions qualifying under one of the
defined categories of "reorganizations" under section 368 of the
Code are eligible for nonrecognition treatment. These defined
categories include the following acquisitive reorganizations:3 (1) an
"A" reorganization, or a "statutory" merger or consolidation in
which a merger or consolidation is conducted "pursuant to the
corporation laws of the United States or a State or Territory or the
District of Columbia";4 (2) a "B" reorganization, or a stock-for-stock
reorganization involving "the acquisition by one corporation, in
exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock ..., of stock of
another corporation if, immediately after the acquisition, the
acquiring corporation has control of such other corporation";5 and (3)
a "C" reorganization, or a stock-for-assets reorganization involving
adjustment to the taxpayer's basis in the property that requires the recognition of the full
amount of gain or loss upon the occurrence of a realization event not exempted by a
nonrecognition provision. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001 (West Supp. 1998); Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,207 (1920). Thus, a mere change in value of property is generally
not subject to taxation. But see I.R.C. § 475 (West Supp. 1998) (imposing mark-to-market
treatment on dealers in securities with respect to their securities held as inventory); id.
§ 817A (West Supp. 1998) (mandating mark-to-market treatment for segregated accounts
held by life insurance companies as modified guaranteed contracts); id. § 1256 (1994)
(mandating mark-to-market treatment for certain contracts); id. § 1296 (West Supp. Oct.
1998) (permitting a taxpayer to elect mark-to-market treatment for marketable stock in a
passive foreign investment company).
2. Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the regulations
promulgated thereunder.
3. Non-acquisitive reorganizations (or reorganizations for which the primary
purpose is not acquisitive) include: (1) a "D" reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(D), or a
transfer of assets to a controlled corporation in connection with another reorganization or
a spin-off under § 355; (2) an "E" reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(E), or a
recapitalization; (3) an "F" reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(F), or a mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization of one corporation; and (4) a "G" reorganization
under § 368(a)(1)(G), or a bankruptcy reorganization. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1) (West Supp.
1998).
4. Id. § 368(a)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (1998). The IRS has officially
taken the position that the A reorganization is not available for mergers between domestic
and foreign corporations. See Rev. Rul. 57-465, 1957-2 C.B. 250; BORIS I. BIrrKER &
JAMEs S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 12.22, at 1241 & n.75 (6th ed. 1994); James M. Lynch, Back to the
Code: A Reexamination of the Continuity Doctrines and Other Current Issues in
Reorganizations, 73 TAxEs 731, 742 (1995). A reverse subsidiary merger, in which the
target corporation's shareholders in a statutory merger receive stock of a corporation
controlling the merged corporation in exchange for their target corporation stock, also
qualifies as a form of A reorganization, but it is subject to the additional requirements that
the surviving corporation retain "substantially all of its properties" and that the former
target corporation's shareholders exchange an amount of stock constituting "control"
under § 368(c). I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1998).
5. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B).
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"the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or part
of its voting stock..., of substantially all of the properties of another
corporation."6 In addition, all such reorganizations are subject to the
judicially imposed requirements that the target shareholders
maintain sufficient continuity of interest in the business in its
modified corporate form, that the acquirer continue to conduct the
target's business enterprise after the acquisition, and that the
transaction have a business purpose.7
For most of these eighty years, the Code's failure to apply a
uniform tax standard for all reorganizations has been widely
criticized as arbitrary, complex, and overly formalistic.8 This criticism
appears to be faithful to some of the original concerns of the
legislative drafters because the Code defines a number of
economically similar transactions as "reorganizations" so that the
same tax consequences should be applied to each. 9 As Professor
Stanley Surrey noted in an American Law Institute Tax Project Study
of the reorganization provisions, "there do not appear to be any
reasons for differences in tax rules simply because one or the other
method is chosen for non-tax reasons."'10 An American Bar
6. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C). A forward subsidiary merger, in which a corporation acquires
substantially all of the properties of another corporation in exchange for the stock of the
acquirer's parent corporation, is a form of A reorganization, although it has many of the
characteristics of a C reorganization. See id. § 368(a)(2)(D).
7. See, e.g., 1 MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS,
AND BUYOUTS §§ 609-611 (1998) (citing Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner,
287 U.S. 462 (1933) (continuity of interest), and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)
(business purpose)); Peter L. Faber, Continuity of Interest and Business Enterprise: Is It
Time to Bury Some Sacred Cows?, 34 TAX LAW. 239,269 (1981) (citing Cortland Specialty
Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932) (continuity of business enterprise)). The
Treasury Regulations now explicitly impose these judicially created doctrines. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (1998) (business purpose); id. § 1.368-1(d) (continuity of business
enterprise); id. § 1.368-1(e) (continuity of interest).
8. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr:
SUBCHAPTER C 155 (1982); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION:
THIRD SERIES 3 (1940). Professor Calvin Johnson said of the "substantially all" properties
requirement of C reorganizations: "The disparity is hard to defend ... as a matter of
policy. If the rule is one of fundamental principle, why does not it apply to all
reorganizations? If the rule is trivial or perverse, why apply it to any?" Calvin H.
Johnson, A Full and Faithful Marriage: The Substantially-All-The-Properties Requirement
in a Corporate Reorganization, 50 TAX LAWV. 319, 355 (1997).
9. See Valentine Brookes, The Continuity of Interest Test in Reorganizations-A
Blessing or a Curse, 34 CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1946).
10. Stanley S. Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders:
American Law Institute Tax Project-American Bar Association Committee Study on
Legislative Revision, 14 TAX L. REV. 1, 20 (1958). The focus on the evils of disparate
treatment is not limited to the reorganization provisions. Disparate treatment was a major
impetus in the recent revision of § 1234A to treat as capital any gain or loss attributable to
1310 [Vol. 77
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Association Committee concluded that these different requirements
"frequently induce corporations to restructure their transactions
(often in convoluted fashion) to fit within particular statutory
definitions while business and economic realities remain
unchanged."" Because of the concern over disparate treatment,
many proposals to collapse the various types of reorganizations and
requirements have been submitted over the years,2 but no wholesale
changes have been made. 3
What reformers have ignored in their quest to rid the overall
system of disparity, however, is that an even more arbitrary and
formalistic disparity exists within "the oldest of, and the prototype
for, the various reorganization forms"-the A reorganization. 4
Under the A reorganization's statutory merger requirement, 5
economically and substantively identical transactions are treated
differently not because of Congress's decision to apply a different set
of requirements, but merely because of differences in state
corporation laws' 6
The statutory merger requirement is an anachronism from a
period when state corporation laws were thought to be more
significant regulators of corporate activity. 7  Mergers and
the cancellation, lapse, expiration, or other termination of a right or obligation with
respect to non-actively traded as well as actively traded personal property. See STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, at 188 (Joint Comm. Print 1997).
11. Committee on Corporate Stockholder Relationships, Tax Section
Recommendation No. 1981-5,34 TAX LAW. 1386,1394 (1981).
12. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., FINAL REPORT
ON THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985, at 3 (Comm. Print 1985); Committee on
Corporate Stockholder Relationships, supra note 11, at 1386; Surrey, supra note 10, at 20.
13. In part, this is because such proposals have attempted to substitute a new complex
system for a system that has as its most commendable quality its general familiarity to
practitioners. See Daniel Q. Posin, A Case Study in Income Tax Complexity: The Type A
Reorganization, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 627, 668 (1986).
14. BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, 12.22, at 12-41.
15. Consolidations are relatively rare among modern business transactions.
Therefore, this Article will refer to the requirement that mergers or consolidations be
statutory as the "statutory merger requirement."
16. Although the Treasury Regulations refer to "the corporation laws of the United
States or a State or territory, or the District of Columbia," Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)
(1998), few corporations are organized under anything but state law, and therefore few
mergers will be subject to anything other than state corporation law, see Posin, supra note
13, at 631.
17. State corporate law is generally defined as the universe of statutory and judge-
made doctrines that govern the operation of corporations and the rights of their
shareholders and other constituencies. See, e.g., David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth
Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 975, 978 (1998). In this context, it is likely that the Treasury regulations'
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consolidations were made tax-free in 1918 to remove bars to business
transactions in the rapidly developing equity markets and to codify
the belief that the exchange of stock in one company for the stock of
a combined venture was not an appropriate time to measure the
realization of income.' Nonrecognition treatment was soon
expanded to cover merger-like transactions, but by the 1930s, loose
draftsmanship and clever advisors combined with the general anti-
merger sentiment following the stock market crash of 1929 to raise
the specter of tax avoidance to an unacceptable level. Amid
proposals to remove the tax-free reorganization provisions from the
Code altogether, an implicit compromise was struck in 1934.19
Congress added the statutory merger requirement to tie the merger
provision more closely to the protections imposed by state
corporation laws, and courts imposed the judicially created doctrines
of continuity of interest and business enterprise on transactions
claiming to qualify for the non-merger reorganization provisions."
Policymakers believed that mergers conducted pursuant to state law
were subject to many limitations, including an automatic continuity
of shareholder interest and a protection of dissenters and creditors,
the aggregate effect of which would be to ensure that the aims of the
reorganization provisions were achieved. Thus, Congress did not
subject statutory mergers to the same restrictions that were imposed
on transactions that only resembled mergers or consolidations. 21
Eventually, however, courts imposed the continuity of interest
requirement on statutory mergers on the theory that Congress had
not bound itself to the vagaries of state law in determining
reorganization status.' This effectively gutted the statutory merger
of any safe harbor protection it may have provided to participants,
but the requirement continued to exist as a theoretical guard against
abuse. Critics complained that the statutory merger requirement
resulted in unequal treatment based on the location of a transaction,
but the advent of more uniform state corporate laws helped to ease
their fears.'
reference to state corporate law is meant to include judicial interpretations of statutory
provisions, rather than doctrines such as the de facto merger that are a wholly judicial
invention in most states. Otherwise, those regulations would delimit the meaning of the
"statutory" reference in the Code.
1M See infra Part I.B.1-2.
19. See infra Part I.B.3.
20. See infra Part I.B.1-3.
21. See infra Part I.C.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. See infra Part I.C.
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Recent developments in state corporation law and federal tax
law have exacerbated the disparities in treatment for parties seeking
A reorganization status and have obliterated any notion that state
corporation laws continue to provide a check against tax avoidance.
The adoption of the new check-the-box regulations, which de-
emphasize the Code's reliance on state corporation law and permit
single-member limited liability companies to elect to be treated as
divisions of their parent,24 has the ironic potential to magnify the
disparity caused by the A reorganization's reliance on state
corporation laws. Because an acquiring corporation need not directly
assume the liabilities of its target under state law,' a single member
limited liability company eliminates one obstacle to the use of the A
reorganization. The statutory merger requirement, however, may
limit tax-free treatment for such a deserving merger when the state
corporation laws do not provide for the merger of corporate and non-
corporate entities or do not recognize the existence of single member
limited liability companies. Moreover, as a gatekeeper, the reliance
on state corporation laws for the determination of whether a
transaction qualifies as an A reorganization has become both over-
and under-inclusive. The reliance on state corporation laws is over-
inclusive because the advent of increasingly liberal state corporation
laws has moved the concept of a merger or consolidation farther and
farther from the common law definitions. While it has long been
apparent that the statutory merger requirement cannot be depended
upon to prevent an abuse of the reorganization provisions, a state
merger statute that permits a sale to be classified as a merger turns
the A reorganization provision on its head. The reliance on state
corporation laws also is under-inclusive because it is difficult to
justify the exclusion of statutory transactions that are not defined as
mergers, but provide many of the shareholder and creditor
protections originally used to justify nonrecognition treatment for
reorganizations. These developments highlight the need to focus on
the disparity and inequity that is caused by the continued reliance on
the statutory merger requirement for A reorganizations.
This Article argues that a merger's eligibility for A
reorganization treatment should not depend upon whether it has
satisfied the requirements imposed by a state's corporation laws.
Part I, which sets forth the history and development of the
reorganization provisions and the advent of the statutory merger
24. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (1998).
25. See 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7, § 801.6.
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requirement, explains why the requirement has become an
anachronism. Part II discusses the developments in both state
corporation law and federal tax law that have magnified the problems
caused by the continued presence of the statutory merger
requirement. Part III argues that eliminating the statutory merger
requirement is both a feasible and preferable alternative to the
current classification system for A reorganizations. Finally, Part IV
concludes by offering a brief perspective on the merits of this
proposal amid the defeat of more comprehensive efforts to integrate
the taxation of corporate and shareholder income taxes.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF THE STATUTORY MERGER
REQUIREMENT
A. Early History of the Reorganization Provisions
1. 1913-1921
When the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax was
enacted as part of the Underwood/Simmons Tariff Act in 1913,26 it
was assumed that Congress had the power to tax reorganization
exchanges but chose not to do so.' The 1913 Act contained no
special provisions for the exemption of gain or loss in mergers,
consolidations, or reorganizations, and no provisions were added in
the 1916 or 1917 Revenue Acts.2s Administrative guidance, while
somewhat more revealing than the Revenue Acts themselves, did
little to develop a definitive position on the tax treatment of such
transactions. Some practitioners contended that reorganizations,
mergers, and consolidations created little more than a nontaxable
stock dividend for the shareholders of the constituent corporations.29
Early pro-taxpayer rulings by the Treasury Department seemed to
agree with the practical effect of such contentions,30 but regulations
26. Tariff Act of 1913, ch.16, 38 Stat. 114. For a history of the use of the income tax in
this country prior to the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, see Steven A. Bank,
Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 329 (1996).
27. See David F. Shores, Reexamining Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Corporate
Reorganizations, 17 VA. TAX REV. 419, 440 (1998).
28. See PAUL, supra note 8, at 8; Homer Hendricks, Federal Income Tax: Definition
of "Reorganization," 45 HARV. L. REV. 648, 648 n.1 (1932); Hugh Satterlee, The Income
Tax Definition of Reorganization, 12 TAX MAG. 639, 639 (1934).
29. See 11 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 43.02 (1990)
[hereinafter MERTENS].




issued in 1918 pursuant to the 1916 Act provided that exchanges of
property for stock might result in taxable income in certain
circumstances1.3  It was not until the summer of 1918 that it became
clear that Congress would resolve the uncertainty through legislative
enactment. 2
Three developments brought the issue to the forefront: (1) the
extension of stock ownership from the privileged few to a much
broader base of the population; (2) the post-World War I boom in
mergers and acquisitions activity; and (3) the significant increase in
taxes imposed under a new Revenue Act adopted in 1917. These
developments combined to raise the stakes for more people on the
question of how to treat mergers and acquisitions for federal income
tax purposes.
First, the rise in participation in equity markets after the onset of
World War I considerably broadened the base of people and
corporations potentially subject to tax in a merger, consolidation, or
other reorganization. During most of the nineteenth century, the
largest corporations were private, family-controlled enterprises, and
the few manufacturing company stocks that were publicly traded
were not widely held.33 The New York Stock Exchange, originating
in 1792 and emerging in its modern form in 1869, experienced its
most substantial growth after the merger movement of the mid-1890s,
gradually replacing a system for raising capital through private
Where upon a reorganization stock of the new company was issued in exchange
for shares of the old, the new company taking over the property of the old, no
income accrued if the exchange of stock was share for share of like par value,
even though the property of the first corporation had increased in value over a
period of years since its stock was first issued.
GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME AND PROFITS TAXES 262 n.20 (1920) (citing
Letter from Treasury Dep't, Mar. 8, 1917; I.T.S. 1918, 1302); see also GEORGE E.
HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 670 n.94 (6th ed. 1925) (citing two 1915 letter rulings to
the same effect); Shores, supra note 27, at 441 n.69 (citing Letter from Treasury Dep't,
Mar. 8, 1917; I.T.S. 1918, 1302).
31. See PAUL, supra note 8, at 8 (citing Treas. Reg. 33 (Revised), arts. 101, 118, 119
(1918), reprinted in 132 U.S. REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950, at 60, 65-66 (Bernard D. Reams,
Jr. ed., 1979) [hereinafter U.S. REVENUE ACTS]; Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate
Reorganizations: Purging Penelope's Web, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1985).
32. Of course, even this resolution left pre-1918 reorganizations to the uncertainties of
the administrative and judicial process. See, e.g., A.R.R. 156, 2 C.B. 39, 40-41 (1920)
(refusing to apply the 1918 Act reorganization provision to a transaction that took place in
1915).
33. See JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 193 (1997); ROBERT SOBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET 32 (1977).
34. See SOBEL, supra note 33, at 26-27; Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York
Stock Exchange, 1791-1860,27 J. LEGAL STUD. 113,115 (1998).
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subscriptions with one that relied on publicly traded shares of stock."
Shares traded on the Exchange jumped from 57 million in 1896 to 260
million in 1907.36 This rise in the volume of shares traded eventually
broadened the base of individuals participating in equity markets.
Individuals holding shares of common stock in corporations
increased four-fold during the first two decades of the twentieth
century, from a half-million to two million." In part, the sale of
Liberty Bonds during World War I helped to introduce a whole new
generation and socioeconomic class of people to the world of
securities and the stock market.3  The growth of financial
intermediaries, such as banks and brokerage houses that offered both
underwriting services to take companies public and investment
advisory services to push the sales of those new issues, further
facilitated the development of a mass market for common stocks.39
With this increase in the number of corporations offering public
shares and in the number of individuals holding such shares, the tax
treatment of reorganizations became a question of immediate
concern for a larger segment of society than it had ever been before.
Second, the increase in mergers and acquisitions after World
War I brought the uncertainty of the tax consequences to the
forefront of the minds of corporations and their newly enlarged
35. See MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 95 (1992); see also MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE
CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at 4 & n.1 (1988)
(describing the transition from closely held to publicly held corporations).
36. See HORWITZ, supra note 35, at 95. Symbolic of this change in the stature of
public trading, the New York Stock Exchange constructed a massive new facility between
1901 and 1903 at a price tag of more than $4 million. See SOBEL, supra note 33, at 45-46.
37. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 33, at 190; see also SOBEL, supra note 33, at
101 ("Prior to World War I, probably less than one hundred thousand Americans owned
securities in firms listed on the N.Y.S.E. By the late 1920s, there were over three million
shareholders .... ).
38. See I Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 114-15 (2d ed. 1961); SOBEL, supra
note 33, at 203 ("Individuals who prior to 1917 had savings accounts, some property, and
considered all stocks and bonds esoterica, now had experiences in dealing with investment
bankers, and learned that they could increase the yields on their savings through the
purchase of bonds-and possibly stocks."); CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY,
A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 442 (1986).
39. See 1 LOSS, supra note 38, at 164-65, 196; see also J. KEITH BUTERS ET AL.,
EFFECTS OFTAXATION: CORPORATE MERGERS 310-11 (1951) (discussing the distinction
between earlier and more recent merger trends, including the role played by investment
bankers). The potential conflict of interest between the two activities was part of the
concern that prompted Congress to separate commercial banks from investment banks in
the Banking Act of 1933-more commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act. See
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630, 633 (1971).
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group of shareholders. Although the merger device enjoyed some
popularity prior to the Civil War,4" it was first relied on by large
segments of business at the turn of the century.4' Businesses turned
to corporation law for refuge in response to judicial and legislative
efforts to slow the growth of trusts and other combinations in
restraint of trade. As Arthur Eddy explained in 1901, "while the
courts might deny the rights of individuals, firms or corporations to
meet together and form associations, pools or agreements with the
intent to control prices and outputs, no court would deny the right of
an individual, or of a partnership, or of a corporation" to actually buy
the assets or business as a whole of another corporation.42 Aided
further by the liberalization of state corporation laws to permit
majority rather than unanimous shareholder approval of mergers and
consolidations, mergers were at an all-time high between 1898 and
1903.43 By 1908, the total capitalization of business combinations was
$31 billion, almost nine times larger than in 1900.4 Notwithstanding
these numbers and the vast size of the corporations created in
industries such as oil and steel during the turn-of-the-century merger
movement 4 the post-war boom was in many ways more significant.
By 1920, business combinations were occurring at a more frequent
clip than at any time during the earlier period.46 As with the rapid
development of the securities market itself, the merger movement
was fostered in part by the development of the investment banking
industry. One commentator noted that "[s]ince the commissions
40. See Comment, Statutory Merger and Consolidation of Corporations, 45 YALE L.J.
105, 106 n.2 (1935). One commentator wrote that the utility of the merger device was first
noticed during the development of interstate methods of transportation by means of
turnpikes and other toll roads. As two roads in separate states became physically joined, it
made sense for the separate corporations operating such roads to be joined as well. See
Eldon Bisbee, Consolidation and Merger, 6 N.Y.U. L. REV. 404, 404-05 (1929); see also
Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and
Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C. L. REV. 687, 746 (1998) (describing the same
phenomenon in the railroad industry).
41. See BUTrERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 287-88.
42. 1 ARTHUR J. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS 601 (1901), reprinted in
HORWITZ, supra note 35, at 87.
43. See HORWrrZ, supra note 35, at 87-89; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate
Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 56 (1990). By the
end of the merger movement, over 300 mergers, having an aggregate capitalization of
approximately $7 billion, had occurred. See BUTrERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 288;
SKLAR, supra note 35, at 46.
44. See FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, THE LORDS OF CREATION 162 (1935).
45. The Standard Oil Trust was created in 1879 and the billion-dollar United States
Steel Corporation was created in 1901. See BUTTERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 287-88.
46. See id. at 292; Conway L. Lackman, Effect of Taxes on Business Mergers, 23
ANTITRUST BULL. 551,556 (1978).
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received by investment bankers and other financiers for the flotation
of combinations were often very large, it seems probable that their
pursuit of financial profit was at least a contributing cause of the
formation of many mergers."'47 This increase in the number of
mergers so soon after the adoption of the income tax magnified the
importance of resolving the taxability of such transactions."
Finally, both the rise in income tax rates and the addition of an
excess profits tax in the 1917 Act increased the economic stakes for
those involved in the new round of reorganizations and prompted a
rapid influx of inquiries in Congress.49 After corporate and individual
normal and surtax rates doubled in 1916 due to wartime
expenditures, Congress in 1917 sought to raise additional revenues
through a significant increase in individual and corporate taxes and a
cut in personal exemptions."0  The House Ways and Means
Committee proposed, in addition to a war excess-profits tax,"1 an
increase in taxes that would yield, during a 12-month period,
approximately $161 million in additional revenues from corporations
and $372 million in additional revenues from individuals. 2 The
Senate sought an increase in these numbers, especially as they
concerned corporations and corporate profits. According to a Senate
Finance Committee Report on the proposed bill, the increase in taxes
"was not an unreasonable additional amount to ask from the
industries whose earnings have been so greatly augmented by the
conditions which made necessary the call for this additional
47. Joe S. Bain, Industrial Concentration and Government Anti-Trust Policy, in THE
GROWTH OFTHE AMERICAN ECONOMY 711 (Harold F. Williamson ed., 1944).
48. See Posin, supra note 31, at 1347 ("Given the size of these transactions, and the
large number of taxpayers holding stock in General Motors and the other large
corporations involved, the lack of predictability in these cases was unacceptable.").
49. See PAUL, supra note 8, at 9 (noting that the increase in income tax rates
"precipitated a flood of inquiries" on corporate reorganizations); Saterlee, supra note 28,
at 639 ("The subject first became of widespread interest because of the high rates under
the 1917 Act, and in the spring of 1918 was studied in the office of the Solicitor of Internal
Revenue as an original problem.").
50. See ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 153
(1940). Maximum income tax rates rose from 15% in 1916 to 67% in 1917 and 77% in
1918 in part because war expenditures caused government spending to rise from 1.8% of
gross national product in 1913 to 21% in 1917 and 24.1% in 1918. See WEBBER &
WILDAVSKY, supra note 38, at 422, 441; see also Arthur A. Ballantine, Corporate
Personality in Income Taxation, 34 HARV. L. REV. 573, 578 (1921) (calling the 1917 Act a
"radical change" in the tax system).
51. "Excess" profits were profits in excess of a reasonable return on invested capital.
Such taxes were enacted under the theory that businesses should not be permitted to keep
certain extraordinary profits caused by wartime expenditures. See WEBBER &
WILDAVSKY, supra note 38, at 422.
52. See H.R. REP. No. 65-45, at 3 (1917), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 48,49.
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revenue." 53 Thus, the Senate proposed a war profits tax that would
raise an additional $562 million in revenue. 4 Furthermore, individual
rates were drastically increased by the Senate amendments to the
House bill. For example, under the new rates as finally adopted,
married individuals making $100,000 who were taxed at a rate of
3.92% prior to 1917 were taxed at a rate of 15.63% as a result of the
1917 Act.55 Married individuals with incomes of $1,000,000 saw their
rates jump from 10.29% to 40.86% as a result of the Act.56 Perhaps
most significantly, the 1917 Act lowered the threshold for imposition
of higher rates from $20,000 to $5000, a drop that significantly
expanded the reach of the increased taxes.5 7 Ultimately, aggregate
taxes per capita increased over 300% during the war-from $23 in
1913 to $75 in 1919-and individual rates reached a maximum of 77 %
by 1918.58 The 1917 Act itself was considered "the greatest burden
that had ever been laid upon the American people." 59 According to
Randolph Paul, the enactment of the higher taxes in 1917
"precipitated a flood of inquiries on the subject of corporate
reorganizations ... [under] the belief that the reorganization
provisions were more a necessity than a luxury. '60  Although the
problem of taxes to shareholders in corporate reorganizations was
still one reserved for the upper economic strata of society, that strata
was growing and diversifying because of the spread of security
holders and the increase in the number of reorganizations.
Supporters of a provision for the nonrecognition of gains
realized in reorganizations, mergers, and consolidations raised
several arguments in favor of its passage: (1) the government should
not tax individuals on a continuing investment in which no cash
changes hands; (2) the government should not tax involuntary
realization events such as a non-unanimously approved merger; (3)
gain or loss on a reorganization was too difficult to value for purposes
of taxation; and (4) the government should remove the tax burden on
53. S. REP. No. 65-103, at 3 (1917), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 56, 57.
54. See id. at 23, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 70 tbl.C.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 23, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 69 tbl.B.
57. See Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 2, 40 Stat. 300, 301.
58. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 7
(11th ed. 1997); WEBBER & WILDAVSKY, supra note 38, at 442.
59. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 50, at 153.
60. PAUL, supra note 8, at 9; see also Posin, supra note 31, at 1341 ("Higher rates are
the mother of tax invention, and it was the tax act of 1917, with unprecedently steep
marginal rates designed to help finance World War I, that stimulated an interest in
reorganization provisions.").
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what were considered necessary business adjustments.
First, the public was uneasy with the concept of taxing a
shareholder currently on gain from a continuing investment in which
the taxpayer receives no cash from which to pay his taxes. In Eisner
v. Macomber,6 one of the earliest and most famous cases on the
concept of income and realization, the Supreme Court recognized as
highly probative in its decision favoring the taxpayer that a
shareholder who received a stock dividend would have to engage in
the additional realization transaction of selling shares in order to pay
the tax.62 Professor Roswell Magill related the story of a taxpayer
who was informed that he had realized taxable gain on the exchange
of his stock in General Motors of New Jersey for stock in General
Motors of Delaware. According to Magill, the taxpayer "called the
law an ass, since his capital was still subject to the risks of the
automobile business, and nothing, in his view, had been severed from
it and made available for expenditure for his private use and
enjoyment."'63 Referring to the same transaction, Professor James
Fahey noted that treating this transaction as taxable was not
fundamentally "in accord with the business man's idea of
realization"' in that "his bank account has not been swelled by funds
which would enable to him to pay such a tax."6 5  While a
"substantive" transaction such as a sale for cash or a cash-equivalent
justified the imposition of a tax on gains realized, the shareholder in a
reorganization is in no "better position to pay than he is at the
moment of a reorganization."66  His investment in the business
61. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
62. See id. at 213 ("Nothing could more clearly show that to tax a stock dividend is to
tax a capital increase, and not income, than this demonstration that in the nature of things
it requires conversion of capital in order to pay the tax.").
63. RoSWELL MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 123 (1936) (referring to the transaction in
Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925), in which General Motors shifted its state of
incorporation from New Jersey to Delaware). According to the American Law Institute's
Subchapter C Project, "[i]t was undoubtedly part of the purpose of enacting the
reorganization provisions to reverse the results in these cases." AMERICAN LAW INST.,
supra note 8, at 157.
64. James E. Fahey, Income Tax Definition of "Reorganization," 39 COLUM. L. REV.
933, 934 (1939).
65. See iL at 934 n.6; see also ROBERT S. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS: THEIR FEDERAL TAX STATUS 68 (1948) ("[If an exchange is
deemed taxable and yet the taxpayer has received nothing that is more than a paper profit,
where is he going to get the money to pay the tax?"); Everett Skillman, Comment, The
Non-Recognition of Taxable Gain in Corporate Reorganizations-Reassessing Legislative
Policy, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 369, 373-74 (1991) (noting that courts deem "paper profits"
arising from a reorganization as a nontaxable event).
66. PAUL, supra note 8, at 5-6; see also Saterlee, supra note 28, at 639 (considering
"the statutory ,definitions of reorganizations as bearing upon intercorporate
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continues in modified corporate form.67 Some scholars expressed this
"continuing transaction" rationale as a desire to define taxable
income in terms of cash receipts.' Milton Sandberg noted that
"[t]his concept ... is based on readily apparent practical grounds.
They are (1) that the cash concept comes close to laymen's ideas
about income; (2) that it is conveniently administered; and (3) that
since tax must be paid in cash, it is cash which best measures ability
to pay."69 According to Sandberg, the belief that the reorganization
provisions followed this cash receipt concept "probably accounts for
the most popular acceptance of the statutes as 'fair.' "70
Second, the public was even more reluctant to impose a tax on a
shareholder in a continuing investment when the shareholder had no
effective opportunity to participate in the decision to engage in the
transaction. Taxing a shareholder who neither voted for nor desired
the transaction upon which gain was recognized seemed inconsistent
with the popular, although not the tax lawyer's, notion of
realization.7' Prior to the turn of the century, unanimous shareholder
consent was the general rule for fundamental corporate changes such
as mergers or consolidations.' In 1880, the Supreme Court held in
transactions").
67. See Ballantine, supra note 50, at 589.
68. See, e.g., Robert H. Montgomery, Reorganizations and the Closed Transaction, in
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 114,121 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921).
69. Milton Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations," 38 COLUM. L.
REV. 98, 100 (1938). Sandberg, however, criticized the applicability of the continuing
transaction concept to the reorganization provisions since both property and cash were
already taxed under the reorganization provisions and the rest of the Code did not adhere
to a cash receipts standard. See id.
Tax policy theorists still mention the liquidity of the taxpayer, or her ability to pay a
tax imposed, as one of the components of measuring the administrability of the tax. See,
e.g., William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in
Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287,300 (1996).
70. Sandberg, supra note 69, at 100.
71. Homer Hendricks distinguished between technical "realization" and "actual
realization" in noting that "until that paper profit or paper loss is actually realized, there is
no logic or fairness in subjecting the transaction to tax or in permitting it to be used as a
basis for a loss, in the absence of a clear direction on the part of Congress." Homer
Hendricks, Developments in the Taxation of Reorganizations, 34 CoLUM. L. REv. 1198,
1221 (1934). Commentators continue to express a general uneasiness with taxation of
forced realization events. See, e.g., Note, Tax Consequences of Contract Breach:
Proposed Relief for the Forced Realization of Income, 11 VA. TAX REV. 915 (1992).
72. See HORWITZ, supra note 35, at 87; Taylor, supra note 40, at 701; Elliott J. Weiss,
The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 627
(1981); Comment, supra note 40, at 112. There were several exceptions to this dominant
common law rule. See, e.g., 1849 Mass. Acts ch. 223, § 11 (majority approval required);
Act of Feb. 15, 1831, § 1, 1831 N.J. Laws 124, 124 (seven-eighths approval required); Act
of Mar. 24, 1856, ch. 197, § 3,1856 Pa. Laws 169, 170 (two-thirds approval required).
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Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co.73 that shareholders in a corporation are
no different than partners in a partnership in their right to unanimous
consent prior to a sale of all of a dissolving corporation's assets and
property.74 Under this rule, a merger or consolidation could not
occur without each individual shareholder's decision to enter into the
transaction. By the turn of the century, however, this rule of
shareholder unanimity showed signs of weakening.75 When Congress
adopted the provisions, the common law rule had been abrogated by
statute in most states so as to permit fundamental corporate changes
to go forward with the approval of as little as a simple majority of the
corporation's shareholders.76 Even though a technical realization
event occurred upon the merger of two companies, the result
resembled an involuntary conversion of a taxpayer's property
through fire, storm, or eminent domain rather than a sale or
exchange.77 At the same time that the reorganization provisions were
first adopted in 1918, the Treasury issued regulations providing
nonrecognition treatment for any gain realized in such circumstances
in acknowledgment of the involuntary nature of the realization
event.7' The involuntary aspects of a non-unanimously approved
merger or consolidation suggested the equity of providing similar
deferral of any amounts realized.
A third justification for not immediately recognizing the gains or
losses incurred in reorganizations was the difficulty in valuing the
73. 133 U.S. 50 (1890).
74. See iL at 59.
75. One example of the weakening that was an exception to the rule for insolvent
corporations was expanded to include the period prior to when a business actually lost all
of its assets. See HORWITZ, supra note 35, at 88.
76. See Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV.
547, 547 (1927); Comment, supra note 40, at 113.
77. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 8, at 158 ("The point may be that corporate
action to carry out a merger, for example, is effective without the individual consent or
voluntary participation of each individual shareholder, and that there is something harsh
about imposing a tax on appreciation realized in such a transaction."); ROBERT N.
MILLER ET AL., REORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER EXCHANGES IN FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 202-03 (1931) (describing the tax consequences of involuntary conversions).
The ALI report goes on to criticize this rationale on the ground that many unilateral
corporate actions result in individual tax consequences. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra
note 8, at 158. This argument, however, ignores the historical background of the
shareholder unanimity requirement for mergers or consolidations.
78. Treasury Decision 2706 was promulgated on April 25, 1918, in response to
wartime conditions. See T.D. 2706, 20 Treas. Dec. 348 (1918), reprinted in MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 77, at 203. As one treatise explained, "[f]or the Government to requisition a
ship, for instance, and almost immediately to exact a surtax or excess profits tax of more
than three-quarters of the gain, involved an injustice so apparent that a prompt remedy
seemed necessary." Id. at 203 n.3.
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stock of corporations, especially when the stock was not publicly
traded.79 Sometimes referred to as "the bogy man of taxation,"
valuation was frequently relied upon in arguments to Congress about
the administrability of many kinds of taxes.8" In testimony to the
Senate Finance Committee on amending certain provisions of the
1918 Revenue Act, one advisor to the Treasury Department noted
that one of the rationales for broadening the reorganization
provisions was the difficulty in making appraisals: "In the average
reorganization, or in many reorganizations, there is no definite, fixed
market price for the securities."81  Although this argument was
roundly criticized by commentators because of the continued
existence of the valuation problem for most kinds of reorganization
boot,2 it appealed to the general desire to remove complexity and to
establish simplicity or administrability in the tax system. This
concern about the complexity of the Code remains one of the
fundamental precepts of tax policy analysis.83
The final rationale cited in support of nonrecognition treatment
was the desire to remove any obstacles to necessary business
adjustments. The reorganization provisions originally were not
designed to stimulate mergers and consolidations, but rather to
minimize any negative effect the uncertainty surrounding their tax
treatment had on the decision to engage in such transactions. One of
the original goals of the tax system was to remain as neutral or
impartial as possible in its effect on an otherwise efficient economy.'
79. Valuation difficulties arose even in the context of publicly traded stock or
securities. See, e.g., Staley v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 752, 775 (1940) (applying a large
block discount in the context of valuation of a gift); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 259, 262-63 (1937) (applying a large block discount in the
context of the valuation of an estate).
80. PAUL, supra note 8, at 6 n.13; see also Sandberg, supra note 69, at 100-01 (noting
that despite the common argument that capital gains statutes "simplify administration by
decreasing the need for valuation," these statutes have "actually increased the number of
occasions for a valuation by introducing allocation formulae in which 'value' is one
element").
81. Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 29 (1921)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 8425] (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, advisor to the Treasury
Department).
82. See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 8, at 6; Sandberg, supra note 69, at 100-01. "Boot"
refers to property that does not qualify for nonrecognition treatment-such as property
not received in exchange for stock in the target corporation. The term apparently
originated from the fact that the taxpayer receives nontaxable stock and other property
"to boot." HOWARD E. ABRAMs & RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE
TAXATION 2.06, at 26 n.23 (4th ed. 1998).
83. See, e.g., JOHN F. WRITE, TBE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 31 (1985); Blatt, supra note 69, at 300-01.
84. See KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 58, at 23. This goal continues to be cited by
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Roswell Magill explained that since the income tax was not originally
seen as an "instrument for social control, it was natural for Treasury
to propose and Congress to adopt statutory provisions intended to
eliminate the bars which the federal income tax, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, had placed across the road to normal corporate
reorganizations."8 5 As discussed previously, high wartime taxes
discouraged corporations and their shareholders from entering into
transactions that would otherwise be efficient and justified for the
company and the economy. In the absence of a reorganization
provision, one post-1918 commentator predicted that stock
ownership "would tend to become fossilized" and the freedom to
enter into necessary business combinations would be severely
limited.8 6 The commentator explained that "[i]f the Government as
the keeper of the toll bridge exacts too great a toll, the bridge will
simply not be crossed," even though "frequent crossings would be of
convenience to the travelers and of incalculable benefit in
encouraging commerce and industry, from which other revenue could
be collected." s In the early years of the federal income tax, this
result seemed contrary to the goals of the reorganization provisions.
Congress was apparently swayed by the arguments that such
modem theorists. See, e.g., Ernest S. Christian, De-Radicalizing Tax Reform, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Apr. 13, 1998, at 70-81, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File ("The
common goal of all the leading tax reform proposals is to be 'neutral.' "); Deborah Paul,
The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform
Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 195 (1997). Sheldon Pollack voices the traditional
counterpoint that federal tax policy has always concerned itself with managing the
national economy. See Sheldon D. Pollack, The Failure of U.S. Tax Policy: Revenue and
Politics, 73 TAX NOTES 341, 341 (1996). This argument, however, is not necessarily
inconsistent with the neutrality point. Much of the effort at management is merely an
attempt to overcome the tax system's inefficient influences on the economy.
85. MAGILL, supra note 63, at 123-24; see also Hendricks, supra note 71, at 1209
("Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress has realized that there are certain
types of business transactions involving the exchange of securities which ... represent
normal business adjustments of a kind which ought not to be interfered with."). One
commentator saw the reorganization provisions as evidence of government's active
participation in cultivating business, rather than its effort to remain a neutral bystander:
The reorganization and exchange provisions were passed to expedite
consolidations and mergers, and the alteration of capital structure. The
government, in its unique position as tax collector, is a major stockholder in
every profit-making corporation; and it is definitely to the government's interest
to see that reorganizations are effected if such reorganization will enable the
corporation to effect operating economies or other legitimate undertakings that
will produce higher net incomes-and hence higher tax revenues for the Bureau
of Internal Revenue.
HOLZMAN, supra note 65, at 68.




reorganizations produced no meaningful change in participation in
the continuing business venture and that imposition of a tax on them
would discourage "necessary business adjustments. "88 In section
202(b) of the 1918 Act, Congress exempted certain transactions from
the general realization requirement in exchanges of property:
When property is exchanged for other property, the
property received in exchange shall for the purpose of
determining gain or loss be treated as the equivalent of cash
to the amount of its fair market value, if any; but when in
connection with the reorganization, merger, or
consolidation of a corporation a person receives in place of
stock or securities owned by him new stock or securities of
no greater aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall
be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock
or securities received shall be treated as taking the place of
the stock, securities, or property exchanged. 9
When the aggregate par or face value of the stock or securities
received exceeded that of the stock or securities exchanged, gain was
recognized in the amount of the excess.90
Although observers welcomed the concept of nonrecognition
treatment for mergers and consolidations, several parties quickly
levied complaints against the reach and scope of the 1918 Act's
reorganization exemption. Essentially, these complaints addressed
the following issues: (1) the failure to define the transactions to
which the nonrecognition treatment applied; (2) the decision to
impose an ill-conceived equivalent par value requirement for
exchanged shares of stock; and (3) the narrow application of the
provision to stock-for-stock exchanges between different
corporations.
First, the statutory provision did not clear up the uncertainty
surrounding the tax treatment of these transactions because it did not
attempt to define the terms "reorganization, merger, or
consolidation," and no regulations or other interpretive guidance
accompanied the Act. Although the concepts of merger and
consolidation were reasonably well developed under the common
law, courts and state legislatures often blurred their meanings, either
by design or through inattention to detail.91 Generally, "merger" is
88. Sandberg, supra note 69, at 99.
89. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1058, 1058 (1919).
90. See id.
91. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, SELECrED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION: SECOND
SERIES 7 n.11 (1938); see also Bisbee, supra note 40, at 406 ("Indeed, taking the legislative
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used to describe a process by which one corporation is completely
absorbed by another corporation that continues in existence and
operates the combined enterprise,92 while "consolidation" is used to
describe the uniting of two corporations into a completely new one.93
In practice, however, many variations on these concepts were
permitted, some of which had little connection to the type of
transaction contemplated in the reorganization exemption. For
instance, because of states' reluctance to give up authority over
corporations operating within their jurisdiction and their inability
under mid-nineteenth century law to exercise authority over
corporations acting outside of their jurisdiction, a consolidation
involving corporations of two different states was held not to result in
the dissolution or merging out of existence of either constituent
corporation.94  Additionally, courts frequently referred to a
transaction that was in form a sale of assets as a merger.95 In United
States v. Republic Steel Corp.,6 the court characterized a sale of assets
for stock followed by a dissolution of the selling corporation and the
distribution of the acquirer's shares to its stockholders as a merger. 97
Moreover, even if the concepts of merger or consolidation could be
sorted out, "reorganization" was itself vague and ill-defined. In one
contemporary treatise, the term was defined as "'the act or process
of organizing again or anew. In the law of corporations, it means
only what the term itself indicates, that a corporation has by some
process organized anew; and yet it implies that some of the features
of the old corporation are retained.' "98 This definition left
practitioners wondering which features of the old corporation could
enactments of New York, New Jersey, Delaware and those of the Federal Government
dealing with national banks as examples, only New York uses the words aptly.").
92- See WALTER CHADWICK NOYES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS § 11, at 15 (1902); PAUL, supra note 91, at 7 n.11. Of
course, in the non-legal environment, the term "merger" is much more broadly defined to
include the purchase of assets and the creation of a holding company. See Lackman, supra
note 46, at 551.
93. See Collinsville Nat'l Bank v. Esau, 176 P. 514, 516 (Okla. 1918); PAUL, supra note
91, at 7 n.11.
94. See NOYES, supra note 92, § 102 at 161 (citing Racine R.R. Co. v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 49 Ill. 331, 348 (1868) (noting that "[w]hile [a consolidation of an Illinois and
Wisconsin corporation] created a community of stock and of interest between the two
companies, it did not convert them into one company, in the same way, and to the same
degree, that might follow a consolidation of two companies within the same State")).
95. See Comment, supra note 40, at 107.
96. 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
97. See id. at 120.
98. Fahey, supra note 64, at 937 n.16 (quoting 8 THOMPSON ON CORPORATIONS
§ 5960 (3d ed. 1927)).
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be retained and which needed to be scrapped in the reorganizing
process. Such uncertainty meant that the provision failed to alleviate
taxpayers' concerns over the taxability of their transactions.
A second complaint levied against the reorganization exemption
was that it only applied to exchanges of stock or securities of equal
aggregate par or face value-an indicia of dubious worth. During the
nineteenth century, par value, which represents the amount fully paid
in to capital from the sale of stock or securities, was one of the few
kernels of information publicly available on a business corporation.99
The concept appears to have originated in the custom of stating on
the stock certificate the amount contributed by the holder to the
corporation."° Lay investors and creditors were led to believe that
the corporation, through the issuance of its shares of stock, held cash
and property in an amount equal to the aggregate par value of the
shares.10 1 This was often not true, though, because the capital stock
of many corporations was literally flooded with "watered" stock.'
In many cases, state corporation laws either did not require full
payment for a company's shares or provided no penalty for the
failure to adhere to such a requirement. 03 Furthermore, early
attempts to require all subscriptions to be made in cash, most notably
by New York in 1848, were soon abandoned in favor of provisions
permitting payment in the form of labor or property-consideration
that easily could be overvalued.Y As early as 1892, a report was
issued by a special committee of the New York Bar Association
recommending a form of no-par stock which would, according to the
report, "relieve any possibility of injury to the public from misleading
representations as to the money value of corporate stock."'' 0 The
recommendations fell on deaf ears at the time, but were revived two
decades later in 1912 when New York passed the first law in America
permitting the issuance of no-par stock.0 6 Although only five states
99. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 33, at 179.
100. See JOHN R. WILDMAN & WELDON POWELL, CAPITAL STOCK WITHOUT PAR
VALUE 20 (1928).
101. See NORMAN D. LATlN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 469 (2d ed. 1971). Courts
reinforced this belief. See Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 153 (1881) (stating that a
creditor could enforce payment of the balance of the unpaid par value against the
individual shareholders).
102. Watered stock is stock issued at a discount from par value or distributed as a
bonus to promoters without collecting any cash. See LATTIN, supra note 101, at 472.
103. See id. at 469-70.
104. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 514-15 (1985);
WILDMAN & POWELL, supra note 100, at 21.
105. WILDMAN & POWELL, supra note 100, at 23-24.
106. See id. at 25-27. The concept of no par stock had its origin in Germany, where it
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had followed New York's lead by the time the first reorganization
provision was adopted in 1918, seventeen more states adopted such
provisions between 1918 and 1921.1° Louis Marshall noted in 1919
that" '[i]t has now become the usual thing for corporations which are
honestly managed to issue their stock without par value.' "108 For two
companies to have stock of the same or similar par value would
require an arbitrary and formalistic coincidence unrelated to the aim
of the reorganization provisions to exempt exchanges of stock having
equivalent value.109 In Eisner v. Macomber,"0 the Supreme Court
officially recognized the irrelevance of par value when it held that a
stock dividend was merely an increase in the number of shares with a
concomitant decrease in the value of each share, despite the fact that
the newly distributed stock held the same $100 par value as the
original shares."' Thus, it was clear almost immediately after passage
of the 1918 Act's reorganization exemption that its reliance on an
anachronistic feature of state corporate law made it arbitrary and
unusable."
2
A final critique of the reorganization exemption was that it was
limited to stock-for-stock exchanges among different corporations
even though many other transactions seemed to fall under the
popular conception of a reorganization. In the Secretary of the
Treasury's Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, he acknowledged this
criticism, writing that "[i]t has been suggested that there are other
similar transactions in which it is difficult to determine the gain or
loss in the absence of an actual sale and which should be treated in
was permitted in mining corporations as early as 1865. See id. at 22-23.
107. See BASKIN & MiRANTI, supra note 33, at 180 n.21; WILDMAN & POWELL, supra
note 100, at 27-28.
108. WILDMAN & POWELL, supra note 100, at 29 (quoting Louis Marshall, in Frederick
H. Hurdman, Capital Stock of No Par Value, 28 J. Accr. 246,247 (1919)).
109. See PAUL, supra note 8, at 18.
110. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
111. See id. at 211; BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 33, at 182; MAGILL, supra note 63,
at 31.
112 See Posin, supra note 31, at 1348; Sandberg, supra note 69, at 102 ("The 1918
statute was of little aid to taxpayers because of the curious stress it placed on par values.
It was also probably unconstitutional in so far as it may have been construed to tax
increased par values in reorganizations involving no constitutionally realized income.").
Although clear to commentators, the failings of the par value standard were not so
obvious to members of Congress. One senator, convinced that par value was the only
measure of equivalent value in a merger or consolidation, argued during the debates over
the Revenue Act of 1921 that the removal of the requirement that the shares in a
reorganization be of equal par value "ought to be designated a law for the purpose of
pumping water into securities, for that is what it amounts to." 61 CONG. REc. 6562 (1921)
(statement of Sen. Jones).
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the same manner in connection with the reorganization, merger, or
consolidation of a corporation.""' 3 Experience had demonstrated
that business transactions covered a much broader spectrum than
envisioned under the 1918 Act. A series of cases arose under pre-
1918 Revenue Acts, each eventually ending up at the Supreme Court,
in which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue asserted that
relatively minor exchanges and reorganizations of single enterprises
constituted taxable events."4  In United States v. Phellis,"5 for
example, the E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company, a New
Jersey corporation, transferred all of its assets to a new Delaware
company created with a higher capitalization in exchange for the
stock of the new corporation." 6 The New Jersey corporation then
distributed the shares in the Delaware corporation to its stockholders
as a dividend." 7 The Commissioner asserted that income was
realized to the extent of the market value in the new shares." 8 While
the Court of Claims held for the taxpayer," 9 the Supreme Court
reversed in 1921. According to the Court, the fact that the new
corporation was organized under the laws of a different state
distinguished the transaction from a mere reorganization of the same
corporation.120 In a similar case, Rockefeller v. United States,'2'
however, a portion of assets was transferred to a new corporation in
the same state, and the Court held that the transaction was taxable
113. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 65TH CONG., 3D SESS., NOTES ON THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1918: SUBMrITED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, WITHOUT
RECOMMENDATION AT THIS TIME 7-8 (Comm. Print 1919) [hereinafter NOTES ON THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1918], reprinted in 94 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra note 31.
114. See, e.g., Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 541-41 (1925) (holding that
reincorporation was taxable); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1923) (holding that
stock of an operating company exchanged for stock in a holding company that controlled
two corporations controlling all of the operating company's previously undivided assets
was taxable); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1921) (holding that spin-
off of a portion of the assets of one corporation to a corporation controlled by its
stockholders was taxable); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 175 (1921) (holding that
reincorporation of a corporation in another state was taxable). In Weiss v. Steam, 265
U.S. 242 (1924), the Court held that a transaction was not taxable where the stockholders
received stock in a new corporation in the same state with no differences except the
infusion of cash from a lending institution. See id at 252.
115. 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
116. See id. at 165-67.
117. See id at 166-67.
118. See id. at 168.
119. Phellis v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl. 157,176 (1921).
120. See Phellis, 257 U.S. at 175. Today, this transaction might be effected as an "F"
reorganization involving "a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one
corporation, however effected." I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) (West Supp. 1998).
121. 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
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because the stockholders became owners of two separate
corporations." In both cases, no exchange of shares took place, and
neither transaction would have obtained relief through the
application of the 1918 Act's reorganization exemption. Given these
and other real world examples to which the reorganization exemption
apparently offered little relief, observers sought to increase
dramatically the scope of the reorganization exemption from the
paradigm stock-for-stock transaction. According to the Secretary,
[t]he following four classes of transactions have been urged
as proper additional exceptions to the general rule laid
down in section 202(b):
1. When the market value of the property received
can not be satisfactorily determined.
2. When property is exchanged in return for all or
substantially all of the stock of a corporation.
3. When property is exchanged between
corporations affiliated within the meaning of section 240.
4. When, in connection with the reorganization of a
corporation or partnership, one corporation or partnership
exchanges property with another corporation or partnership
involved in such reorganization, or a person receives in
place of stock or securities owned by him, new stock or
securities.'23
These four proposed transactions were notable not only for their
expansion of the exemption from stock transactions to stock-for-
property transactions, but also for their inclusion of partnership
transactions.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue attempted to address some of
the criticisms of the Act through the issuance of regulations. A 1919
version of Regulation 45 promulgated under the 1918 Act had not
addressed the reorganization issue, but the Bureau amended the
regulation on January 28, 1921, to define the term "reorganization"
to include the following transactions:
(a) the dissolution of corporation B and the sale of its assets
to corporation A, or (b) the sale of its property by B to A
and the dissolution of B, or (c) the sale of the stock of B to
A and the dissolution of B, or (d) the merger of B into A, or
122 See id at 183. Today, this transaction might have been effected as a "D"
reorganization in which one corporation spins off assets to a corporation controlled by its
shareholders in a transaction that qualifies under § 355. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).
123. NOTEs ON THE REVENUE Acr OF 1918, supra note 113, at 8.
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(e) the consolidation of the corporations.124
Although the regulation did not define "merger" or
"consolidation," it did define "reorganization" and it broadened the
scope of the exemption to other transactions such as "cases of
corporate readjustment where stockholders exchange their stock for
the stock of a holding corporation" in which the two corporations are
closely related.' 5 Regulation 45 also addressed the issue of no-par
stock, permitting the amount under local law that a corporation with
no-par stock is required to keep in capital and not impair by the
distribution of dividends to be treated as the aggregate par value of
the corporation's shares.26 Where no such capital was required to be
kept unimpaired, the Regulations conceded that such stock would in
fact have "no greater aggregate par or face value than the stock or
securities exchanged therefor."' 27 Despite the clarifications provided
by Regulation 45, it did not go far enough to improve the workability
of the reorganization provision. As Homer Hendricks noted, "[t]he
1918 provisions were impracticable in operation; the then status of
the law was such as to hamper necessary business adjustments."'"
2. 1921-1934
By 1921, the reorganization exemption's de facto presumption in
favor of taxation appeared particularly out of step with the efforts to
jump-start the nation's economy through tax reform prior to the
"roaring twenties." 9 The 1918 Act's attempt to reduce the tax-
driven obstacles to business reorganizations had failed to achieve its
objective. In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in
September of 1921, Dr. T.S. Adams, an economic advisor to the
Treasury Department,130 argued that "the principal defect of the
124. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1567 (Jan. 28, 1921), reprinted in 134 U.S. REVENUE Acrs,
supra note 31; see also PAUL, supra note 8, at 20 (quoting Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1567).
125. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1567, reprinted in 134 U.S. REVENUE ACTs, supra note 31.
126. See icL
127. Id,
128. Hendricks, supra note 28, at 648 n.1.
129. During the campaign leading up to the 1920 elections, Republicans declared that
"one of the chief needs of the country is the revision of taxation as one way to lower the
cost of living, restore business confidence, and stimulate business enterprise." BLAKEY &
BLAKEY, supra note 50, at 190. One of the principal targets for reform was the excess
profits tax. See id. at 191.
130. Adams has been called the "father of the 1921 Act." Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form
and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11
VA. TAX REV. 349, 383 n.117 (1991). During the period in question, Adams, a professor
of political economy at Yale, was the principal Treasury spokesperson before the Senate
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee on tax legislation and was
1999] 1331
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
present law is in blocking desirable business readjustments.1 31 While
there were other justifications for amending the reorganization
exemption, Dr. Adams reported that "the most important reason
[was that] [a]ll kinds of business readjustments have been stopped"
because of the threat of heavy taxation.132
Economic and business necessity were persuasive rationales for
tax reform in 1921. The end of World War I had led to a drop in the
artificially high prices that had dominated during the previous few
years, and the country found itself in the midst of an economic
downturn in 1920.13 Approximately 20,000 companies went out of
business during 1921, and 4,750,000 persons were unemployed.1 4
According to a House Ways and Means Committee Report
submitted in August of 1921, "the exacting of the present excessive
sums of taxes from the country contributes in no small degree to the
depressing influences under which business and industry in general
are staggering as an aftermath of the World War." 135 The Committee
explained that the financial ravages of war are felt most acutely
"after the cessation of hostilities, at which time the demand for war
supplies terminates, with a resulting shrinkage of values. The Nation
is now passing through the trying period of liquidation and
readjustment. The reduction of the tax burdens is essential to
business recovery." '136
Congress concluded that one component of the effort to reduce
the tax burden on business was to amend the reorganization
exemption to broaden its scope and to clarify its uncertainties.1 37
Under the Revenue Act of 1921, the reorganization exemption no
considered one of the foremost tax and public finance theorists of his day. See Michael J.
Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46
DUKE L.J. 1021,1029-30 (1997).
131. Hearings on H.R. 8245, supra note 81, at 29 (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, advisor
to the Treasury Department).
132. Id. This sentiment was echoed on the floors of Congress. In debates over the
removal of the par value requirement, one senator noted that "when so much
reorganization is going on in the business world, it is thought by all those interested in the
upbuilding of the industries of the country at this time that this is a very helpful
provision." 61 CONG. REC. 6563 (1921) (statement of Sen. Watson).
133. See 1 CHARLEs A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, AMERICA IN MIDPASSAGE 28
(1939); PAUL, supra note 8, at 21; Jensen, supra note 130, at 386 n.126.
134. See Jensen, supra note 130, at 386 n.126.
135. H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 1 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 168.
136. Id.
137. See ROSwELL MAGILL, THE IMPACr OF FEDERAL TAXES 130 (1943) ("[I]n the
early twenties, Congress regarded business reorganizations as frequently desirable and




longer depended on the par value of the stock involved in the
exchange and included a definition of "reorganization" that was
designed to address some of the previous concerns. Section 202(c)(2)
provided for nonrecognition of gain or loss
[w]hen in the reorganization of one or more
corporations a person receives in place of any stock or
securities owned by him, stock or securities in a corporation
a party to or resulting from such reorganization. The word
"reorganization," as used in this paragraph, includes a
merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one
corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at
least a majority of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of another corporation, or of substantially
all the properties of another corporation), recapitalization,
or mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of
a corporation, (however effected) ....
In discussing this amended provision, the House Ways and
Means Committee explained that "[p]robably no part of the present
income-tax law has been productive of so much uncertainty and
litigation or has more seriously interfered with those business
readjustments which are peculiarly necessary under existing
conditions."' 3 9 Moreover, one byproduct of the economic downturn
was that parties were using reorganizations to recognize losses. The
Committee noted that the provision, "if adopted, will, by removing a
source of grave uncertainty, not only permit business to go forward
with the readjustments required by existing conditions but will also
considerably increase the revenue by preventing taxpayers from
taking colorable losses in wash sales and other fictitious
exchanges."'140
Congress further liberalized the reorganization exemption in the
Revenue Act of 1924, a monument to comprehensiveness and detail,
under the guidance of A.W. Gregg, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of the Treasury.'4' First, the 1924 Act expanded the definition of
reorganization to include spin-offs and split-offs.' 42 Representative
138. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 227,230.
139. H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 10, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 175. The Senate
Finance Committee issued an almost identical statement. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11
(1921) ("Probably no part of the present income tax law has been productive of so much
uncertainty or has more seriously interfered with necessary business readjustments."),
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 188.
140. H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 10, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 176.
141. See Posin, supra note 31, at 1350.
142. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(h)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 257 (stating that the
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Green of the House Ways and Means Committee explained to
Congress that this amendment was inserted "to include other usual
forms of corporate reorganization in the advance of business, such as
the splitting of one corporation into two or more corporations, which
I may say under the present law would not be permitted except by
forming two entirely new corporations.,"43 Second, the 1924 Act also
formally extended the exemption from taxation to corporations so
that they received the benefit of nonrecognition of any gain.1 44
Although a Treasury interpretation had concluded that corporations
were exempt under the 1921 Act, the Senate Finance Committee
explained that "[tihe present ruling of the Treasury Department on
this question is of doubtful legality and a statutory provision is most
necessary. "145 This expansion was designed to further remove any
limits placed on business readjustments by the tax law. The House
Ways and Means Committee explained that nonrecognition
treatment was granted in order to permit "ordinary business
transactions" to go forward free from tax constraints, and "[i]f it is
necessary for this reason to exempt from tax the gain realized by the
stockholders, it is even more necessary to exempt from tax the gain
realized by the corporation."'46  Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the 1924 Act refined the definition of reorganization to
make it the exclusive definition for tax purposes. 47 This refinement
term "reorganization means... (B) a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or
both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred"). A "spin-off"
involves a contribution by a corporation of some or all of its assets to another corporation,
followed by a distribution of the stock of that corporation to all of the first corporation's
existing shareholders as a dividend. See 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7, § 1001. A
"split-off" is the same transaction as a spin-off except that instead of distributing the new
corporation's stock as a dividend, the stock is distributed to certain of the first
corporation's shareholders in exchange for their stock in the original corporation. See 1
id. The result is two separate corporations with two separate groups of shareholders. See
1 id.
143. 65 CONG. REC. 2429 (1924), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN's LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, at 697 (1938).
144. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(b)(3), 43 Stat. at 256 ("No gain or loss
shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property, in
pursuance of a plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation
a party to the reorganization.").
145. S. REP. No. 68-398, at 14 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 276; see also 11
MERTENS, supra note 29, § 43.02 (noting that the Mellon Bill codified the Treasury's
decision to extend the benefits of nonrecognition to corporations and stockholders);
Sandberg, supra note 69, at 102-03 (same). A regulation promulgated under the 1921 Act
had construed the reorganization provisions so as to exempt corporations as well as their
shareholders. See id. (citing Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1566(b) (1923)).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 13 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 250.
147. The 1924 Act replaced the phrase "the word 'reorganization' includes," with the
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lessened the possibility that taxpayers would rely on general
corporate law as their authority for reorganization status and thus, at
least temporarily, elevated tax law above state corporate law for
determining the taxable status of a reorganization."4
Despite the great improvements made by the 1921 and 1924 Acts
in extending nonrecognition treatment to the typical business
reorganization, the Acts went too far in at least one respect. The
parenthetical clause in section 202(c)(2) of the 1921 Act, which
permitted an acquisition of a majority of a corporation's voting stock
or substantially all of its properties to qualify as a tax-free
reorganization, 149 did not stipulate the consideration required for
such an exchange. Thus, under the terms of the statute, a cash sale of
a corporation's stock or assets could conceivably be classified as a
reorganization-a possibility never contemplated by the drafters of
the original reorganization exemption.50  This "blunder of
draftsmanship" led to confusion not over the treatment of cash
consideration, since other provisions limited the tax benefits of
nonrecognition and carryover basis to exchanges of stock or
securities, but rather over the treatment of short-term notes and
other forms of non-equity securities.' In the congressional debates
over this section, the House held significant discussion over the type
of property transferred to the acquiring corporation in a
reorganization, but directed little attention to the type of
consideration required.52 According to one commentator, the
unarticulated assumption was that any consideration would likely be
paid in stock.153 This assumption was not unreasonable in 1921.
While bonds may have been the dominant class of securities issued
during the nineteenth century, capital-raising techniques had evolved
phrase "the term 'reorganization' means." Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(h)(1), 43
Stat. at 257.
14& See Shores, supra note 27, at 442.
149. See supra text accompanying note 138.
150. See, e.g., Brookes, supra note 9, at 5-6; Sandberg, supra note 69, at 105. A.W.
Gregg, then-special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, issued a statement on the
1924 Act in which, among other things, he reported that the ability to gain nonrecognition
treatment in a sale of property for cash in the context of a contribution to a controlled
corporation "'does not represent the intent of Congress, which was to exempt the gain
only if the consideration consisted of stock or securities, with the result that it constituted
a mere change in the form of ownership of the property.'" MILLER ET AL., supra note 77,
at 397 (quoting from the Gregg Statement).
151. Brookes, supra note 9, at 5-6.
152 See 61 CONG. REC. 6549-50, 6561-69 (1921).
153. See Faber, supra note 7, at 241-42.
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significantly at the beginning of the twentieth century.154 As
discussed earlier, common stocks had become the preferred method
of investing by the 1920s. 5 Corporate finance was a nimble field,
however, and investment bankers soon devised short-term debt
instruments to take advantage of the reorganization exemption's
seeming invitation to treat sales as tax-free reorganizations.'56 The
parenthetical clause served as a significant source of confusion during
the more than ten years it remained part of the reorganization
provisions.17
In an attempt to limit this gaping hole in the statute, the
Treasury Department took the position that the parenthetical clause
was modified by the terms "merger or consolidation," and, therefore,
any transaction described by the clause must resemble a merger or
consolidation.58 Because those terms were not uniformly defined,
however, it was not immediately clear to what extent transactions
described by the parenthetical clause were thus limited. One possible
implication was that the transferring corporations must be dissolved,
as a merged or consolidated corporation might be under the common
law definitions. 5 9 The Court, however, rejected this argument, even
though the argument received some support at the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and before the Board of Tax Appeals. 60
Ultimately, the Court upheld the Treasury Department's
interpretation by applying the somewhat looser requirements that the
shareholders of the target corporation retain a continuity of
proprietary interest in the venture and that the acquiring corporation
continue the target's business in its modified corporate form. 6'
These requirements were "based on the traditional conception of a
merger or consolidation as a union of corporate assets into one
154. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 33, at 160, 167.
155. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
156. See Brookes, supra note 9, at 6 ("[I]n due course sales occurred by corporations of
substantially all their assets to other corporations for the short-term notes of the latter,
and the question was raised whether the gain was entitled to non-recognition under the tax
statutes."); Comment, Corporate Reorganization to Avoid Payment of Income Tax, 45
YALE L.J. 134, 134 (1935).
157. See Sandberg, supra note 69, at 104-05.
158. See iL at 106.
159. See id.
160. See ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK 168 (1935);
Sandberg, supra note 69, at 106; see also G. & K. Mfg. Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 389, 391
(1935) (holding that dissolution is not required to receive nonrecognition treatment);
Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935) (same); John A. Nelson Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 374,377 (1935) (same).




organism, the owners of each of the old corporations becoming
together the owners of the new.""16
The requirement that a reorganization be characterized by both
continuity of shareholder interest and continuity of business
enterprise was first imposed by Circuit Judge Augustus Hand in
Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner.6 In this case, the Cortland
Company entered into an agreement with the Deyo Company in 1925
whereby the Cortland Company transferred substantially all of its
assets to the Deyo Company in exchange for $53,070 in cash and
$159,750 in six unsecured, short-term promissory notes payable at
specified intervals over the next fourteen months."6 The Cortland
Company liquidated soon after the completion of the transaction and
distributed the proceeds and all remaining assets to its two sole
stockholders.16 The issue presented was whether the transaction
constituted a taxable sale or a tax-free reorganization.'66 The court
noted that the agreement contemplated a sale in which Cortland's
shareholders would sever their interest in the business. 67 The only
way the transfer could be characterized as a reorganization was if the
parenthetical clause permitted any transfer of "substantially all the
properties" of one corporation to another to be a reorganization
regardless of the consideration received in return. 68  The court
determined, after a review of the statutory and common law
definitions of the terms "merger" and "consolidation," that a mere
sale was not sufficient to fall within the statutory exemption. 69
Although state statutes differed as to whether dissolution was
required, the court concluded that "the general purpose of them all
has been to continue the interests of those owning enterprises, which
have been merged or consolidated, in another corporate form."17
Thus, "there must be some continuity of interest on the part of the
transferor corporation or its stockholders in order to secure
exemption. Reorganization presupposes continuance of business
under modified corporate form.""' Since the short-term promissory
162. Sandberg, supra note 69, at 108.
163. 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932).
164. See id. at 938.
165. See id. According to the court's estimates, 91.5% of Cortland's assets were
transferred and only 8.5% were retained. See id.
166. See id. at 937.
167. See id- at 939.
168. Id
169. See id at 939-40.
170. Id at 939.
171. Id. at 940.
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notes were insufficient to demonstrate such continuity of interest or
business, the court deemed the transaction a taxable sale. 72
These judicially imposed requirements were soon adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner.173 In this case, two commonly owned companies,
Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Company and Citizens' Ice & Storage
Company, entered into an agreement in 1926 for the sale of
substantially all of their assets to the National Public Service
Corporation.74 Of the $1.4 million purchase price, $400,000 was to
be paid in cash with the balance to be represented by three secured
promissory notes earning interest at 6%, each payable at specified
intervals within the next six months. 7 5 Following the transfer, the
cash and notes were distributed to the stockholders and the target
corporations were dissolved. 76 The Court rejected the taxpayer's
contention that this was a tax-free reorganization, holding that "to be
within the exemption the seller must acquire an interest in the affairs
of the purchasing company more definite than that incident to
ownership of its short-term purchase-money notes. ''177
An additional protection was introduced by the Second Circuit
in 1934 and approved by the Supreme Court a year later in the form
of a business purpose requirement. In Helvering v. Gregory,178 Mrs.
Gregory, the sole stockholder of a holding company, the United
Mortgage Company, desired to sell the holding company's stock in a
subsidiary, the Monitor Securities Corporation, at a significant
profit. 9 If the holding company sold the shares and then distributed
the proceeds to Mrs. Gregory, however, both the holding company
and Mrs. Gregory would have had to pay tax on the gain on sale. To
avoid this result, Mrs. Gregory formed a new corporation ("Averill"),
caused United Mortgage Company to transfer the Monitor Securities
stock to Averill in a reorganization, and then liquidated Averill to
receive the Monitor Securities stock.180 Because of Mrs. Gregory's
ability to allocate a portion of her basis in the United Mortgage stock
to the Averill stock, she was able to deduct a larger basis from the
securities received upon liquidation and thus reduce her capital gains
172. See id.
173. 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
174. See id at 463-64.
175. See id. at 464.
176. See id at 465.
177. Id at 470.
178. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).




taxes upon sale.' Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court,
reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals"8 that the
transaction was immune from taxation under the literal terms of the
statute. According to Judge Hand, given the original intent to aid
necessary business adjustments, "the underlying presupposition is
plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane
to the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident,
egregious to its prosecution. To dodge the shareholders' taxes is not
one of the transactions contemplated as corporate
'reorganizations.' ",183 The Supreme Court, in upholding the lower
court's decision, appeared to distinguish between a prohibition on tax
avoidance motives and a requirement of a business motive-
approving only the latter."8 According to the Court, the statutory
language permitting a tax-free transfer of assets "means a transfer
made 'in pursuance of a plan of reorganization' of corporate business;
and not a transfer of assets by one corporation to another in
pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of either, as
plainly is the case here."85 As one observer complained in 6olorful
fashion, the "business purpose" requirement, if applied as a test of
subjective intent, "[was] all embracing, like a London fog." '186 The
firestorm started by the Gregory Court's broad requirement of a
business motive separate from a plan to reduce business taxes was,
however, as much a function of the tax bar's growing reliance on tax
avoidance techniques as on the questionable basis for the doctrine
itselff 87
Notwithstanding the development of such judicial protections,
the abuse of the parenthetical clause's shoddy draftsmanship by
taxpayers seeking to characterize sales as tax-free reorganizations led
many to question whether a reorganization exemption was
appropriate at all. According to the Treasury Department, because
of the 1924 Act's attempt to legislate the minute details of the
reorganization exemption, "astute lawyers could and did arrange
181. See Fahey, supra note 64, at 938; Sandberg, supra note 69, at 111.
182. See Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1933), rev'd sub nom., Helvering v.
Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
183. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811.
184. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); see also Sandberg, supra note
69, at 112 (arguing that as long as a business motive exists, a tax avoidance motive is
irrelevant).
185. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 (quoting Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(g), 45 Stat.
791, 818).
186. Satterlee, supra note 28, at 689.
187. See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 8, at 125-26; Comment, supra note 156, at 140.
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what were really sales to take the technical form of a reorganization
within the statutory definition, with resultant loss of revenue."188
Faced with such problems, a House Ways and Means Subcommittee
conducted a study on tax avoidance and recommended that the
reorganization and exchange provisions be abolished so as to simplify
the revenue provisions and "close the door to one of the most
prevalent methods of tax avoidance." 189  According to the
Subcommittee, the abuses outweighed the advantages of retaining
nonrecognition treatment. 9 The Subcommittee estimated that such
a move would result in an increase in tax revenues of at least $18
million annually. 9'
Despite agreeing with the Subcommittee's basic premise,
Treasury advised against the abolition of the reorganization
exemption."9 One seemingly plausible argument for retaining the
exemption was that the economic climate had changed since 1921
188. STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY REGARDING THE
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS
RELATIVE TO METHODS OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE AND EVASION OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGETHER VITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION
AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF, 73D CONG., 2D SESS. 9 (Comm. Print 1933) [hereinafter
STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY], reprinted in 100 U.S.
REVENUE ACTS, supra note 31.
189. SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73D CONG., 2D SESS.,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE 8 (Comm. Print 1933),
reprinted in 100 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra note 31; see also PAUL, supra note 8, at 37
(stating that the committee recommendation was in the interest of the "twin phantoms" of
tax simplification and the prevention of tax avoidance). In cases of hardship, the
Subcommittee proposed permitting the postponement of payment rather than the deferral
of tax liability altogether. See George Grayson Tyler & John P. Ohl, The Revenue Act of
1934, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 607, 625 (1935). Tyler was the former assistant to Roswell Magill,
Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, and Ohl was a staff member in the office of the
General Counsel to the Secretary of the Treasury. One of the most basic forms of tax
avoidance cited by the Subcommittee was that deferral often turned into avoidance when
a corporation waited to sell gain assets received in a reorganization during a loss year for
the corporation, effectively avoiding tax altogether. See SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON
PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE 8-9 (Comm. Print 1933), reprinted in 100 U.S.
REVENUE ACTS, supra note 31.
190. See SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73D CONG., 2D
SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE 8-9 (Comm. Print
1933), reprinted in 100 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra note 31; see also Comment, supra note
156, at 140 n.41 (citing another study on revenue revision in which the Subcommittee
concluded that "the abuses under the present policy far outweigh the advantages").
191. See SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73D CONG., 2D
SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PREVENTION OF TAx AVOIDANCE 9 (Comm. Print
1933), reprinted in 100 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra note 31.
192. See STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, supra note 188,
at 10.
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when the reorganization exemption was seen as a vital aid to business
recovery. After the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing onset
of the Great Depression, many profitable enterprises became loss
corporations seeking to recognize such losses. The Acting Treasury
Secretary noted that since many reorganizations were being effected
by struggling corporations, "[t]he immediate result of abolishing the
reorganization provisions would be to permit the thousands of
bondholders and stockholders of such organizations to establish
losses, even though they obtain and retain securities in a new
enterprise which is substantially the same as their original
investment. '" 193  In fact, Congress heard testimony that several
reorganizations pending at the time that the House Subcommittee's
recommendations were being debated would give rise to loss
recognition if they were made taxable.94 The problem with this
argument, however, was that the Revenue Act of 1934 adopted limits
on the recognition of capital losses that effectively eliminated any
incentive to recognize losses through reorganizations. 195
Furthermore, given the technical hoops set up in the 1934 Act for
reorganizations to receive nonrecognition treatment, this argument
ignored the likelihood that many taxpayers would fall outside the
statute and be forced to realize their losses under other provisions of
current law.196 The more persuasive reason offered by the Acting
Secretary for the preservation of the exemption was that, in the case
of many business transactions, the exemption was consistent with
Congress's understanding of realization and it was beneficial to
business readjustments. 197  Furthermore, the fact that many
reorganizations then occurring involved loss corporations meant that
the exemption did not contribute greatly to tax avoidance. 98 In any
193. Id. Although this argument was not made at the time, a taxpayer's ability to
create losses is currently cited as one of the failings of a realization test for income
taxation. See Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 97 TAX
NOTES 967, 969 (1997).
194. See 78 CONG. REc. 2512 (1934) (letter from H. Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the
Treasury, to Rep. Robert L. Doughton, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and
Means (Feb. 12, 1934)).
195. See Sandberg, supra note 69, at 121.
196. See id.
197. See STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, supra note 188,
at 10.
198. See Revenue Revision 1934: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways &
Means, 73d Cong. 76 (1933) (statement of Roswell Magill, Assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasury Department) ("[O]ur suggestion is we do not think you will lose much in the
next year by leaving things in the way they are, in view of the fact that there are not many
reorganizations going through now which would show a profit.").
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event, Treasury recommended revising the provisions rather than
abolishing them.
B. 1934 and the Institution of a Statutory Merger Requirement
In the Revenue Act of 1934, Congress undertook the first
wholesale revision of the reorganization provisions in a decade. 99
The goal was to "stop the known cases of tax avoidance," while at the
same time permitting "legitimate reorganizations, required in order
to strengthen the financial condition of the corporation" to continue
without tax.2"0 The House Ways and Means Committee therefore
proposed cutting back on the number of transactions in which a
reorganization exemption was available. Under the House proposal,
the definition of reorganization was designed to "conform more
closely to the general requirements of corporation law. ' 2 1 Thus,
under this proposal, only "(1) statutory mergers and consolidations;
(2) transfers to a controlled corporation, 'control' being defined as an
80 per cent ownership; and (3) changes in the capital structure or
form of organization" would be classified as reorganizations.2° This
first appearance of a statutory merger requirement reflected both a
federal embrace of state corporate law protections and a suspicion of
the role business combinations played in the onset of the stock
market crash and the Great Depression.
1. Use of State Corporation Laws to Protect Against Abuse
The desire to conform the reorganization provisions with
corporation law by exempting only mergers effected under the
authority of a state or the federal government was a seemingly
redundant exercise. As James Fahey pointed out soon after the
requirement was enacted, "[i]t is well established that corporations
cannot lawfully consolidate or merge without the consent of the
legislature from which they received their charters. '23 Underlying
199. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,48 Stat. 680.
200. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 13, 14 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 564; see
also Dana Latham, Taxation of Capital Gains, Tax Avoidance and Other Problems Under
the Revenue Act of 1934, 23 CAL. L. REV. 30, 41 n.39 (1934) (suggesting that the statutory
merger requirement was designed to stem the loss of taxes caused by reorganizations
during the Depression).
201. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 14, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 564.
202 Id. The first requirement conforms to the present day A reorganization. See
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A). The second requirement conforms to an organization of a new
corporation under § 351. See id. § 351(c)(2). The third requirement conforms to an E
reorganization. See id. § 368(a)(1)(E).
203. Fahey, supra note 64, at 947; see also ARNOLD R. BAAR & GEORGE MAURICE
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this doctrine was the long-held belief that a corporation is a creature
of the state and derives its power and authority, including any right to
merge or consolidate, through a grant or concession by the state.204
In Roman times, religious bodies and feudal organizations such as
communes and guilds were "rivals" of the state in its claim to
complete sovereignty. 5 In order to bolster its claims, the State
sought to treat all such lesser bodies as " 'conjurations' and
conspiracies," unless they operated under an express grant of
authority from the state. 6 England eventually relied on similar
principles to justify its regulation and use of private trading
companies for public diplomatic functions.2 0 7 Although this theory
was not as prevalent by the early twentieth century as it once was, it
was still a part of the intellectual fabric when the reorganization
MORRIS, HIDDEN TAXEs IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 32 (1935) (noting that it
was only by statute that corporations had any power to consolidate or merge, even before
the 1934 Act); George S. Hills, Definition- "Reorganization" Under the Revenue Act of
1934, 12 TAX MAG. 411, 411 (1934) ("The insertion of the word 'statutory' before 'merger
or consolidation' adds nothing to the intentions or requirements of corporation law.");
Taylor, supra note 40, at 695 (noting that corporate combinations were not allowed at
common law, but only through state enabling statutes); Comment, supra note 156, at 141
("Since a merger or consolidation is necessarily statutory, Congress has here not
introduced any additional restriction, but has merely indicated more clearly the meaning
to be attached to 'merger or consolidation.' "); Comment, supra note 40, at 108 (describing
an attempt at merger or consolidation without such authorization as an "absolute
nullity"). One commentator has speculated that the insertion of the term "statutory" was
intended to free courts from the task of explaining why all mergers had to be effected
pursuant to a state or federal statute. See HOLZMAN, supra note 65, at 67.
204. See BAAR & MORRIS, supra note 203, at 32 ("[I]t is only by virtue of a statute that
corporations have any authority to merge or consolidate. Corporations are created, live
and cease to exist, solely by statutory authority. Any changes in their structure which
affect their continued existence or their demise are, consequently, matters of statutory
prescription."). See generally WILLIAM L. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1, at 3 (2d ed. 1907) (describing a corporation as a "mere creature of
law"); HORWITZ, supra note 35, at 112 (noting that this state-created conception began
with the archetypal eighteenth-century American corporation as a municipality charged
with carrying out public functions and only slowly developed to assume private interests);
NOYES, supra note 92, § 11, at 15 (stating that mergers and consolidations are merely
transfers of property and rights from one corporation to another "in existence with the
[surviving corporation's] original powers").
205. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655,666 (1926).
206. Id.; see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 2 (1970) ("To
maintain central authority over diverse potential competitors, the Roman state and the
church at times found it expedient to declare that legally effective corporate being
required an act of the civil or religious sovereign-or at least a license.").
207. See GERARD CARL HENDERSON, TIE POSITION OF THE FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1918); HURST, supra note 206,
at 2-4; LATrIN, supra note 101, at 174-75.
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provisions were first adopted. In 1918, Professor Ernst Freund
observed that "there is no capacity to act as a body corporate without
positive authorization. 2 08 Since a consolidation involved the creation
of a new corporation and both a merger and a consolidation involved
the transfer of one or more corporation's franchises to another
corporation, legislative authorization was seen as a prerequisite for
according legal effect to the change.
Applying this doctrine, courts refused to recognize or give effect
to mergers lacking statutory or legislative authorization. In Pearce v.
Madison & Indianapolis Railroad Co.,20 9 the Supreme Court rejected
the claims of an assignee of certain notes who argued that since the
notes were signed by the joint management of a formerly
consolidated railroad corporation, each corporation was liable on the
notes after the consolidated corporation separated.210 According to
the Court, the original execution of the notes was ultra vires since
"[tihere was no authority of law to consolidate these corporations,
and to place both under the same management, or to subject the
capital of the one to answer for the liabilities of the other. 211
Similarly, in Topeka Paper Co. v. Oklahoma Publishing Co.,211 the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that because the attempted
consolidation of two corporations to form The Oklahoma City
Publishing Company was "not authorized by any provision of the
statutes," a creditor could maintain its claim against one of the
corporations.1  According to the court, "[i]n the absence of any
statute authorizing the consolidation which was attempted, the legal
rights of the creditors of the defendant corporation and its legal
liabilities and those of the directors remain the same. ' 214 Thus, a
legislative authorization requirement appeared to be redundant
because a merger or consolidation was only legal if effected pursuant
to some sovereign authority.
One distinction between the statutory merger and an ordinary
merger, however, was that the term "statutory merger" excluded
208. ERNsT FREUND, STANDARDS IN AMERICAN LEGISLATION 39 (1917), reprinted in
Dewey, supra note 205, at 667.
209. 62 U.S. (1 How.) 441 (1859).
210. See id. at 442.
211. Id. at 443.
212. 54 P. 455 (Okla. 1898).
213. Id. at 456.
214. Id.; see also Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Georgia, 92 U.S. 665, 675 (1876)
(holding that in a merger, the surviving corporation takes the assets of the merged




mergers effected pursuant to authority contained in a corporation's
charter or some other non-statutory legislative authorization.215 As a
treatise writer noted at the turn of the century, "[a] grant of power to
consolidate contained in the charters of the constituent corporations
... furnishes undoubted authority" to consummate the transaction.216
In the first half of the nineteenth century, corporations were created
through a special act of the legislature outlining the rights, powers,
and obligations of the new corporation, including the right to merge
or consolidate.217 Originally, the vast majority of such "special
charters" were granted for quasi-public enterprises such as bridge,
canal, or turnpike companies.218
Because of the public benefit associated with such ventures, their
special charters were often accompanied by a grant of explicit or
implicit subsidies 19 While these special charters were necessary
during the development of the country and its infrastructure, they
came to be seen by Jacksonians as " 'special privileges' or 'partial
laws' that violated 'equal rights,' corrupted state legislators, and
created new forms of aristocracy."'  State legislatures turned to
215. See Fahey, supra note 64, at 947 ("The wording of Part (A) indicates that only
those consolidations or mergers which have been carried out pursuant to 'statutory'
authority, as contrasted with a charter provision, are included within the scope of this
clause of the definition.").
216. NOYES, supra note 92, § 20, at 27.
217. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 104, at 188; HAROLD F. LUSK, BUSINESS LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND CASES 694 (3d ed. 1946). Initially, special acts were sought at the time of
merger or consolidation. See Comment, supra note 40, at 109 ("At the time the merger
and consolidation device originated, corporations were created solely by special legislative
acts. Consequently, the earliest sources of the power to merge or consolidate were also
special acts."). Soon, however, incorporators began to plan ahead and insert provisions in
their special charters authorizing the merger or consolidation of the corporation on their
own initiative. See icL
218. Professor Willard Hurst found that nearly two-thirds of the 317 state special
charters granted for specific lines of business between 1780 and 1801 were for
transportation businesses such as inland navigation, turnpikes, and toll bridges, 20% for
banks or insurance companies, and 10% were for the provision of local services such as
water or other utilities. See HURST, supra note 206, at 17. Less than 4%, however, were
for general business or manufacturing corporations. See id.
219. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,
76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1609 (1988).
220. Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Ante Bellum Political
Culture, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1893 (1989) [hereinafter Incorporating the Republic]
(citations omitted); see also Taylor, supra note 40, at 750 (noting that such acts were
perceived as the products of political favoritism); Note, The Corporation and the
Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833, 1844
(1981) (finding that special charters came to be viewed as corrupt opportunities to convey
significant economic benefits on the few). This attitude extended to those outside the
Jacksonian movement. Amasa Walker, a Free Soiler and Republican, argued at the
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853 that "this system of corporations is
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general incorporation statutes, which served as enabling acts and thus
did not require the passage of a special act of incorporation, in order
to open up the incorporation process to more people.221 The special
charter system was scrapped or limited by several states to avoid
what Justice Brandeis referred to as "the scandals and favoritism
incident to special incorporation."' This did not mean, however,
that no special charters were issued, or that corporations formed
under special charters did not continue to operate well into the
twentieth century. Although the first truly "general" incorporation
statute was enacted as early as 1837 by Connecticut' and general
incorporation statutes began to dominate after the 1870s,224 special
charters were still issued in many states when the corporate aims
could not be attained under the general laws.m The issuance of
special charters was often used to permit certain corporations to
obtain advantages not provided for in the general incorporation and
merger statutes. In 1892, for instance, New York issued a special
charter to the General Electric Co. to prevent its reincorporation in
New Jersey, a state with a more favorable corporation law, and, as
late as 1952, a special charter was issued to a variable annuity
company, the College Retirement Equities Fund. 26 Moreover,
unincorporated companies and associations, such as business trusts,
joint-stock companies, and insurance companies, could only rely on
their charters as a source of authority for their right to merge or
nothing more nor less than a moneyed feudalism." ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE
LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL
WAR 22 (1970).
221. See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Comment, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit:
The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA.
L. REv. 603,611 n.36 (1991).
222. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
223. See Act of June 10, 1837, ch. 63, 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49. Connecticut's act was
the first to apply to corporations formed for "any lawful purpose" rather than for a
specific industry. Incorporating the Republic, supra note 220, at 1883 & n.2. New York
and New Jersey both enacted limited statutes in the beginning of the nineteenth century
for the purpose of authorizing general incorporation in manufacturing industries. See
Taylor, supra note 40, at 751.
224. See HURST, supra note 206, at 37; Davis, supra note 221, at 613 n.47.
225. See HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 17 (1961); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 104, at 512 (noting that
special charters were not supposed to be issued unless corporate goals could not be
realized otherwise); HURST, supra note 206, at 33 (noting that corporation law was
primarily a form of social regulation of business behavior).
226. See HENN, supra note 225, at 17 n.14; see also Bisbee, supra note 40, at 404
(reporting that a corporate client of Bisbee's firm that had been organized in the
eighteenth century continued to seek special legislative authority for actions that were
otherwise covered by the general incorporation act).
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consolidate. While the Revenue Acts had generally taxed such
associations as corporations, state merger statutes rarely provided
them a right to engage in mergers or consolidations.'2 7 Instead, such
powers were normally included within the association's charter.' As
one contemporary treatise observed, "[i]f it be insisted, therefore,
that mergers and consolidations are inherently statutory, such
enterprises as associations which lack authority, under state laws, to
merge or consolidate, could not reorganize by such route."2 9
Permitting statutory mergers, but not mergers effected pursuant
to authority granted in a corporation's charter or mergers conforming
to a common law tax definition, to qualify for nonrecognition
treatment reflected a general congressional sentiment regarding the
significance of state corporation law in the regulation of mergers and
consolidations. Historically, fundamental corporate changes required
strict compliance with certain statutory restrictions before receiving a
State's blessing. Such restrictive conditions included a requirement
that the parties engage in the same or similar businesses, that the
target shareholders acquire an equity or other permanent interest in
the acquirer, and that the target corporation dissolve after the
completion of the merger or consolidation2 0 These corporate law
requirements became the basis for the doctrines that there must be
continuity of business enterprise, continuity of shareholder interest,
and dissolution of the "merged" entity in order to qualify for tax-free
treatment under the parenthetical clause?31 These doctrines were
premised on the theory that a transaction did not resemble or partake
of the nature of a merger or consolidation if it did not follow those
three underlying corporate law requirements for a merger or
consolidation.232
227. See BAAR & MORRIS, supra note 203, at 33.
228. See id.
229. Id. Baar and Morris suggested that one possible answer to the dilemma of the
unincorporated association was to interpret the "however effected" language, as courts
had done before, as an expansion of the technical reorganization to cover de facto mergers
and consolidation. See id. (discussing the language of what is now I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F)
(West Supp. 1998)).
230. See David S. Miller, The Devolution and Inevitable Extinction of the Continuity of
Interest Doctrine, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 187, 192 (1996); Taylor, supra note 40, at 760, 762
(discussing the similar business and stock consideration requirements).
231. See, e.g., Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939-40 (2d Cir.
1932) (noting that the "general purpose" of all state merger statutes "has been to continue
the interests of those owning enterprises, which have been merged or consolidated, in
another corporate form" and that the reorganization provisions must be read in light of
these provisions); supra notes 159-87 (discussing corporate law requirements).
232. See BAAR & MORRIS, supra note 203, at 29; Satterlee, supra note 28, at 644-45.
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Although courts initially applied all three doctrines to determine
the tax treatment of a transaction,233 the Supreme Court eventually
rejected the dissolution requirement in a series of cases by allowing
tax-free treatment of asset or stock transfers that stopped short of
technical or "true" mergers or consolidations.2 Dissolution was still
thought to be required, however, in the context of a statutory merger
or consolidation.235 Thus, when adopted, the statutory merger
requirement was a way of forcing dissolution in transactions
attempting to qualify for the more lenient A reorganization
treatment.
In addition to providing a baseline definition of merger or
consolidation, state corporation laws were thought to provide certain
protections for dissenting shareholders and creditors of the merged
corporations236 Dissenting shareholders have always been accorded
special protections by the common law. The former rule of
unanimous shareholder consent had meant that no stockholder of the
target corporation, no matter how small his interest in the company,
could be forced to become a stockholder of the surviving
corporation.?7 When the requirement of shareholder unanimity
disappeared from the statutes and judicial doctrine, this general
principle was modified so that while dissenters could not block a
merger or consolidation in the absence of fraud or illegality, they
could sue for the value of their shares under a statutory appraisal
233. See, e.g., Cortland Specialty Co., 60 F.2d at 939-40; Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 591, 593-94 (1933); BAAR & MORRIS, supra note 203, at 71-72 &
n. 95 (collecting Board of Tax Appeals cases that followed the Minnesota Tea Co. decision
and imposed a dissolution requirement prior to the Supreme Court's resolution of the
issue).
234. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 160; see also Robert N. Miller, Income Tax
Liability in Reorganizations, 14 TAX MAG. 131, 131-32 (1936) (discussing the cases that
rejected the dissolution requirement).
235. See Pillar Rock Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 571, 574 (1936) (imposing
a dissolution requirement on a statutory merger, while acknowledging that such a
requirement did not apply to other types of reorganizations); Hendricks, supra note 71, at
1217.
236. Although most states had liberalized their corporation law statutes by the 1920s,
courts often kept a tight grip on the interpretation of such statutes to preserve the original
protections. See Norman D. Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers
Given to Majority Stockholders, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 645, 664-65 (1932); Weiss, supra note
72, at 631.
237. See NOYES, supra note 92, § 64, at 104; Comment, supra note 40, at 112. This
doctrine was rooted in the belief that a shareholder's property interest and contractual
relationship with the firm constituted a vested right deserving of protection. See Cecile C.
Edwards, Dissenters' Rights: The Effect of Tax Liabilities on the Fair Value of Stock, 6
DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 77, 83 (1993).
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remedy238  As discussed previously, this breakdown in the
shareholder unanimity requirement was one of the original
developments leading to the adoption of nonrecognition treatment
for reorganizations, 39 and the appraisal remedy was one of the
attempts to remedy the perceived inequity under corporate law of
forcing dissenters to accept the consideration offered.24 By the time
the statutory merger requirement was adopted in the Revenue Act of
1934, virtually all state merger and consolidation statutes contained
such appraisal provisions, although relief under these provisions
could only be invoked by strict compliance with the terms of such
statutes. 241 In many jurisdictions, this statutory remedy emerged not
merely as an alternative to the unanimous shareholder consent
requirement, but as a replacement for any common law remedy
previously afforded to dissenting shareholders, such as a direct action
at law for conversion of one's shares or in equity for an unconsented
taking.242 By requiring mergers to be statutory in order to qualify as
tax-free mergers, Congress signaled its desire to condition favored
tax treatment on the existence of state corporate law's protection of
nonconsenting shareholders.243
State corporate law also served to protect the interests of any
creditors of the parties seeking to merge or consolidate. During the
mid- to late-nineteenth century, the judiciary protected corporate
creditors as part of its general reverence for the law of private
contracts.?4 In fact, until 1934, the Supreme Court struck down all
attempts to modify retroactively a creditor's ability to enforce its
238. See Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 156 A. 183, 187 (Del. Ch. 1931)
(determining no fraud and therefore refusing to enjoin a proposed merger); Taylor, supra
note 40, at 737; James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1189,1194 (1964); Comment, supra note 40, at 114-16, 120.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
240. See Comment, supra note 40, at 121.
241. See id. at 120.
242. See id. at 121. Courts refused to recognize an alternative to the appraisal remedy
because to do so would sanction dissenters' noncompliance with the statutory
requirements and increase uncertainty for the parties as to the appropriate means of
satisfying the claims of minority shareholders. See id.
243. Although the introduction of the appraisal remedy would appear to obviate one of
the original motivating factors for the adoption of nonrecognition treatment for mergers
and consolidations, it still did not address the shareholder who did not favor the
transaction, but also did not wish to recognize tax from the sale of the stock at that time.
Such a stockholder continued to need nonrecognition protection to avoid a forced tax bill.
244. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 104, at 537-38; L.A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for
Substantive Due Process: The Municipal Bond Cases, 53 TEx. L. REv. 738, 742 (1975)
(discussing the Court's desire to uphold the principle of bondholder reliance during the
period).
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substantive right to repayment that affected more than merely the
remedy available to the creditor. 45 Judicial remedies, however, had
proven less than complete in protecting creditors. 46 Absent the
purchasing company's agreement to assume the obligations of the
selling company, the latter's creditors were potentially left with
uncertain recourse. 47 To resolve these gaps and inadequacies in the
protection of creditors, state merger statutes effected the transfer of
the merged company's debts and liabilities by operation of law. As
one contemporary commentator noted, "[b]y a merger or a
consolidation the creditors of the merging or consolidating
corporations cannot be deprived of their right to have access to the
property of such corporations for the payment of their claims.' 48
The statutory merger requirement thus served to limit tax-free
treatment to those transactions in which creditors were protected
against the possibility of a disappearing debtor.
The House's proposal to limit tax-free reorganizations to
statutory mergers was part of a larger effort, as evidenced by the
similar move in the Securities Act, to tie federal benefits to
compliance with state corporation law. During the period that the
reorganization provisions were made to conform to corporation law,
federal securities law relied on corporate law as well. When the
Securities Act of 1933 was adopted, a "no sale" theory was developed
to explain exemptions from registration for certain mergers,
consolidations, and reorganizations. 4 9 Originally, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), the administrator of the Act in the year prior
245. See Hovenkamp, supra note 219, at 1613. In 1934, the Court handed down its
decision in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), in which it
upheld a statute passed during the heart of the Depression that placed a moratorium on
mortgage foreclosures. See id. at 444-48.
246. See, e.g., McAlister v. American Ry. Express Co., 179 N.C. 556, 560-61, 103 S.E.
129, 130-31 (1920); Comment, Rights of Creditors Against a Successor Corporation, 44
HARV. L. REV. 260, 264 (1930). But see American Ry. Express Co. v. Commonwealth,
228 S.W. 433 (Ky. 1920) (holding that the sale of all of a company's assets in exchange for
the stock of another company was fraudulent with respect to the company's creditors
because shares were not adequate consideration for the assets).
247. See LATrIN, supra note 101, at 619. For example, in equity, creditors were only
protected to the extent of the value of the assets held by the selling corporation prior to
transfer, not the extent of the value of the debt itself or to the extent of the value of future
earnings. See LUSK, supra note 217, at 803; Comment, supra note 246, at 261 ("Cash and
stock are easily concealed and readily taken out of the jurisdiction; and the transferee's
promise to pay money may be enforced only by an additional equitable or statutory
proceeding. This is equally true of an assumption of liability, except where third party
beneficiaries are allowed to sue.").
248. LUSK, supra note 217, at 803.




to the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
took the position that such transactions were sales for which
registration was required °50 The FTC created Form E-1 for the
registration of securities "sold" in reorganizations and defined
"reorganization" to include a "statutory merger or consolidation" in
Rule 5, which explained the use of Form E-1.51 After the American
Bar Association ("ABA") suggested the expansion of the exemption
from registration to include mergers, consolidations, and
reorganizations, the newly created SEC amended Rule 5 to require
the registration of only non-statutory mergers or consolidations.52 In
a Note to Rule 5, the SEC deemed "'no sales to stockholders of a
corporation to be involved ... where [there is] a plan or agreement
for a statutory merger or consolidation, provided the vote of a
required favorable majority' would operate to authorize the
transaction and bind all stockholders except for appraisal rights of
dissenters." 3  The theory underlying this no sale provision, much
like the theory favoring nonrecognition treatment when an exchange
of stock occurs in a merger, was that a shareholder should not be
deemed to have sold his interest when the exchange occurs by virtue
of state law rather than individual action5 4 Since statutory mergers
were subject to the approval of a majority of shareholders and
provided certain protections for dissenting shareholders and
creditors, while nonstatutory mergers involved a certain element of
voluntariness, the SEC determined that only the latter constituted a
sale subject to the registration requirements. 5 Thus, federal reliance
250. See id. at 519.
251. Id., at 519-20 (quoting Rule 5 as to the Use of Form E-1, Securities Act Release
167 (1934)).
252- See id. at 520. The SEC's first general counsel took this position before it was
formally introduced as an amendment to Rule 5. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Mergers,
Consolidations, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, in ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING
AND BUSINESS LAW, SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 279, 282
(Herbert S. Wander & Warren F. Grienenberger eds., 1968).
253. 1 Loss, supra note 38, at 520 (quoting Adoption of Form E-1, Securities Act
Release No. 493(c), 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3090.566 (Sept. 20,1935)).
254. See 1 id. at 521; see also RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 310 (5th ed. 1982) (explaining the
Rule 133 requirement that "the submission of the acquisition transactions to the vote of
shareholders is not deemed to involve a 'sale' or 'offer to sell' ").
255. Rule 133 of the Securities Act of 1933, which embodied the no sale rule, was
rescinded in 1972 and replaced with Rule 145 requiring the registration of securities issued
in connection with a reorganization. See Notice of Adoption of Rules 145 & 153A,
Securities Act Release No. 5316, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,015 (Oct. 6, 1972), reprinted in JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES & MATERIALS 534 (1991).
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on state corporation law extended beyond the federal tax system.
2. Limit Excessive Business Combinations in Response to the 1929
Stock Market Crash
The House's proposal to limit tax-free reorganizations to
statutory mergers and a few other narrow transactions was also
prompted by a general desire to limit the excessive business
combinations thought to be responsible for the Stock Market Crash
of 1929. The post-World War I economic boom that triggered the
rapid increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions discussed
earlier was slowed by the depression of 1921.1 6 During the economic
prosperity of the mid- to late 1920s, business combinations again
picked up. Of the ninety-two active holding companies whose stock
was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1928, seventy-seven
had been granted charters since 1910, and of those companies, at
least thirty-four had received their charters between 1923 and 1928.257
Furthermore, during 1928 and 1929, mergers occurred at a far more
rapid pace than at the beginning of the decade or at any time during
the merger movement at the turn of the century s8 Of the 8500
formerly independent manufacturing and mining businesses that
were acquired between the end of World War I and the end of 1931,
more than 4800 were acquired between 1926 and 1930 and almost
2300 disappeared in 1928 and 1929 alone2 9
Economic concentration accompanied this revived period of
merger and consolidation. Between 1922 and 1929, there were eight
mergers valued at over $100 million and at least fourteen transactions
in which the target corporation had assets valued at over $50
million.2 6° By 1933, Justice Brandeis reported that "the process of
absorption has already advanced so far that perhaps two-thirds of our
industrial wealth has passed from individual possession to the
ownership of large corporations whose shares are dealt in on the
stock exchange. '261 According to Justice Brandeis, 200 non-banking
corporation, each possessing assets of over $90 million directly
controlled about one-fourth of the nation's wealth. 62 One study
256. See BUTTERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 292.
257. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 204 n.18 (1932).
258. See BUTTERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 292.
259. See id.
260. See id- at 294.
261. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 257, at vii).
262- See id. at 566 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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concluded that the merger movement in the 1920s not only
significantly increased economic concentration but did so "to a
substantial extent" in certain key industry groups.263
After the stock market crash in October of 1929, which quickly
ended the "seemingly indefinite prosperity" of the post-World War I
era,264 popular opinion attributed much of the blame for the crisis to
the "excessive" business combinations and resulting economic
concentration of the 1920s.2165 As Paul Conkin reports, this blame was
probably misplaced: "Numerous corporate consolidations increased
efficiency even as they narrowed participation in key managerial
choices. '"266 The broad impact of the crash, however, made this
reality irrelevant for a Congress seeking to blunt its bitter effects, as
"[t]he statutes which 'permitted necessary business adjustments' in
1921" became from the post-Crash perspective of the 1930s, "one of
the major and indispensable forces in the thrust towards economic
concentration which characterized the 'twenties.' "267
Some of this popular backlash against the merger movement was
attributable to the personal losses suffered by the stock market's
relative newcomers. The stockholdings of those masses who entered
the market during the rising tide of the 1920s quickly turned sour
after the crash. On September 1, 1929, the aggregate value of all
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange was $89 billion.268
Within a month, that number had fallen by $18 billion and by 1932,
the aggregate number had dropped to $15 billion-a loss of $74
billion in value over the course of two and one-half years.269 The
acute shock of the crash, coupled with the long, hard years of the
Depression, led to a series of reform measures. Such measures
included the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, and a variety of tax law
changes.270 Thus, the stock market crash and ensuing depression,
both because they reduced some of the original pressure from new
263. BUTTERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 299 (discussing increased concentration in
industry groups such as oil, steel, and copper).
264. 1 LOSS, supra note 38, at 120.
265. See Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 566-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Other
writers have shown that, coincident with the growth of these giant corporations, there has
occurred a marked concentration of individual wealth; and that the resulting disparity in
incomes is a major cause of the existing depression.").
266. PAUL K. CONKIN, THE NEW DEAL 24 (3d ed. 1992).
267. Sandberg, supra note 69, at 125.
268. See 1 Loss, supra note 38, at 120.
269. See 1id.
270. See 1 id. at 121; see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971)
(discussing the Glass-Steagall Act).
1999] 1353
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
stockholders for a reorganization exemption and because
reorganizations received some of the blame for the spate of
overspeculation and concentration leading up to the crash, led the
House to pass a bill severely limiting the availability of
nonrecognition treatment by restricting the reorganization exemption
to statutory mergers.
3. Expansion to Include Other Forms of Reorganizations
Although the Senate Finance Committee stated that it was "in
complete agreement with the purposes of the House bill which aim at
tax-avoidance," it sought to expand the scope of the reorganization
exemption to cover transactions not qualifying as statutory
mergers.27' The Committee agreed with the Treasury that "some
legitimate and desirable business readjustments would be prevented"
absent nonrecognition treatment for certain reorganizations.2 72 For
the Senate, such "legitimate and desirable business readjustments"
included a wider array of transactions.2 73 Thus, in addition to the
statutory merger or consolidation requirement necessary for an A
reorganization, the final version of the Revenue Act included a
Senate amendment:
(B) the acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely
for all or a part of its voting stock: of at least 80 per centum
of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of another
corporation; or of substantially all the properties of another
corporation, or (C) a transfer by a corporation of all or a
part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after
the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in
control of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred, or (D) a recapitalization, or (E) a mere change
in identity, form, or place of organization, however
effected.274
Through these amendments to the House bill, the Senate accepted
the restrictions imposed by the statutory merger or consolidation
requirement while expanding the number of transactions covered by
the exemption.
271. S. REP. No. 73-558, at 16 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 586, 598.
272 Idl at 17, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 599.
273. Id, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 598.
274. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g), 48 Stat. 680, 705. In the Revenue Act of
1939, the phrase "substantially all the properties of another corporation" was removed
from clause (B) and placed in a new clause (C), resulting in the relettering of the
remaining clauses. See George v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 396,403 (1956).
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One rationale for expanding the reorganization exemption to
cover transactions other than statutory mergers was to permit
nonrecognition in states without merger or consolidation statutes.
According to the Senate Finance Committee, the additional
reorganization provisions were necessary "in order to bring about a
more uniform application of the provisions in all 48 of the States.
Not all of the States have adopted statutes providing for mergers or
consolidations; and, moreover, a corporation of one State cannot
ordinarily merge with a corporation of another State." 275 By 1935,
only thirty-three states and the Territory of Hawaii had general
statutes authorizing merger or consolidation, and a special act or
charter provision was still required to effect a merger or
consolidation in the fourteen remaining states, the District of
Columbia, the Philippine Islands, Alaska, and Puerto Rico. 76 Of the
jurisdictions permitting mergers or consolidations, only twenty-one
authorized the merger or consolidation of a domestic and a foreign
corporation, and at least three of these more liberal jurisdictions still
required the surviving corporation to be domestic in order to qualify
under their respective statutes.277 Thus, both in the jurisdictions not
having any general merger or consolidation statute and in the
jurisdictions whose statutes did not authorize the merger of domestic
and foreign corporations, there could be no "statutory merger or
275. S. REP. No. 73-558, at 16, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 586, 598. Testimony
before the Senate Finance Committee during a hearing on the proposed bill may have
contributed to the Committee's conclusion. A Report of the Committee on Federal
Taxation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce concluded that since the definitions of
merger and consolidation in effect in the jurisdiction in which the transaction took place
would govern the classification, "[w]hat would be a merger or consolidation in one State
might not be in another. Instead, then, of having uniform principles generally applicable
to all corporations, there would be different standards applicable to different
corporations." Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 73d Cong. 59
(1934) (Report of the Comm. on Federal Taxation, Chamber of Commerce of the United
States), reprinted in 11 U.S. REVENUE ACrs, supra note 31. Similarly, a representative of
the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce predicted that "a substantial amount of litigation
will be necessary in order to find out just what is and what is not a statutory consolidation
or merger." Id. at 2-3 (statement of David A. Gaskill of the Cleveland Chamber of
Commerce).
276. See Fahey, supra note 64, at 948; Comment, supra note 40, at 110.
277. See PAUL, supra note 8, at 61; Fahey, supra note 64, at 948. Although there was
some disagreement as to which states were included on the lists, that does not seem to be
attributable to amendments. Compare Comment, supra note 40, at 110 n.26 (listing
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington), with Fahey, supra note 64, at 948 n. 67 (listing 18
states and one territory). Kentucky, Maine, and Virginia explicitly required the surviving
corporation to be domestic, and Montana and New Jersey's statutes seem to have imposed
a similar requirement. See Comment, supra note 40, at 110.
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consolidation," and therefore no tax-free reorganization, under the
House's narrowly drafted reorganization exemption.2 78 Moreover,
even in a state with a merger statute, if the parties effected a practical
merger or consolidation, but failed to comply with all the technical
requirements of the statute, nonrecognition treatment was
unavailable. The Senate Finance Committee amendments attempted
to mitigate these results.279
Congress's bad experience with the loosely drafted parenthetical
clause from the 1921 Act led the Senate to advocate a more uniform
and precise definition of such non-merger transactions. The fact that
many states had either no merger statute or a limited one had
prompted the Senate to reject the House's proposal to eliminate the
parenthetical clause transactions altogether from the reorganization
definition. The Senate Finance Committee explained that, in states
where no statutory merger or consolidation provision was available
or applicable, it believed that it was "desirable to permit
reorganizations in such cases, with restrictions designed to prevent
tax avoidance.""2 To accomplish this latter goal, the Senate scrapped
the old parenthetical clause and separated the various descriptions
into their own clauses. Most significantly, in the 1934 Act, the non-
statutory mergers specified the required consideration. For a B
reorganization acquisition of stock, the transferring corporation had
to transfer voting stock constituting control of the corporation or
substantially all of the properties of the transferring corporation.28
Milton Sandberg explained that "Part (B) was claimed to be a
loophole-proof substitute for the former parenthetical words of Part
(A). Its purpose was to permit readjustments in states which have no
statutory system of mergers and consolidations. '' 282 Speaking on the
Revenue Act of 1936, the Committee explained to the rest of
Congress that the controlling voting stock requirement was
"declaratory of existing law but expresses it in more apt language. "283
278. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY, supra note 160, at 169; Fahey, supra note 64, at 948.
279. See Mark Eisner, Taxation Affecting Corporation Reorganizations, (noting that in
drafting the Revenue Act of 1921 and later acts, "Congress sought to provide for the
situation presented where an attempt was made to effectuate a practical merger or
consolidation without compliance with the technical requirements of state laws, or where
there is no state law, covering the readjustment which has taken place"), in SOME LEGAL
PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 403, 419
(1931), quoted in Miller, supra note 230, at 194.
280. S. REP. NO. 73-558, at 16, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), 586,598.
281. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 680,705.
282. Sandberg, supra note 69, at 117.
283. 80 CONG. REC. 8799 (1936) (statement of Sen. George).
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The Senate's decision to draft with specificity resolved a ten-year
debate that had begun with the issuance of the Gregg Statement in
1924.1 At that time, Congress concluded after extensive study that
an expansion of the reorganization provisions to detail the precise
nature of each requirement was necessary to provide certainty and
predictability for taxpayers and thus to avoid the ambiguity and
uncertainty of the 1918 Act 5 However, given the almost inherent
ability of creative tax lawyers to exploit loopholes in seemingly
explicit language, such efforts at precision soon proved to be
ineffective."s6  In its response to the 1933 Ways and Means
Committee Report proposing the removal of the reorganization
provisions, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury complained that the
specificity of the statute contributed to its avoidance:
In addition to their complexity, [the reorganization
provisions] are open to the serious objection of being
overspecific. When they were adopted in 1924, the
draftsmen attempted to state in minute detail exactly how
each step of a reorganization should be treated for tax
purposes. Although this method had the apparent
advantage of enabling taxpayers and their lawyers to
determine in advance exactly how proposed transactions
would be taxed, it had the disadvantage of leaving the
Department no leeway in the administration of the law.
Consequently, astute lawyers could and did arrange what
were really sales to take the technical form of a
reorganization within the statutory definition, with resultant
loss of revenue.'a7
Thus, Treasury proposed that the provisions should be redrafted
so as to "express in the statute as simply as possible the general plan
for dealing with these transactions, leaving to the Department as in
other cases the power to make rules and regulations to carry out the
284. The "Gregg Statement"' is the popular name for a report prepared by A.W.
Gregg, then-Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. See MAGILL, supra note
63, at 128 n.11.
285. See PAUL, supra note 8, at 37; see also Brookes, supra note 9, at 5 (stating that the
1924 Act reorganization provisions "were probably the most detailed and precise statutes
which had been evolved up to that time"). The Gregg Statement, thought to be the origin
of the 1924 Act, advocated specific and all-encompassing provisions designed to provide
certainty and predictability, while the Treasury Department advocated flexible provisions
enabling it to provide appropriate interpretations as specific situations arose. See
Satterlee, supra note 28, at 640.
286. See PAUL, supra note 8, at 37.
287. STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, supra note 188, at
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congressional intent."' Congress, however, chose the path of
greater rather than less specificity in adopting the final
reorganization provisions in 1934. s
C. The Judicial Evisceration of the Statutory Merger Requirement
When Congress originally adopted the statutory merger
requirement, it was suggested that the judicial doctrines of continuity
of interest and business enterprise would be inapplicable. Calvin
Johnson points out that "[i]n 1934, there was plausibly nothing in the
continuity-of-interest doctrine that would not be satisfied by
qualification as a state-law merger."2 9 Congress, by not placing the
same restrictions on consideration that it imposed upon B
reorganizations, appeared to assume that state law would impose
such limitations as conditions for the qualification of a transaction as
a merger or consolidation.291 As Roswell Magill reported, "it has
been argued that Congress, when it amended the reorganization
definition in 1934 to include 'a statutory merger or consolidation,'
showed an intent to consider such a statutory procedure as in itself
providing the necessary continuity of interest. '' 212 Moreover, even if
state law did not automatically offer the protections enacted by
Congress for the other types of reorganizations, some observers
argued that such protections should be unnecessary in the context of
statutory mergers or consolidations. 93 One commentator noted that
the continuity of interest requirement "was formulated in order to
determine whether a transfer of substantially all the assets of a
corporation sufficiently resembled a merger and consolidation when
it technically was not such, and when the transaction fully satisfies
every formal requisite of a true merger or consolidation, the standard
is unnecessary."2 94 Because the judicial doctrines had been created to
close a loophole in the 1921 Act's parenthetical clause that had long
288. Id. at 10.
289. As Randolph Paul described it, "[a] confused Congress refused to follow the
Treasury's desperate recommendation, and preferred Llewellyn's advice: 'No cure for law
but more law.'" PAUL, supra note 8, at 38 (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH 108 (1930)).
290. Johnson, supra note 8, at 328.
291. See Faber, supra note 7, at 263.
292. RosWELL MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 161 n.48 (rev. ed. 1945); see, e.g., Hills,
supra note 203, at 412 (noting that, with respect to the new statutory merger requirement,
"general court decisions such as those found in the Cortland Specialty Case ... are not
controlling").
293. See, e.g., Brookes, supra note 9, at 32; Miller, supra note 230, at 134; Satterlee,
supra note 28, at 688; Comment, supra note 40, at 142.
294. Comment, supra note 40, at 142.
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since been removed by subsequent Acts, the attitude was that "[t]he
statute should... be interpreted literally, free of any carry-over from
the gloss placed on a deleted portion. A statutory merger should be a
reorganization because the statute says it is."2 95  Soon after the
statutory merger requirement was put in place, however, critics were
quick to question the presumption that a statutory merger did not
need to be subjected to the same judicial doctrines as a non-statutory
merger reorganization. 296
The lack of uniformity among the general merger or
consolidation statutes highlighted the problems in relying upon state
corporation law to perform the gatekeeping function that the courts
had provided prior to 1934. James Fahey explained that "[t]hey were
not drafted with the thought that their provisions would be a criteria
of federal income tax liability."2" Thus, in many cases, they were not
well-suited to serving such a function.2 98 In 1935, the laws of
Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee
authorized a merger or consolidation even when the transferee
corporation conveyed to the transferor corporation securities other
than shares of its stock as consideration.29 9 Arkansas's 1931 merger
statute, for example, explicitly stated that "[t]he agreement may
provide for the distribution of cash, notes or bonds in whole or in
part, in lieu of stock to the stockholders of the constituent
corporations or any of them. ' 30  Other statutes permitted the
distribution of "shares or other securities or obligations of the
surviving corporation," thus permitting the use of bonds rather than
instruments evidencing a proprietary interest in the continuing
venture.3"' Furthermore, few if any state merger statutes then or
today require post-reorganization continuity or restrict the ability to
295. Brookes, supra note 9, at 32. One observer commented that "the history and
structure of the reorganization provisions prior to the Revenue Act of 1934 indicate that
any requirement of a continuity of interest was consciously and advisedly omitted from the
definition of reorganization in clause A." Satterlee, supra note 28, at 688; see also Miller,
supra note 234, at 134 ("[T]he changes made when the 1934 law was enacted make it
possible, under that and subsequent laws, to follow the literal meaning, without looking to
such vague considerations as 'underlying assumptions and purposes.' ").
296. See, e.g., Fahey, supra note 64, at 950; Comment, supra note 156, at 142.
297. Fahey, supra note 64, at 948.
298. See id.; see also 11 MERTENS, supra note 29, § 43.02, at 22-24 n.24 (discussing the
limitations of state laws with respect to statutory reorganizations).
299. See Fahey, supra note 64, at 950 n.77; Comment, supra note 156, at 141 n.48.
300. ARK. DIG. STAT. § 1701i2 (Crawford & Moses Supp. 1931).
301. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 62 (Cahill & Moore 1935); see also Miller, supra
note 230, at 200 ("[S]ome 'modem' state statutes permitted mergers without any equity
consideration."); Comment, supra note 156, at 141 n.48 (discussing several states'
statutes).
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sell the stock received in the surviving or resulting corporation.3 (u
Thus, despite the statutory merger requirement's promise of bringing
certainty and predictability to an area previously shrouded with
ambiguity, practitioners were still left to debate whether strict
compliance with the requirements of state law was both necessary
and sufficient.
The resulting uncertainty produced an unusual amount of
litigation and confusion involving the statutory merger requirement.
As one member of the New York Bar noted, clause A regarding
statutory mergers and consolidations, "which at first was rather
generally thought to be the easiest provision of the new statute to
apply, has, strangely enough, been provocative of more recent
litigation than any other section of the reorganization statute. '30 3 It
was not until 1944, ten years after the insertion of the statutory
merger requirement, that the issue of whether the judicial doctrine of
continuity of interest applied to a statutory merger or consolidation
was finally resolved by the courts in Roebling v. Commissioner. 4 In
that case, South Jersey Gas, Electric and Traction Company ("South
Jersey") merged with the Public Service Electric and Gas Company
("Public Service") pursuant to the requirements of New Jersey's
merger statute. 5 Under the plan of reorganization, the former
stockholders of South Jersey exchanged their stock for eight percent
one hundred-year first mortgage bonds of Public Service. 306  The
merger agreement expressly provided that the merger would not
affect the capital stock of Public Service and that the shares of stock
in South Jersey would be delivered up and canceled.3 7 Roebling, an
individual holding 166 shares of stock in South Jersey prior to the
merger, treated the transaction as a tax-free reorganization and did
not recognize any of the income realized on the bonds received from
Public Service.301 In sustaining the Commissioner's assertion of a
deficiency, the Third Circuit quickly disposed of the notion that
302. See Faber, supra note 7, at 263.
303. Clarence Castimore, Effect of Recent Decisions upon Reorganization and Basis
Problems, 3 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 130, 138 (1944).
304. 143 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1944).
305. See id. at 811-12.
306. See id. Public Service had previously attempted to use 6% cumulative preferred
stock callable in three years to merge with other companies, but such mergers had been
enjoined by the Chancery Court of New Jersey on the grounds that the consideration was
unfair to the minority stockholders of the merged corporations. See id. (citing Outwater v.





complying with state law merger statutes was sufficient to obtain
nonrecognition treatment. According to the court, the fact that the
merger was "a 'true statutory merger' under New Jersey law is not
dispositive of the question as to whether there was a 'statutory
merger' here within the meaning of Sec. 112(g)(1)(A). It is well-
settled that a State law cannot alter the essential characteristics
required to enable a taxpayer to obtain exemption" from federal
taxation.0 9
Although several courts had by then decided that the continuity
of interest doctrine did not apply to a recapitalization, or E
reorganization,31 the court distinguished such cases on the basis that
a recapitalization, involving no change of assets or capital stock, was
fundamentally different from a merger or consolidation.31' Since the
long-term bonds received by the former South Jersey stockholders
did not constitute a proprietary interest in Public Service, the Third
Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that "no continuing stake in the
merged enterprise was retained by South Jersey or its
stockholders. ' 312  Therefore, the court concluded that "we cannot
subscribe to the taxpayer's contention that under Sec. 112(g)(1)(A)
of the Revenue Act of 1938 the requirements of New Jersey law
supersede the 'continuity of interest' test as applied in LeTulle v.
Scofield and the numerous other decisions. 313
309. Id at 812. The case cited by the Third Circuit for the proposition that it is "well-
settled" that state law cannot affect a determination of exemption from federal tax,
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 665 (E.D. Pa. 1943), is of
questionable precedent in this instance. In that case, the issue leading to the statement
was whether the taxpayer qualified as a mutual company exempt from federal taxation
under section 101(11) of the Revenue Act of 1938, see id. at 667. The particular section,
and its corresponding regulation, did not define mutual company with reference to state
law and the court rebuffed the taxpayer's claim that its classification as a mutual company
under state law was sufficient. See id. at 671-74. By contrast, the statutory merger
requirement specifically directs the IRS to examine whether the merger qualifies as such
under state law.
310. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1998); see, e.g., Commissioner v. Capento
Sec. Corp., 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944) (involving an exchange of new preferred stock for
an outstanding bond issue); Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1942)
(involving an exchange of 20-year 6% debentures for 10-year 3.25% debentures); Annis
Furs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1096 (1943) (involving an issuance of debentures in
exchange for outstanding preferred stock), acq., 1944 C.B. 2; Docherty v. Commissioner,
47 B.T.A. 462 (1942) (same); Schoo v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 459 (1942) (same).
311. See Roebling, 143 F.2d at 814 (citing Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F.2d
528 (2d Cir. 1942)).
312. Id.
313. Id- at 813. In LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940), the Court held that a
creditor's interest as evidenced by the receipt of bonds was insufficient to satisfy the
continuity of interest test. See id. at 420-21. Notwithstanding the fact that LeTulle was a
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The applicability of the continuity of interest test to statutory
mergers was confirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Southwest Natural Gas
Co. v. Commissioner.314 Pursuant to Delaware's merger statute,
Peoples Gas & Fuel Corporation ("People") merged with and into
Southwest Natural Gas Company ("Southwest").315 In the exchange,
People's former stockholders had the option to receive either cash
only or a mixture of stock, bonds, and cash.316 The holders of 59.2%
of People's stock chose the latter option, receiving 16.4% of
Southwest's stock having an aggregate market value of $5592.50,
$340,350 in the principal amount of 6% mortgage bonds and
$17,779.50 in cash.317 The remainder of People's holders elected to
receive an aggregate of $230,700 in cash.18 Thus, according to the
court's calculations, "less than one per cent of the consideration" was
paid by Southwest in stock.319 Agreeing with the Roebling court that
the continuity of interest test "must be met before a statutory merger
may properly be a reorganization within the terms of Section
112(g)(1)(A)," 3 ° the Fifth Circuit explained further that continuity of
interest is not satisfied unless the corporation can show: "(1) that the
transferor corporation or its shareholders retained a substantial
proprietary stake in the enterprise represented by a material interest
in the affairs of the transferee corporation, and, (2) that such retained
interest represents a substantial part of the value of the property
C-type asset acquisition decided under the old parenthetical clause, see Brookes, supra
note 9, at 13; Miller, supra note 230, at 204, and that the other two cases cited by the court
in support of its holding, Commissioner v. Gilmore's Estate, 130 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1942),
and Morgan Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1941), were not
on point, the statutory merger requirement appeared to have been rendered a dead letter
as a bright line standard for nonrecognition treatment. In Gilmore's Estate, the court
applied the business purpose requirement to a statutory merger to determine if it was a
sham and concluded it was not. See Gilmore's Estate, 130 F.2d at 794-95. While this
suggests that there is some judicial gloss to the statutory merger requirement, the court
did not decide that the substantive requirements of state law would be examined to see if a
merger really occurred for tax purposes. See id. at 792-93. In Morgan Manufacturing, the
court used what is now known as the step-transaction doctrine to hold that a cash sale in
which a statutory merger was an intermediate step was not a reorganization by virtue of
the merger. See Morgan Mfg., 124 F.2d at 602. This again elaborates on the role of the
judiciary in interpreting the Code, but does not suggest that it may determine whether a
statutory merger is really a merger.
314. 189 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1951).
315. See id. at 333.
316. See id. at 334-35.
317. See id. at 335.
318. See id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 334.
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transferred. ' 32 ' Since a less than 1% continuing proprietary interest
did not meet this formulation of the test, the court affirmed the Tax
Court's decision to sustain the Commissioner. 32
Thus, soon after its insertion into the A reorganization clause
under the Revenue Act of 1934 and its adoption as part of the
Internal Revenue Code in 1939,31 the statutory merger requirement
was an anachronism. It neither produced certainty and predictability
by permitting taxpayers to control their fate through compliance with
state merger procedures, nor, because of the variability in state
merger statutes, did it serve as an effective filter against transactions
attempting to characterize sales as mergers or consolidations. The
requirement only served arbitrarily to force parties in states without
progressive corporation laws to resort to the less attractive option of
complying with the stricter reorganization provisions -provisions
that could not pretend to cover all cases with a legitimate claim to
nonrecognition treatment.324 Moreover, the addition of the statutory
merger requirement to the Code only complicated Treasury's task.
As one contemporary practitioner stated, "[t]he changed provision
has increased rather than simplified the administrative problems of
the Treasury, as each examining revenue agent must become an
expert in the corporation law of his state or pass the entire problem
back to Washington for solution. '' 31 Placed into the 1934 Act as a
method of further guarding against tax avoidance, critics complained
that "the result has been to hamstring the tax-free reorganization
provisions to the point where they amount to little more than an
empty gesture toward the encouragement of necessary business
adjustments."'326
321. I&
322 See id. at 335.
323. Originally, tax laws were enacted as part of a succession of federal Revenue Acts,
each of which repealed its immediate predecessor. In 1939, however, the tax laws were
compiled in an Internal Revenue Code. Each successive Revenue Act constituted an
amendment to the relevant provisions of the Code. See MAGILL, supra note 63, at 7.
324. See Fahey, supra note 64, at 968; see also George v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 396
(1956) (applying the C reorganization clause test for the consolidation of a Louisiana and
Mississippi corporation that was not specifically questioned by Mississippi authorities, but
could not be approved in Louisiana because its statute approved the consolidation of
foreign and domestic corporations only when authorized by the laws of the foreign
corporation's state of incorporation); 11 MERTENS, supra note 29, § 43.02, at 22 n.24
(noting that the requirement of a "statutory merger" produces inequitable results due to
the wide disparity in state statutes).
325. Latham, supra note 200, at 41.
326. Fahey, supra note 64, at 968. The spread of merger statutes and the complete or
partial adoption by several states of the Uniform Business Corporation Act in 1928 and
the Model Business Corporation Act in 1950 lessened these concerns that the variability in
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II. THE CASE FOR REMOVING THE STATUTORY MERGER
REQUIREMENT
Congress should eliminate the statutory merger requirement
from the reorganization provisions. While the requirement has never
been a particularly useful part of the reorganization provisions,
recent developments suggest that now is the time to remove it
altogether. The statutory merger requirement is out of step with
recent congressional efforts to reduce the Code's reliance on historic
and formalistic differences among state statutes. Moreover, the
statutory merger requirement's reliance on state corporation laws as
a guard against tax avoidance has become both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive.
A. The Statutory Merger Requirement Is at Cross-Purposes with the
New Check-the-Box Regulations
Although the statutory merger requirement was consistent with
the traditional method of classifying entities under the Code, it
appears to be at odds with the recently adopted check-the-box
regulations,32 7 which permit entities to elect their tax classification
under the Code. Not only do the check-the-box rules supplant the
notion that state law distinctions are important under the Code, but
they potentially open up the tax-free reorganization provisions to
new tax classifications for non-traditional entities such as single-
member limited liability companies. The statutory merger
requirement-by elevating in importance the historical differences
among state statutes and by limiting the benefits of A reorganization
treatment to state-law corporations-stands in the way of this
progressive development of the Code.
Under the old "corporate resemblance" test, the tax
classification of entities was determined by applying a complicated
set of four corporate characteristics designed to replicate the criteria
state statutes would render the A reorganization option a tool of limited availability, but
these developments were far from a complete resolution of the issue. Only four states
adopted the Uniform Business Corporation Act in whole or in part, and it was withdrawn
in 1943 and renamed the Model Business Corporation Act. Meanwhile, the ABA
developed its own version of the Model Business Corporation Act which was published in
1950. Nine states based their corporation statutes on the ABA's version of the Act
between 1950 and 1959, and 11 additional states adopted the ABA's version of the Act's
provisions between 1960 and 1969. See Robert Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1455-57 (1985).
327. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1998). For a description of the check-the-box
regulations, see supra text accompanying notes 340-46.
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used by state corporation laws.3' These four factors, enacted in
response to a decision by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Kintner,329 were (1) limited liability (that is, an owner of interests in
the entity is not liable for the entity's debts); (2) centralized
management (that is, rather than managing the entity themselves, the
owners appoint a group of managers similar to a corporation's board
of directors); (3) free transferability of interests (that is, the interests
in the entity may be transferred without securing the consent of the
entity's other owners); and (4) continuity of life (that is, the entity's
existence does not end automatically on the death, resignation,
bankruptcy, etc., of one of its owners).3 Under what became known
as the Kintner test, an entity with three or more of the characteristics
was classified as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.331
This test, however, became increasingly formalistic. In 1995, the IRS
issued a Notice announcing its intent to consider an alternative
method of classification.332 According to the Notice, taxpayers and
the IRS continued to expend significant resources in determining the
classification of entities for tax purposes despite the fact that state
statutes had begun to blur the distinction: "[M]any states have
recently revised their statutes to provide that partnerships and other
unincorporated organizations may possess characteristics that have
traditionally been associated with corporations, thereby narrowing
considerably the traditional distinctions between corporations and
partnerships. '333  The Notice proposed an elective system of
classification. 4
In December of 1996, such an elective system was adopted. The
Treasury Department issued final regulations permitting non-state
328. See William B. Brannan, Lingering Partnership Classification Issues (Just When
You Thought It Was Safe to Go Back into the Water), 1 FLA. TAx REv. 197 (1992); Amy
Eisenberg & William Galanis, To "A" or not to "A". Can a Single Member LLC Be the
Acquirer in an "A" Reorganization?, 38 TAx MGMT. MEM. S-193 (July 21, 1997); Henry J.
Lischer, Jr., Elective Tax Classification for Qualifying Foreign and Domestic Business
Entities Under the Final Check-the-Box Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 99, 103-04 (1997);
Victor E. Fleischer, Note, "If It Looks Like a Duck": Corporate Resemblance and Check-
the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 518 (1996).
329. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
330. See id. at 422; Armando Gomez, Rationalizing the Taxation of Business Entities, 49
TAX LAW. 285, 291-93 (1996). The adoption of this test was an attempt to simplify the
"corporate resemblance" test enunciated in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935). See PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUsINESs
ORGANIZATIONS 426 (2d ed. 1997); Lischer, supra note 328, at 103-04.
331. See Gomez, supra note 331, at 292.
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law corporations to elect to be taxed as either a corporation or
association, as a partnership, or to be disregarded as an entity
separate from its owner in the case of certain single-owner entities. 335
In their official explanation to the new regulations, the IRS and the
Treasury Department cited a desire to distance the Code from the
requirements of state corporation laws: "The existing regulations for
classifying business organizations as associations (which are taxable
as corporations under section 7701(a)(3)) or as partnerships under
section 7701(a)(2) are based on the historical differences under local
law between partnerships and corporations. Treasury and the IRS
believe that those rules have become increasingly formalistic. 3 36
Local law therefore takes on a diminished significance under this
system. As one observer commented, "[t]he so-called 'check-the-
box' regulations mark the toppling of the old, formalistic regime. 3 37
Thus, according to the preamble, "certain joint undertakings that are
not entities under local law may nonetheless constitute separate
entities for federal tax purposes; however, not all entities formed
under local law are recognized as separate entities for federal tax
purposes. 338
Under the regulations as adopted effective January 1, 1997, 339 a
non-trust entity that is not automatically classified as a corporation,
or an "eligible entity," may elect its treatment under the Code.340
Generally, a domestic eligible entity with at least two members can
elect to be classified as either a corporation or a partnership,341 while
a domestic eligible entity with a single owner can elect to be classified
as either a corporation or to be disregarded as an entity separate
335. See IRS Issues Final Entity Classification Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec.
18, 1996, at 245-1, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. Proposed regulations
were issued on May 13, 1996, and a public hearing was held on the regulations on August
21, 1996. See T.D. 8697, 1997-2 I.R.B. 11.
336. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
337. Larry E. Ribstein & Mark A. Sargent eds., Check-the-Box and Beyond: The
Future of Limited Liability Entities, 52 BUs. LAw. 605, 615 (1997).
338. T.D. 8697, 1997-2 I.R.B. 11.
339. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(f) (1998).
340. The regulations preserve the general distinction between trusts and business
entities. Trusts generally do not have associates and do not carry on business for profit.
See T.D. 8697, 1997-2 I.R.B. 11. Entities organized as corporations under federal, state, or
tribal law, associations under Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-3, joint-stock companies,
insurance companies, insured banking entities, business entities wholly owned by a state or
political subdivision, business entities taxed as corporations under some other provision of
the Code, and certain foreign entities are automatically classified as corporations under
the regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1998).
341. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
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from its owner 4Z Because of the potential for this elective regime to
overwhelm the capacity of the IRS to administer the paperwork,
however, the regulations also establish default rules. A domestic
eligible entity that does not file an election is classified as a
partnership if it has two or more members and is disregarded as an
entity separate from its owner if it has a single owner.343 A foreign
eligible entity that does not file an election is classified as a
partnership if it has two or more members, at least one of whom has
unlimited liability, as a corporation if all members have limited
liability, and is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner if it
has a single owner and that owner has unlimited liability.34 For
purposes of determining limited liability, the check-the-box
regulations continue to rely on the statute or law pursuant to which
the entity is organized 4
One of the most written about changes ushered in by the new
check-the-box regime is the codification of a "tax nothing" status for
certain single owner entities such as limited liability companies
("LLCs").346 While it appeared that a single member entity lacking
two of the four corporate characteristics should have been
disregarded for federal income tax purposes under prior law, 47 the
check-the-box regulations officially confirmed this conclusion and
paved the way for a number of creative tax planning devices and
transactions. One such transaction is an A reorganization in which a
342- See id.
343. See id. § 301.7701-3(b)(1).
344. See id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2).
345. See id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(ii).
346. See Michael L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed "Check-the-Box"
Regulations, 71 TAx NOTES 1679, 1682 (1996) (coining the phrase "tax nothing" to
describe the single-member LLC under the new check-the-box regulations); see also
Lawrence M. Axelrod, Are Consolidated Returns Obsolete?, 74 TAX NOTES 89, 89-90
(1997) (referring to a single-member LLC as a "tax nothing"); Christopher Barton, Much
Ado About a Nothing: The Taxation of Disregarded Entities, TAX NOTES TODAY, June
30, 1997, at 125-98, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (same); Eisenberg &
Galanis, supra note 328, at S-193 (same); David S. Miller, The Tax Nothing, 74 TAX
NOTES 619, 620 (1997) (same).
347. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-37-100 (June 19, 1987); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-33-003 (May 7,
1985); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,395 (Aug. 5, 1985); Joel Rabinovitz & Eric M. Zolt, Tax
Nothings, 75 TAXES 869, 869 (1997); Francis J. Wirtz & Kenneth L. Harris, Tax
Classification of the One-Member Limited Liability Company, 59 TAX NOTES 1829, 1833
(1993); Bernard Wolfman, How to Treat Single-Member LLCs, 68 TAX NOTES 361, 361
(1995). But see Rod Garcia, Single-Member LLCs: Basic Entities Raise Complex
Problems, 68 TAX NOTES 142, 142-43 (1996) (suggesting classification as a corporation);
Pomy Ketema, Note, Did the Federal Check-the-Box Regulations Open up a State Tax
Pandora's Box? A Reflection on State Conformity to the New Federal Classification
Scheme of Single-Member LLCs, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1659, 1660 (1998) (same).
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target corporation merges into the acquirer's single-member limited
liability company in exchange for stock of the acquirer. Public
companies often resist conducting an acquisition through an A
reorganization, despite its less restrictive requirements, because of
the state-law liability concerns involved with absorbing another
corporation, the shareholder approval requirements imposed for
mergers directly into the parent company, and the prohibition on
regulated companies from conducting certain businesses directly.3 8
However, by setting up an LLC of which the acquiring company is
the only member, the target corporation can merge into the
acquirer's LLC for state law purposes while being treated as if it
merged into the parent corporation under § 368(a)(1)(A) for federal
income tax purposes.349
To date, the IRS has not officially confirmed that a single
member LLC A reorganization is permissible under the Code.3 50 The
question surrounding the applicability of nonrecognition treatment
under § 368(a)(1)(A) is whether the merger recognized by state law
needs to be the same merger deemed to occur for federal income tax
purposes. Most commentators, however, have concluded through an
analysis of similar IRS rulings and the policies that underlie them
that a single member LLC merger with a corporation can qualify for
nonrecognition as an A reorganization. 1  In the analogous area of
348. See 1 GINSBURG & LtVIN, supra note 7, § 801.6; Irving Evall et al., Tax and
Practical Considerations in the Negotiation for the Purchase/Sale of a Going Business: A
Panel Discussion, 30 INST. ON FED. TAx'N 893, 916 (1972). Another concern is the
shareholder approval requirement for direct mergers that may not be applicable in the
context of a triangular merger or other form of reorganization. See Lynch, supra note 4, at
742.
349. A single-member LLC A reorganization would probably need to be designed as a
merger of the target into the acquirer's LLC, rather than as an acquisition of a
corporation's single-member LLC, to qualify for nonrecognition treatment. Although a
merger of a single-member LLC into a corporation would qualify as a merger for state
law, the transaction would risk recharacterization as a failed C reorganization if the LLC
constituted less than substantially all of the target's assets. Additionally, it might run afoul
of the requirements for a valid spin-off under § 355. See Rabinovitz & Zolt, supra note
348, at 874.
350. The IRS appears to be struggling with the choice of permitting single-member
LLC mergers to qualify as A reorganizations or forcing them to satisfy the requirements
for a stock-for-assets C reorganization. According to one reporter, "a decision is expected
soon." Lee A. Sheppard, More Mischief with Tax Nothings, 80 TAX NOTES 762, 764
(1998).
351. See, e.g., 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7, § 801.6; Eisenberg & Galanis, supra
note 328, at S-197; Rabinovitz & Zolt, supra note 348, at 873. But see Axelrod, supra note
347, at 91 (concluding that an LLC could not be a party to a reorganization under I.R.C.
§ 368(b)); Jeffrey A. Maine, Evaluating Subchapter S in a "Check-the-Box" World, 51 TAX
LAW. 717,745-46 (1998) (same).
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qualified Real Estate Investment Trusts ("REIT") subsidiaries,352
business forms that are also disregarded from their owners for tax
purposes, the IRS has ruled that the merger of a target corporation
into a qualified REIT subsidiary in exchange for the stock of the
REIT parent can qualify as an A reorganization rather than a
triangular merger in which the stock of the parent is utilized or as a
stock for assets exchange under § 368(a)(1)(C)1 3 A 1958 Revenue
Ruling reached a similar conclusion. Under the situation described
in that Ruling, X, a corporation, owned 79% of the stock of Y, a
corporation incorporated in State C. Individuals owned the
remaining 21% of the stock. To eliminate the minority shareholders
and to continue Y's activities in State B, Y engaged in a
reincorporation statutory merger with a newly formed State B
corporation, Z, in which Y transferred all of its assets to Z in
exchange for all of the Z stock. Y then merged into its parent, X,
with the result that X now conducted its subsidiary business in State
B through a wholly rather than partially owned subsidiary. Although
Z merged with Y rather than X under state law, the IRS
recharacterized the transaction as a merger between Z and X and
permitted the transaction to qualify as an A reorganization followed
by a drop-down of assets to a wholly owned subsidiary under
§ 368(a)(2)(C) 5 4  Thus, in both contexts, the IRS treated a
transaction as an A reorganization even though it resulted from a
state-law merger that was different than the one deemed to occur for
federal income tax purposes 5 5 Furthermore, the same result should
352. A REIT is an entity that invests primarily in passive real estate investments and is
permitted to pass-through its income without tax to the holders of its interests. In this
sense, it is generally taxed like a partnership on distributed earnings. See 11 MERTENS,
supra note 29, § 41A.01, at 3. A Qualified REIT Subsidiary is a wholly owned corporation
that is treated as a division of the REIT for federal income tax purposes. See I.R.C.
§ 856(i) (West Supp. 1998).
353. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-12-020 (Dec. 29, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-03-074 (Oct. 26,
1988).
354. See Rev. Rul. 58-93, 1958-1 C.B. 188.
355. A recent private letter ruling reconfirms the IRS's willingness to treat a
transaction as a statutory merger even if the merged corporation did not directly merge
into the surviving entity under state law. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-43-010 (June 22, 1997)
(concerning a two-step transaction involving an acquisition merger and an upstream
merger "treated as if Acquiring directly acquired the Target assets in exchange for
Acquiring stock and Acquiring's assumption of Target liabilities through a 'statutory
merger' as that term is used in § 368(a)(1)(A)" (citations omitted)). There is a contrary
line of authority in the context of a merger that a corporate "grandparent" causes to be
directed. See Eisenberg & Gallanis, supra note 328, at S-196 to S-197. A merger of the
target corporation into a second-tier subsidiary of the parent corporation in exchange for
the parent's stock would not qualify for A reorganization treatment. Instead, the parent
agrees to acquire the target's assets in exchange for its stock, but directs the target to
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be reached in the context of limited liability entities such as the
recently created Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary that can similarly
be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner 6.35  As Joel
Rabinovitz and Eric Zolt have observed, "there does not appear to
be any tax policy requiring liability exposure as a prerequisite for tax
deferral and, therefore, no policy objection to treating direct mergers
into tax nothings as mergers into the parent subject only to the
requirements of an A reorganization. 357
Despite the theoretical possibilities opened up for the LLC A
reorganization by the check-the-box regulations and the rule's stated
goal to reduce the tax code's reliance on the arbitrary and formalistic
differences among state corporate laws, the statutory merger
requirement poses an insurmountable obstacle in many states. The
LLC vehicle is itself of recent vintage. Originating in Wyoming in
1977,358 the LLC became available in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia only in the past few years.359  This relatively slow
development of state law is likely to be repeated in the adoption of
provisions permitting LLCs to merge with corporations. In some
states, an LLC is still required to have more than one member, and in
the forty-three states that permit a single-member LLC, only twenty-
nine authorize such LLCs to merge with corporations. 60 While
transfer its assets directly to the second-tier subsidiary. The IRS has recast this
transaction as a C reorganization followed by a drop-down even when the transfer to the
second-tier subsidiary occurs by virtue of a statutory merger. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-224,
1970-1 C.B. 79; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-17-051 (Jan. 30, 1996). Although the IRS has never
stated that the transactions could not be treated as A reorganizations, some commentators
have arrived at this negative inference. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Gallanis, supra note 328, at
S-196 to S-197.
356. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3) (West Supp. 1998) (adopted by the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1308(b), 110 Stat. 1755, 1782).
357. Rabinovitz & Zolt, supra note 347, at 873. In a similar example, the IRS has ruled
that an exchanging party's use of a single-member LLC in a like-kind exchange under
§ 1031 does not violate the requirement that the property be "held." See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-
07-013 (Nov. 13, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-51-012 (Sept. 15, 1997); see also Michael G.
Schinner, IRS Rulings Expand Opportunities for Using Single-Member LLCs in 1031
Exchanges, 88 J. TAX'N 286 (1998) (discussing the benefits of using single-member LLCs
to hold real property).
358. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66
U. COLO. L. REv. 855, 855 (1995); Ribstein & Sargent, supra note 338, at 615 (quoting
John DeBruyn).
359. See Axelrod, supra note 346, at 89; Lischer, supra note 328, at 102. Most states
adopted LLC statutes between 1990 and 1996-after the IRS confirmed their favorable tax
treatment in 1988. See Ketema, supra note 347, at 1667.
360. The following states permit single-member LLCs: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
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important incorporation jurisdictions such as Delaware, New York,
and Texas are among the states to permit single-member LLC
mergers, equally important jurisdictions such as California,
Massachusetts, and Nevada do not permit single-member LLCs.36' In
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
ALA. CODE § 10-12-9 (Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.155(b) (Michie Supp. 1998);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-631 (West 1998); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-32-201 (Michie
1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-203 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-101(9) (West
1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(6) (Michie Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. § 608.405
(Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-100(12) (Supp. 1998); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 428-202 (Michie Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 53-607 (1994); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
180/5-1(b) (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-2-4 (1995); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 490A.102(13) (West Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7605 (Supp. 1998); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275.020 (Michie Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301(A)(10) (West
Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 621 (West Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-202 (Supp. 1998); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.198(4202) (Law Co-op
Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.11 (West Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-
103(h) (Supp., 1998); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.017 (Supp. 1999); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 35-8-201 (Smith 1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2605 (1997); 1998 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 79,
§ 2 (West) (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-7
(Michie 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 102(m) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57C-2-20 (Michie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-06 (Supp. 1997) (permitting single-
member LLCs if they are authorized in the Articles of Organization); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1705.04 (Anderson Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2001(11) (West
1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.044 (1997); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8912 (West 1995); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-16-5 (Lexis Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-202.1 (Michie
Supp. 1998); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 4.01 (West 1997); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-103 (Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3022 (1997); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1046.3 (Michie Supp. 1998) (although not specifically authorizing the formation of a
single-member LLC, the statute provides that no dissolution shall occur as long as the
LLC has at least one member); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.070 (West Supp. 1999);
W. VA. CODE § 31B-2-202 (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0201(West Supp. 1998). Of
these states permitting single-member LLCs, the following states do not authorize LLCs
to merge with corporations: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and
Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.500 (Michie Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-
80-1003 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-193 (West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 428-904 (Michie Supp. 1997) (permitting corporations to merge into LLCs but not
appearing to authorize the reverse); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-7-1 (1995); KANS. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7650 (1995) (permitting corporations to merge into LLCs but not appearing to
authorize the reverse); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.198(4701) (Law Co-op Supp. 1998); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 79-29-209 (Supp. 1998) (unless otherwise provided in the certificate of
formation or limited liability company agreement); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 35-8-1201
(Smith 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-59 (Michie 1993) (unless otherwise provided by
the articles of organization or an operating agreement); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-9-01
(Michie 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.481 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-149 (1998);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.1201(2) (West Supp. 1998) (unless otherwise provided in an
operating agreement).
361. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17050(b) (West Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
156C, § 2(5) (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.151(1) (Michie Supp. 1997). Other
states that do not permit single-member LLCs include New Hampshire, Tennessee, and
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the fourteen states that permit single-member LLCs, but not their
merger with corporations,362 parties can effect the equivalent of a
merger-the target corporation's sale of all of its assets and liabilities
to the parent's single-member LLC in exchange for parent
corporation stock, followed by the target corporation's liquidation-
but such a transaction would be treated as a C rather than an A
reorganization under the Code. If the target corporation had
recently sold off a division or a large part of its assets or engaged in a
redemption or spin-off, the transaction may fail the "substantially all
of the properties '363 rule for C reorganizations. 64  Similarly, if the
parent corporation desired to issue stock other than voting stock, and
such "boot" plus liabilities assumed exceeds 20% of the target's total
assets, or if the parent corporation already holds "old and cold" some
portion of the target corporation's stock,365 the transaction may fail
the "solely" for voting stock rule for C reorganizations. 66 Moreover,
even if a state both recognizes a single member LLC and permits it to
merge with a corporation, it is questionable whether the transaction
will qualify as an A reorganization if the authority for the merger is
granted under the state's LLC statute rather than its corporation
laws.367 Thus, simply by virtue of the location of the transaction, the
Wyoming. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:1(V) (Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-203-103 (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-106 (Michie 1997). South Carolina does
not currently permit single-member LLCs or permit LLCs to merge with corporations, but
has repealed those provisions effective January 1, 2001, when it adopts the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-201 & 33-43-1301 (Law
Co-op Supp. 1998) (repealed effective January 1, 2001).
362. See supra note 360.
363. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1998).
364. See Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1938); Rev. Proc. 86-42,
1986-2 C.B. 722, § 7.05(3) (requiring, for ruling purposes, that acquiring entity acquires at
least 90% of the fair market value of the net assets and at least 70% of the fair market
value of the gross assets held by target immediately prior to the transaction (including all
redemptions and distributions made by target immediately preceding the transaction as
assets held immediately prior to the transaction)); 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7,
§ 702.3; Rabinovitz & Zolt, supra note 345, at 873.
365. Whether a corporation's ownership of a target corporation's stock is sufficiently
pre-existing to be considered "old and cold" depends in part on the holding corporation's
subjective intent and in part on the amount of time in which the stock has been held. See 1
GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7, § 701.4. The IRS takes the position that a 12-month
holding period is not sufficient to establish the stock ownership as old and cold. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1998); 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7, § 701.4.
366. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C); 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7, § 702.3.
367. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1986); Rabinovitz & Zolt; supra
note 347, at 873. In Florida, for instance, a single-member LLC merger with another
business entity is authorized under the chapter of the Florida Statutes titled "Limited
Liability Companies," rather than the chapter titled "Corporations." See FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 607.120-.193 & 608.401-.514 (West Supp. 1999).
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statutory merger requirement may convert a tax-deferred
reorganization under the new check-the-box regulations into a fully
taxable transaction. As in 1934 when the statutory merger
requirement was inserted into the Code's reorganization provisions,
the taxability of a transaction thus depends upon the progressivity
and flexibility of the corporation laws in the state in which the
transaction took place, rather than upon the conformity of a
proposed transaction with the federal tax policies underlying
nonrecognition treatment.368
B. State Corporation Laws Have Become Increasingly Poor
Gatekeepers
A statutory merger requirement might still be justified, despite
its inconsistency with the new check-the-box regulations and the
concomitant de-emphasis on state corporate law, if it either acted as a
safeguard against tax avoidance or provided a bright-line test for
qualifying for nonrecognition under the Code. After all, just as a
taxpayer is required to pay no more tax than is due,369 the IRS is
under no compulsion to err on the side of collecting less tax than is
due under existing law. Because of the application of judicial
doctrines such as continuity of interest to the statutory merger
requirement, however, the requirement has long since failed as a
bright-line standard. Moreover, the development of state laws
indicates that the statutory merger requirement is also not a reliable
safeguard against abuse. In fact, the requirement is both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive as a check against tax avoidance.
1. Generally
While state merger or consolidation statutes never have been
considered truly adequate for ensuring that such transactions
conform to the ideals of the Code's drafters, there are indications
that state corporation laws are becoming increasingly
counterproductive for the task. As an initial matter, state
368. See supra notes 275-79 (discussing the inclusion of the statutory merger
requirement in the 1934 Revenue Act).
369. As Judge Learned Hand noted: "Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." Gregory v. Helvering,
69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Affirming the Second Circuit,
the Supreme Court also agreed that "[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount
of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits, cannot be doubted." Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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corporation laws are becoming less rather than more uniform.
Despite the dominant position of the Model Business Corporation
Act in smaller states in the 1950s and 1960s, larger or more corporate
law-oriented states have adopted their own acts. When Delaware
revised its corporation act in 1967, it decided not to follow the Model
Act because, in the words of the President of the United States
Corporation Company, " 'we do not want to be a "me too" state.' "370
Whether this recurrence of a so-called "race to the bottom" really
has resulted in statutes favoring managers at the expense of
shareholders is irrelevant to the fact that state corporation laws are
diverging rather than coming together and are developing in such a
way that the state in which a merger is effected has once again
become important for tax purposes371
Moreover, strict anti-takeover statutes in many states may
thwart "desirable business adjustments," to use the language of
1921,372 that would otherwise comply with the requirements and spirit
of the reorganization provisions. In the 1980s, many states adopted
anti-takeover statutes intended to deny merger treatment for
transactions that would be permitted in other states. In statutes
adopted in New York in 1986, New Jersey in 1987, and in Delaware
in 1988, for example, an acquirer in a tender offer was prohibited
from entering into a merger with the target for a period of between
three and five years after the original acquisition of shares.373 Thus,
such statutes impose an elevated requirement of continuity of
interest among a target's historic shareholders, excluding an acquirer
from such class until several years after the acquisition. Under
Wisconsin's merger statute, no target can enter into a merger with a
10% stockholder for a period of three years after such holder
acquired its shares unless otherwise approved by the board of
directors prior to the original acquisition. 74 Furthermore, fifteen
370. Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 861, 866-67 (1969) (quoting Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law
Revision Commission, 4th Meeting, July 14, 1964, at 2-3).
371. The original "race to the bottom" began in 1896 when New Jersey enacted the
most liberal corporation law statute to date. See Davis, supra note 221, at 617.
372. Hearings on H.R. 8245, supra note 81, at 29 (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, advisor
to the Treasury Department).
373. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (three years); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:10A (West Supp. 1998) (five years); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 1999) (five years); see also E. Norman Veasey et al., The Delaware Takeover
Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Comparisons, 43 Bus. LAW. 865, 866 (1988) (describing
the New York and New Jersey statutes and discussing in detail Delaware takeover
provisions).
374. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1140(8)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (defining a
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states adopted anti-takeover provisions patterned after Maryland's
"fair price" and "super-majority voting" requirements for mergers of
targets with their tender offer acquirers.375 In all such cases, policy
concerns which may or may not be considered relevant to
nonrecognition treatment assume elevated significance for parties
seeking to qualify their transaction as an A reorganization under the
Code. The focus in determining tax treatment shifts from the nature
of the transaction to the location of the transaction and in some cases
the relationship of the parties.
2. Over-Inclusive-The Texas Example
Perhaps the most surprising and unnerving development in state
corporation law for purposes of the statutory merger requirement is
the expansion of the definition of merger or consolidation to cover
transactions that are arguably outside the contemplation of the
Code's reorganization provisions. In 1989, Texas adopted a revised
Texas Business Corporation Act ("TBCA") that revolutionized the
definitions of "merger" and "consolidation" in Texas.376 Under the
provisions, which are still in effect today,37 7 two or more entities
(regardless of whether all or some are entities other than
corporations) can effect a statutory merger or consolidation in which
all entities survive. Moreover, under the statute one entity may
divide into two, or effect a transaction popularly referred to as a spin-
off, split-off, or split-up, as a simple statutory merger rather than as a
two- or three-step transaction involving conveyances, share issuances,
and distributions. As currently drafted, Article 1.02 of the TBCA
defines "merger" to mean:
(a) the division of a domestic corporation into two or
more new domestic corporations or into a surviving
corporation and one or more new domestic or foreign
corporations or other entities, or (b) the combination of one
or more domestic corporations with one or more domestic
or foreign corporations or other entities resulting in (i) one
or more surviving domestic or foreign corporations or other
holder of 10% of the voting stock of a corporation as an "interested stockholder"); id.
§ 180.1141 (West 1992) (imposing a three-year restriction on business combinations
involving interested stockholders); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS: CASES AND MATERIALS 898 (4th ed.
1990).
375. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 3-601 to 3-603 (1993 & Supp. 1998);
HAMILTON, supra note 375, at 899.
376. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 1.02A(18), 5.01 (West Supp. 1999).
377. See id.
1999] 1375
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
entities, (ii) the creation of one or more new domestic or
foreign corporations or other entities, or (iii) one or more
surviving domestic or foreign corporations or other entities
and the creation of one or more new domestic or foreign
corporations or other entities.378
Article 5.01 of the TBCA, which sets forth the procedure for
effecting a statutory merger, also provides that "one or more
domestic corporations may merge with one or more domestic or
foreign corporations or other entities 3 79 by adopting a plan of
merger that specifies whether "more than one domestic or foreign
corporation or other entity is to survive or to be created by the terms
of the plan of merger."3 If more than one entity will survive the
merger, the parties are directed to describe the manner and basis of
allocating the parties' assets and liabilities among the surviving
entities,381 including specifying which entity is responsible for paying
dissenting shareholders." To be instituted, the plan of merger must
be approved by at least two-thirds of the eligible shareholders
present in person or by proxy at the meeting upon which the matter is
raised.383 The result of the Texas statutory merger provision is that
two entities can merge together with both surviving and a single
entity can effect a merger by dividing-neither transaction being in
the least bit consistent with the original conception of a merger which
involved the "blending of one corporation into another, whereby the
latter swallows up the properties and franchises of the first.''384
According to Curtis Huff, one of the drafters of the Texas
merger statute, the goal was to maintain "modem incorporation
statutes in the State of Texas in order to attract and maintain the
incorporation of corporations in the State. '385 The Commentary to
the TBCA provided by the Business Law Section of the State Bar of
Texas states that the new provisions were designed "to significantly
expand the flexibility of corporations to engage in merger and
378. Id. art. 1.02A(18). Texas's definition of "merger" includes within it the ability to
carry out a consolidation. See J. Leon Lebowitz, The 1989 Amendments to the Texas
Business Corporation Statutes: Part 1, 8 CORP. COUNS. REV. 24, 26 (1989).
379. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.01A.
380. Id. art. 5.01B(2).
381. See id. art. 5.01B(2)(c).
382 See id. art. 5.01D.
383. See id. art. 5.03E.
384. PAUL, supra note 91, at 7 n.11.
385. Curtis W. Huff, The New Texas Business Corporation Act Merger Provisions, 21
ST. MARY'S L.J. 109, 110 n.2 (1989). Mr. Huff was a member of the subcommittee of the
Corporation Law Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of Texas that
drafted the amendments to the merger provisions of the TBCA. See id.
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acquisition transactions."3"6 Citing a 1985 article in the Texas Law
Review in which the author suggested that transactions that can be
accomplished through alternative structures should not be subject to
the "[m]eaningless restrictions" contained in statutes such as the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act,387 the drafters pointed to
several transactions that previously had to be performed through
cumbersome multi-step transactions involving common law
conveyancing and share issuances and distributions. Examples
included "acquisitions of a single corporation by multiple
corporations each desiring different segments of the acquired
corporation, mergers conditioned on the sale or spin-off of unwanted
assets or business segments of the acquired corporation,
recapitalizations, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, and creations of
holding companies. '38 Under the corporation laws of most states,
for instance, when the parties to a merger want to place some or all of
the assets or liabilities of the merged corporation into another entity
that is not a subsidiary of the surviving parent, but is instead
separately owned by the parent's shareholders, the parties have to
transfer the assets and liabilities to a subsidiary beforehand and then
distribute interests in that subsidiary to the shareholders of the
constituent parties under the plan of merger.8 9 The new Texas
merger provisions permit this transaction to be done in one step as
part of the merger. The Texas statute is unprecedented and to this
point has not attracted imitators; therefore, it is effectively limited to
transactions among Texas corporations and other business entities. 30
Nevertheless, its existence and the possibility that it will be adopted
386. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.01 commentary 121 (West Supp. 1999)
[hereinafter Texas Bar Commentary].
387. J. Patrick Garrett, Merger Meets the Common Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1509, 1519
(1985); see also Huff, supra note 385, at 111 n.5 ("The new Texas merger provisions
embrace Mr. Garrett's proposal that the corporation statutes should provide greater
flexibility and not impose meaningless restrictions on transactions that may be
accomplished through other forms and provide a framework for the future evolution of
the TBCA.").
388. Huff, supra note 385, at 116.
389. See Lebowitz, supra note 378, at 28-29.
390. See Texas Bar Commentary, supra note 386, at 121; Huff, supra note 385, at 114.
There is no bar, however, on the reincorporation or reorganization of one or more entities
into Texas in order to effect a statutory merger under Texas law. Huff predicts rather
optimistically that the "1989 amendments to the merger provisions of the TBCA represent
the first of a new generation of state laws governing mergers." Huff, supra note 385, at
157.
Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory division provision for effecting a spin-off, but
does not provide a mechanism for combining a division with a merger. See 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1951 (West 1995); Huff, supra note 385, at 114.
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by other jurisdictions in the future illustrates the great potential for
abuse of the statutory merger requirement under § 368(a)(1)(A).
One statutory merger in Texas that would otherwise be subject
to stricter requirements under the Code is a spin-off. In a typical
spin-off, a corporation with two different lines of business will drop
the assets and liabilities of one of those businesses into a wholly
owned subsidiary created for the transaction, and the parent
corporation will distribute the stock of the new subsidiary to its
shareholders.39 ' Section 355 of the Code outlines the procedure for
obtaining nonrecognition treatment for the shareholders of a
corporation who receive stock or securities of a controlled
corporation in a distribution by the corporation.392 To qualify for
nonrecognition under § 355, certain requirements must be met,
including: (1) the transaction must not be used principally as a device
for the distribution of earnings and profits;393 (2) the distributing and
controlled corporations must have engaged in the active conduct of a
trade or business throughout the five years preceding the spin-off;394
(3) the distributing corporation must distribute at least 80% of the
stock of the controlled corporation in the transaction and its
retention of the remaining 20% must not have as one of its principal
purposes the avoidance of federal income tax;3 95 and (4) the
transaction must meet the § 355 business purpose requirement, which
is stricter than the requirement imposed on § 368 reorganizations.396
Thus, if, for instance, the spun-off line of business was recently
started or was acquired within the five-year period preceding the date
of the distribution, the transaction will not qualify for nonrecognition
under § 355.397 In Texas, however, since a spin-off can qualify as a
statutory merger, a corporation desiring to spin-off its recently
acquired assets could attempt to qualify as a tax-free reorganization
under § 368(a)(1)(A) instead.
The IRS might challenge such an attempt on the ground that it
fails to satisfy the continuity of interest requirement for A
reorganizations. Shareholders of entities party to a split-off or split-
391. In a spin-off, the controlled corporation stock is distributed with respect to the
stockholder's shareholdings in the parent corporation. See supra note 142 (explaining a
spin-off). In a split-off, the controlled corporation stock is exchanged for the
stockholder's stock in the parent corporation. See supra note 142 (explaining a split-off).
392. See I.R.C. § 355 (West Supp. 1998).
393. See iL § 355(a)(1)(B).
394. See id. §§ 355(a)(1)(C) & (b).
395. See id. § 355(a)(1)(D).
396. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (1998); 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7, § 1005.
397. See I.R.C. §§ 355(b)(2)(B) & (C).
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up do not retain their proprietary interests in both business
enterprises, and shareholders of entities party to a spin-off may not
possess the requisite historic continuity of interest with respect to
businesses acquired within the five-year period preceding the
distribution.398 Until recently, the IRS and the courts had broadened
the focus of the continuity of interest test beyond the original
concern for the type of consideration issued in the exchange to
address the concepts of pre- and post-reorganization continuity.3 99
Pre-reorganization continuity was instituted in the form of a
requirement that only a target corporation's "historic" shareholders,
or "those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the
enterprise prior to the reorganization" must be the shareholders for
whom continuity of interest is measured.4 ° The IRS developed post-
reorganization continuity to require target shareholders to hold their
acquired shares for a requisite period of time.40'
Both pre- and post-reorganization continuity requirements,
however, have come under judicial and administrative attack of late.
The first sign of weakening came in the Tax Court decision J.E.
Seagram Corp. v. Commissioner.4' This case involved a battle
between Seagram and DuPont for control of Conoco. In a tender
offer, Seagram acquired 32% of Conoco's stock. DuPont, however,
acquired control of Conoco through its own tender offer in which
54% of the Conoco stock, including the 32% previously acquired by
Seagram, was exchanged for cash and DuPont stock, after which
DuPont merged Conoco into a wholly-owned subsidiary. 43 Because
the stock acquired from Seagram was not from a "historic"
shareholder under pre-reorganization continuity principles, Seagram
claimed a loss on the sale based on the argument that 22% continuity
398. The IRS has not heretofore asserted this latter argument, but it is a logical
extension of the pre-reorganization continuity requirement. If the IRS were looking for a
back-door avenue for imposing the § 355 five-year active trade or business requirement in
A reorganizations, this might be the most likely choice.
399. See Committee on Taxation of Corporations of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Postreorganization Transactions and Continuity of Shareholder Interest,
72 TAX NOTES 1401,1402 (1996).
400. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1998).
401. See id.; Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67 (finding that a target shareholder under a
court order in an antitrust case to dispose of the stock received in the merger within seven
years did not violate continuity of interest because seven years was sufficient to establish
unrestricted rights of ownership and there were no plans or arrangements in place prior to
the merger for a sale of the acquirer's stock).
402. 104 T.C. 75 (1995).
403. See id. at 89-90.
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was insufficient.404  The Tax Court rejected Seagram's argument,
holding that, absent some evidence that Seagram and DuPont acted
in concert, it stepped into the shoes of its former stockholders and
continuity of interest was thus satisfied. 05
The continuity of interest requirement was further called into
question when the IRS issued proposed regulations that substantially
narrowed the post-reorganization continuity of interest
requirement.4 6 Under the proposed regulations, which have since
been adopted in final form, dispositions of stock of the acquiring
corporation by former target shareholders after the reorganization
will not be taken into account for continuity of interest purposes
unless such dispositions are made to the acquiring corporation or a
related entity.4°7 The final regulations extend this narrowing of the
post-reorganization continuity of interest requirement to the pre-
reorganization continuity of interest requirement as well.4"' There is
some suggestion that the Seagram decision and the new continuity of
interest regulations merely portend the demise of the continuity of
interest requirement altogether. 4°9
Another transaction qualifying as a statutory merger under
Texas law that would otherwise be limited by the Code is popularly
known as a "Morris Trust." The Fourth Circuit, in a case of the same
name that was the first to address the tax treatment of the
technique,41° held that an acquisition of some but not all of a
corporation's assets following a spin-off of the unwanted assets to the
target corporation's shareholders was tax-free.4 In the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997,412 however, Congress amended § 355 to make
404. See id. at 91.
405. See id. at 101-02.
406. See Continuity of Interest, 61 Fed. Reg. 67512 (1996) (codified at Treas. Reg.
§ 1.368-1(e)(1)(i)) (proposed Dec. 23, 1996).
407. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i) (1998) ("[A] mere disposition of stock of the
issuing corporation received in a potential reorganization to persons not related ... to the
issuing corporation is disregarded.").
408. See id. ("For purposes of the continuity of interest requirement, a mere
disposition of stock of the target corporation prior to a potential reorganization to persons
not related ... to the target corporation or to persons not related ... to the issuing
corporation is disregarded .... "); 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7, § 610.
409. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 230.
410. See Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966); New Morris Trust
Provisions Have Broad Reach, 75 TAxES 658 (1997).
411. See Morris Trust, 367 F.2d at 799-802 (holding that a state bank's spin-off of its
insurance operations prior to a merger with a national bank, necessitated by a federal
banking law bar on the conduct of insurance activities, was not taxable); see also Rev. Rul,
68-603, 1968-2 C.B. 148 (following the Morris Trust decision).
412. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1012(a), 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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spin-offs taxable to the selling corporation (but not to the
shareholders of either the target or the seller) if done in connection
with an acquisition of 50% or more of stock of the target corporation
or any controlled corporation.413 Congress's concern was that such
Morris Trust transactions go too far toward permitting corporations
to engage in business adjustments by permitting sales of corporate
assets tax-free.414 According to the Conference Committee Report
issued upon the release of the Act, this was especially true in the case
of so-called "leveraged" Morris Trust transactions.415  In such
transactions, the distributing corporation incurs debt and contributes
the proceeds of the debt to a controlled corporation prior to the spin-
off of the controlled corporation.416 The spin-off thus separates the
proceeds of the loan from the obligation to repay-simulating a
transfer of cash-without triggering the requirement that such
distributions of cash outside the corporate solution be recognized as
gain under the rules governing consolidated groups. 417  Such
leveraged Morris Trust transactions were becoming increasingly
popular in the year preceding the congressional enactment.418
One Morris Trust transaction announced in April of 1997 may
have prompted Congress to accelerate its consideration of a
legislative fix to such transactions. In that transaction, Disney
(111 Stat.) 788, 914 (amending I.R.C. § 355(e)).
413. See I.R.C. § 355(e) (West Supp. 1998); see also Howard G. Krane & Keith E.
Villmow, Spin-Offs and Leverage, 75 TAXES 679, 687 (1997) (describing the new § 355(e)).
414. The Treasury Department supported the Administration's proposal to amend
§ 355 by stating that "[c]orporate nonrecognition under section 355 should not apply to
distributions that are effectively dispositions of a business." Department of the Treasury,
General Explanations of the Administration's Revenue Proposals, reprinted in Sydney E.
Unger, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, New York Attorneys Oppose
Morris Trust Legislation, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 30, 1997, at 146-33, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File. Representative Bill Archer's introductory statement to the
release of his proposed legislation stated that many recent Morris Trust transactions " 'are
prearranged structures designed to avoid corporate level gain recognition. In essence,
these transactions resemble sales.'" Unger, supra, at 146-33 (quoting from
Representative Archer's introduction to H.R. 1365, renumbered H.R. 2014).
415. See Conference Report and Statement of Managers, H.R. 2014, 105 Cong., in 1997
Tax Legislation: Law, Explanation and Analysis (CCH) 11,170, at 1086 (July 31, 1997).
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. See James R. Saxenian, A Post-Spin-Off Acquisition of the Controlled Corp.: The
IRS' Misguided Position, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 21, 1997, at 76-79, (discussing the
Viacom Letter Ruling, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-37-043 (June 17, 1996), in which the IRS blessed
a Morris Trust transaction involving Viacom's contribution of $1.7 billion in preexisting
debt to its cable television subsidiary whose stock was effectively acquired by Tele-
Communications, Inc.), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File; Unger, supra note
407, at 146-33.
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proposed to dispose of some newspapers that it had obtained in
connection with the acquisition of Capital Cities and the ABC
network while at the same time borrowing $1 billion and letting the
debt obligation follow the newspaper assets.4"9 The Treasury
Department explained that "[t]here is a natural tension between
ensuring the appropriate taxation of gain when a company disposes
of its assets and allowing corporate restructurings to proceed in an
efficient manner to ensure competitiveness in the global
marketplace."'42  According to Treasury, bills introduced by
Representative Bill Archer (R-Tex.) in the House of Representatives
and by Senator William Roth (R-Del.) in the Senate "represent[ed]
an appropriate balancing of those concerns."421
The Texas merger statute was explicitly designed to permit
parties to accomplish a Morris Trust transaction in one step through
a statutory merger rather than through a multi-step spin-off.4 22 As
Curtis Huff has explained, "[c]orporations in today's competitive
environment must seek new and innovative ways of acquiring
corporations and managing their assets and businesses. This often
involves the division of a corporation among different entities that
may more efficiently operate such assets and businesses. '"423 Through
a single plan of merger, two Texas entities can enter into an
agreement in which the target entity spins-off the assets of the
unwanted business and merges into the acquiring entity, all without
relying on § 355 and therefore without being subject to the
restrictions on Morris Trust transactions contained in the 1997 Act.
The transaction must be effected pursuant to § 368(a)(1)(A), rather
than pursuant to the triangular merger provisions, because the target
corporation's spin-off will prevent the acquisition of substantially all
of the properties as required for a tax-free forward subsidiary
419. The transaction was announced in April, right before the chairs of the Senate
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee jointly announced the
introduction of a bill to make Morris Trust transactions taxable. See Robert Stowe
England, Tax Beater, CFO, May 1997, at 27, 27; JCT Releases Statement Clarifying Morris
Trust Legislation, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 21, 1997, at 76-53, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File.
420. Letter from Donald C. Lubick, Acting Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy),
Department of Treasury, to Richard D. McCormick, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, US WEST, Inc. (July 23, 1997), in Treasury Supports Proposals to Limit Morris
Trust Transactions, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 3, 1997, at 128-32, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File.
421. 1&
422. See Huff, supra note 385, at 115 & n.24.
423. Id. at 116 n.27.
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merger 424 and will prevent the surviving corporation from holding
substantially all of its properties after the merger as required for a
tax-free reverse subsidiary merger.4u2 A Morris Trust statutory
merger, however, should otherwise comply with the judicial doctrines
imposed on A reorganizations. The most vulnerable point for attack
by the IRS is the continuity of business enterprise requirement. The
Treasury Regulations, however, only require that the acquirer
"continue a significant line of business."'426 Thus, when a target
corporation operates more than one line of business prior to a
merger, a spin-off will not prove fatal. As long as the transaction is
not used to transfer a secondary line of a company's business, such a
Morris Trust-type transaction appears to meet all the formal
requirements for nonrecognition under § 368(a)(1)(A).
Thus, with respect to a state merger statute such as that of Texas,
the statutory merger requirement is over-inclusive. It potentially
affords tax-free treatment to "mergers" effected pursuant to Texas
law even though the definition of merger includes transactions that
would normally be taxable sales or subject to a different statutory
regime under the Code. As one prominent practitioner noted when
the statutory merger requirement was first enacted, "[t]hat a merger
or consolidation is statutory in nature does not imply that no sale in
the guise of a genuine reorganization with consequent freedom from
tax liability has occurred."'42 7 By continuing to assume that the
statutory merger requirement serves as a proxy for some of the
requirements imposed in B and C reorganizations, the Code is
susceptible to abuse when the state merger statute falls short of these
requirements.
424. See supra note 6 (describing a forward subsidiary merger); see also I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1998) ("The acquisition by one corporation, in exchange for
stock of a corporation (referred to in this subparagraph as 'controlling corporation') which
is in control of the acquiring corporation, of substantially all of the properties of another
corporation shall not disqualify a transaction under paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(G) if .... ).
The spin-off and merger will be stepped together by the IRS and will be treated as if the
acquiring corporation acquired all of the target's properties except the properties to be
spun-off. Unless the spin-off involves a de minimis amount of assets, the transaction will
thus fail to qualify as a tax-free forward subsidiary merger.
425. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E) (providing that a reverse subsidiary merger of the
controlling corporation's subsidiary into the target corporation with the target
shareholders exchanging their stock for stock of the controlling corporation will not be
disqualified "if-(i) after the transaction, the corporation surviving the merger holds
substantially all of its properties"). Since the target's spin-off of a more than de minimis
amount of its assets immediately prior to the merger will be stepped together with the
merger, the target will fail to hold substantially all of its properties after the merger.
426. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(2)(ii) (1998).
427. Latham, supra note 200, at 41.
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The inevitable response to the theoretical possibility of a Texas
end run around the Code is the contention that any loophole would
soon be closed by the courts. Just as they did with respect to the 1921
Act's parenthetical clause, the courts would likely invent doctrines to
ensure that a statutory merger does not qualify for reorganization
treatment when a transaction fails to comport with the common law
definition of a merger or consolidation. The courts would probably
look to the Treasury Regulations, which specify that to qualify for A
reorganization treatment "the transaction must be a merger or
consolidation effected pursuant to the corporation laws of the United
States or a State or Territory or the District of Columbia. '' 42s Thus, a
transaction must first constitute a "merger or consolidation" as those
terms are commonly defined and then qualify for merger treatment
under the relevant statutory scheme. Regardless of whether this
Treasury Regulation is authorized under a plain reading of the
statutory language, the attempt would defeat the aim of the drafters.
By interjecting such a judicial gloss on the statutory language, the
statutory merger requirement would lose what little bright-line test
quality it may have retained after the extension of the continuity of
interest requirement in Roebling.4 9 Furthermore, given the fact that
states have begun to enact merger statutes that rely on definitions of
merger or consolidation that are completely at odds with the
common law and popular notions of the terms, the statutory merger
requirement can hardly be defended as a bulwark against tax
avoidance. If we must rely upon the courts to protect against
statutory mergers that abuse the tax-free treatment accorded
reorganizations, then we may as well leave the matter to the
discretion of the courts altogether.
3. Under-Inclusive
At the same time that the statutory merger requirement
unjustifiably includes state merger statutes that are too expansive in
their definition of a merger, it unnecessarily excludes transactions
that arguably should be eligible for A reorganization treatment.
Such transactions include: (1) "de facto mergers," or transactions
treated as mergers by the courts; and (2) transactions effected under
state reorganization statutes that accord merger-type effect and
restrictions without defining the transactions as mergers.
428. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (1998).
429. See supra notes 304-13 and accompanying text (discussing Roebling).
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a. De Facto Mergers
Although the only method of effecting a merger or consolidation
under the grant or concession theory of the corporation is pursuant to
state statute or legislative pronouncement,430 this theory of state
dominance over the powers and privileges of the corporate entity has
fallen from favor.431 With the increase in general incorporation
statutes and the resulting ease in which individuals are able to obtain
charters, the role of the state in creating the corporation and in
endowing it with its power to merge or consolidate with another
corporation has become much less significant.432
One acknowledgment of this paradigm shift is the recognition of
the de facto merger doctrine by courts in many jurisdictions.433
According to the Second Circuit, "[a] de facto merger occurs when
one corporation is absorbed by another, but without compliance with
the statutory requirements for a merger."4 4  Courts have identified
several elements that must be present in order for a transaction to be
classified as a de facto merger: (1) continuity of business enterprise;
(2) continuity of shareholder interest through the payment of solely
stock consideration; (3) dissolution of the target corporation; and (4)
the acquiring corporation's assumption of the target corporation's
430. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
431. See Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under the First Amendment:
Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 370 (1991) ("No longer is there any
meaningful state involvement in the creation of a corporation. Mere ministerial
recordation does not constitute a concession from the sovereign, although the
establishment of a corporation, or its equivalent, is not possible without such ministerial
action."); Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1646
(1982).
432. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 102, at 191; see also ROBERTS. STEVENS & ARTHUR
LARSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 82 (1955) ("It is
usually stated that the issuing official who is asked to file a certificate which on its face
complies with the statutes has no discretion in the matter and that his act is purely
ministerial .... ).
433. See, e.g., Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying North
Dakota law); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Pratt
v. Ballman-Cummings Furniture Co.,, 549 S.W.2d 270 (Ark. 1977); Marks v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App. 1986); Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136
N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965); Appelstein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), affd, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960); Gilbert v. Burnside, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430
(App. Div. 1961); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958). This is not merely a
modem development. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, courts looking to
protect creditors of merged corporations occasionally relied upon the de facto doctrine.
See Comment, supra note 246, at 263.
434. Arnold Graphics Indus., Inc. v. Independent Agent Ctr., Inc., 775 F.2d 38, 42 (2d
Cir. 1985).
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liabilities.435 In cases in which the doctrine is enforced, it is used to
ensure that parties comply with the statutory protections afforded to
dissenting shareholders and to creditors in a statutory merger.436
Even in those jurisdictions such as Delaware and Texas where it has
been rejected by statute or by the courts, the de facto merger
doctrine may still apply in certain situations. 437 Despite the fact that
the de facto merger generally satisfies the judicial continuity
requirements applied to reorganizations and the statutory protections
that are afforded to dissenters and creditors, it will not qualify as a
statutory merger. It is a merger effected privately, rather than
pursuant to the corporation laws of a state.
b. State Reorganization Statutes: The California Example
Even in California, where the de facto merger doctrine has been
adopted by statute and the protections normally accorded to
statutory mergers have been explicitly extended to the de facto
variety, such transactions are ineligible for A reorganization
treatment because they are not defined as mergers under the statute.
California's General Corporation Law includes a provision for a
"reorganization" transaction that is broader than a merger. Under
section 181 of the California statute, "reorganization" is defined as
one of three transactions: (1) a "merger reorganization" effected
pursuant to the statute;438 (2) an "exchange reorganization," or the
"acquisition by one corporation in exchange in whole or in part for its
equity securities ... of shares of another corporation if, immediately
after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of the
other corporation; ' 439 or (3) a "sale-of-assets reorganization," or the
"acquisition by one corporation in exchange in whole or in part for its
equity securities ... or its debt securities ... , or both, of all or
substantially all of the assets of another corporation.""0  According
435. See Keller, 715 F.2d at 1291; Marks, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 598. Not coincidentally,
these are the same elements originally thought to be necessary for tax-free reorganization
status.
436. See 3 JAMES D. COXETAL., CORPORATIONS § 22.7 (1995).
437. Most notably, the doctrine may apply in transactions in which there appears to be
an attempt to defraud creditors. See, e.g., id. § 22.7, at 22.23 (citing Drug Inc. v. Hunt, 168
A. 87 (Del. 1933)); Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 141 A. 54 (Del. Ch. 1928)); Frank
William McIntyre, Note, De Facto Merger in Texas: Reports of Its Death Have Been
Greatly Exaggerated, 2 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 593, 618 (1996).
438. CAL. CORP. CODE § 181(a) (West 1999).
439. Id § 181(b).
440. Id. § 181(c). Both the exchange and sale-of-assets reorganizations also permit
triangular reorganizations in which the acquiring corporation uses the stock or securities
of its parent corporation. See id. §§ 181(b) & (c).
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to one commentator, the California statute "attempts to minimize the
long-standing technical distinctions between different forms of
corporate reorganization, such as the distinctions found in the I.R.C.
and in some SEC rules." 441
One of the most significant features of the California
reorganization statute is that it specifies the form of consideration.
Both the "exchange" reorganization under section 181(b) and the
"sale-of-assets reorganization" under section 181(c), despite its
misleading name, stipulate that the exchange consideration must
consist in whole or in part of the equity securities of the acquiring
corporation." 2 A sale of corporate assets is not a "reorganization" in
California if the consideration for the transaction does not consist of
either cash, stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent, or
inadequately secured debt securities that mature more than five years
after the closing of the transaction.4 3 Thus, the California statute
addresses the fear that the sales were being characterized as tax-free
reorganizations in the absence of a statutory merger requirement.
Although most reorganizations are not defined as mergers under
California law, the statute and judicial interpretations provide many
of the same protections that are characteristic of the statutory
merger. Dissenters, for example, are offered a statutory means of
receiving compensation instead of being forced to acquiesce in a
fundamental corporate change. Under section 1201(a), a majority of
the outstanding shares of each class of stock must approve the
principal terms of a reorganization.4' Those minority shareholders
that refuse to accede to the wishes of the majority may require the
corporation to purchase its shares at fair market value as of the day
before the first announcement of the proposed reorganization under
an appraisal remedy.445 Moreover, although the statute does not
expressly provide for the allocation of liabilities by operation of law
as is done under a statutory merger, California courts have
nonetheless inferred such protection for creditors of the constituent
entities to a reorganization by applying the de facto merger doctrine.
441. HERBERT KRAUS, THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATION: LEGAL AsPEcTS OF
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION, at A-33 (BNA Corp. Prac. Series No. 31-2d, 1997).
442. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 181(b) &(c).
443. See KRAUS, supra note 441, at A-33.
444. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(a) (West 1999).
445. See id. §§ 1300(a), 1304 (West 1999). California's requirement that dissenters
forgo post-announcement appreciation in value has caused some to discount the
protection this procedure offers to dissenters. See 1 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 7,
§ 805.2.2, at 8-35 & n.3.
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In Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,"6 for instance, a
California court of appeals held that 3M was liable for punitive
damages imposed on a corporation whose business, assets, and
goodwill were acquired in exchange for 3M's stock and its agreement
to assume certain specified liabilities. 47 Under the agreement
between the parties, 3M only agreed to assume the target
corporation's normal operating liabilities and the parties engaged in a
reorganization rather than in a statutory merger under California
law.' The court acknowledged that while the general rule is that a
purchaser of assets does not automatically assume the seller's
liabilities, including its tort liabilities, there are several exceptions to
that rule." 9 One such exception, the de facto merger doctrine, was
determined to be applicable to the case at bar.450 According to the
court, this exception applies "'"where the consideration consists
wholly of shares of the purchaser's stock which are promptly
distributed to the seller's shareholders in conjunction with the seller's
liquidation." ' "451 Under this doctrine, the court held that when the
target corporation was acquired, "as a matter of corporate law it
carried with it all of its liabilities."'45 The court brushed aside the
disclaimer in the parties' agreement for "unknown claims," reasoning
that "[s]ince the disclaimer would have had no effect in a statutory
merger, where, as here, all of the indicia of a de facto merger are
present, the same result is entirely appropriate. ' 453 Creditors and
dissenting shareholders thus receive the same protection under
California's reorganization provisions as they do in a statutory
merger.
Although California's reorganization provision contains many of
the features that played a role in the original adoption of the
statutory merger requirement, a statutory reorganization does not
appear to qualify for nonrecognition treatment under § 368(a)(1)(A).
The "exchange" or stock-for-stock reorganization and the "sale-of-
assets" or stock-for-assets reorganization in sections 181(b) and (c) of
the California statute are specifically distinguished from a "merger
446. 232 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App. 1986).
447. See icL at 599.
448. See id. at 598.
449. See id. at 597.
450. See id.
451. Id. (quoting Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 7 (Cal. 1977) (quoting Shannon v. Samuel
Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974))).




reorganization" under section 181(a).454 Arguably, this fact should
not matter since the same reasoning that might be used to reject
statutory merger treatment for the Texas divisive merger suggests the
acceptance of the California reorganization. The Treasury
Regulations describe a statutory merger as a merger or consolidation
effected pursuant to the corporation laws of a state, implying that a
de facto merger conducted pursuant to the California General
Corporation Laws should qualify as an A reorganization. It does not
appear, however, that the courts or the IRS are willing to expand the
concept to this extent, especially since California's stock-for-stock
and stock-for-assets reorganization provisions are eligible for
nonrecognition treatment as B or C reorganizations, respectively.455
The problem with this argument, however, is that a transaction that
otherwise satisfies the goals or concerns of the statutory merger
requirement is forced to comply with the more difficult non-merger
reorganization provisions for no other reason than the technical form
chosen for the transaction under California and other local laws.456
III. OPTIONS FOR FEDERALIZING THE TAX-FREE MERGER
To the extent that nonrecognition treatment for mergers and
consolidations is still justified,4 7 and thus that any gain from stock
and securities received in reorganizations should continue to be tax-
deferred, it makes little sense to maintain a statutory merger
requirement as a condition of a tax-free reorganization. There are at
least three alternatives: (1) Congress could itself decide on a uniform
set of common law criteria for mergers that could be imposed on
parties seeking A reorganization treatment; (2) the A reorganization
could be eliminated from the Code altogether; or (3) the statutory
merger requirement could be excised from the Code and the
definition of the phrase "merger or consolidation" could be left to
454. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 181(a), (b), & (c) (West 1999); KRAUS, supra note 441,
at A-33.
455. See George v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 396, 403-04 (1956). In George, the court
found a transaction to be in substance a consolidation of a Louisiana corporation and a
Mississippi corporation even though the transaction did not comply with a technical
statutory requirement. However, the court would not evaluate whether the transaction
qualified as an A reorganization because of the availability of nonrecognition treatment as
a C reorganization. See id.
456. Other states also provide certain rights and remedies to dissenting shareholders in
fundamental corporate changes not qualifying as statutory mergers. See, e.g., Donald J.
Brown & M. Daniel Waters, Dissenters' Rights and Fundamental Changes Under the New
Iowa Business Corporation Act, 40 DRAKE L. REv. 733 (1991).
457. Whether nonrecognition treatment is still justified, either under the original
principles or other, more modem justifications is the subject of another ongoing project.
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the IRS and the courts.
A. Redraft Section 368(a) (1) (A) to Include Certain Common Law
Requirements
The statutory merger requirement can be replaced with more
directed language that replicates the type of state law features now
thought to be inherent in the statutory merger. This result could be
accomplished by redrafting the provision to capture explicitly certain
fundamental features of a merger, such as requirements that: (1) the
target shareholders receive stock consideration; (2) the merging
entity dissolves; and (3) the surviving corporation assumes all
liabilities. 458 The belief that such requirements were intrinsic to a
statutory merger led the drafters of the Revenue Act of 1934 to
consider it as a separate category.45 9 Although there may be some
disagreement in identifying and defining the fundamental elements of
a merger or consolidation, it would not be an insurmountable
obstacle.
Imposing an explicit stock consideration requirement for A
reorganizations has both statutory precedent in the existing "solely
for voting stock" rule for B reorganizations460 and judicial precedent
in the continuity of interest requirement.461  Moreover, this
suggestion has been made several times over the years. One
commentator noted in 1981 that "[t]he most sensible approach would
be to eliminate the judicial continuity of interest test and to amend
the statute to provide a uniform consideration test for all kinds of
corporate reorganizations," including the statutory merger.462 In
1996, two committees of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar
Association recommended that the application of the continuity of
interest doctrine be limited to those reorganization transactions, such
as A reorganizations and forward subsidiary mergers under
§ 368(a)(2)(D), for which the Code contains no explicit stock
consideration requirement.43 The committees suggested an 80%
voting stock requirement based on the statutory merger's analogy to
a C reorganization. 464
458. See supra note 230.
459. See supra notes 230-55 and accompanying text.
460. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1998).
461. See supra notes 163-77 and accompanying text.
462. Faber, supra note 7, at 263.
463. See Corporations Comm. and Reorganizations Comm. of the N.Y. State Bar
Assoc. Tax Section, Postreorganization Continuity of Interest, 73 TAX NOTEs 481, 489
(1996).
464. See id. at 490.
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An explicit dissolution requirement also would not be an
unprecedented addition to the reorganization provisions. Dissolution
is already imposed on the acquired party in a C reorganization under
§ 368(a)(2)(G). 465  Moreover, the Treasury Regulations issued to
provide a definition of "reorganization" under the Revenue Act of
1918 specifically required the dissolution of a corporation the
property or stock of which was acquired by another corporation
pursuant to the reorganization.466 While a dissolution requirement
disappeared from administrative pronouncements after 1921,467 the
reference to dissolution as a feature of the reorganization survived
amendments to the Treasury Regulations through those issued under
the Revenue Act of 1926.461 As discussed earlier, however, even after
the Court finally determined that dissolution was not required for
qualification as a parenthetical clause transaction, it was still thought
to be necessary for the merger or consolidation.469
Moreover, the statutory merger provision is a poor method for
enforcing a dissolution requirement. One contemporary treatise
writer noted "that the difficulty arises from the fact that these terms,
as applied to corporations, are inherently statutory. Dissolution ...
may be the effect of the procedure for merger or consolidation
required by the statutes of one state, and not be the effect under the
laws of another jurisdiction." 470  Replacing the statutory merger
language with an explicit dissolution requirement would be a better
means to enforce a uniform standard. This in fact may have been the
implicit scheme in place prior to the adoption of the statutory merger
requirement in the 1934 Act. In discussing the elimination of a
465. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(G)(i) (West Supp. 1998). ("A transaction shall fail to meet
the requirements of paragraph (1)(C) unless the acquired corporation distributes the
stock, securities, and other properties it receives, as well as its other properties, in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization."). The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
waive this liquidation or dissolution requirement if, but for a legal or other force staying
liquidation, it has liquidated substantively. See id. § 368(a)(2)(G)(ii); Rev. Proc. 89-50,
1989-2 C.B. 631-32. See generally BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, 12.24[4]
(explaining the liquidation requirement); Johnson, supra note 8, at 334 & n.103 (discussing
the rationale behind the liquidation requirement).
466. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. These are the predecessors of the
modem B and C reorganizations.
467. See BAAR & MORRIS, supra note 204, at 71; see also Satterlee, supra note 28, at
644 ("It is significant that items (2) and (3) of the 1921 regulation omitted the requirement
of dissolution present in the regulation under the 1918 Act, and did not introduce such
requirement in item (6).").
468. See Treas. Reg. 69, art. 1574 (1926), reprinted in 137 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra
note 31; Satterlee, supra note 28, at 641 (citing Treas. Reg. 69, art. 1574).
469. See supra note 235.
470. BAAR & MORRIS, supra note 204, at 72.
1999] 1391
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
universal dissolution requirement in Helvering v. Minnesota Tea
Co.,471 one commentator suggested that the Court's opinion implied
that dissolution, although not required, would permit a transaction
resembling a merger or consolidation to be treated like a technical
merger or consolidation rather than a parenthetical clause
transaction.472  Under the Code as currently drafted, explicitly
imposing a dissolution requirement on A reorganizations would
distinguish such a merger from a stock-for-stock reorganization in
which the target remains a subsidiary of the acquirer and from a
statutory merger in states such as Texas where dissolution is not
required. The fact of dissolution may ease some concerns that a
taxable sale or exchange, rather than a tax-deferred reorganization,
has occurred. 473
Finally, requiring an acquirer to assume all of the known and
unknown liabilities of its target, although not presently required by
any of the reorganization provisions, would not be a difficult rule to
administer. The general rule is that an acquirer is not liable for the
debts and liabilities of the transferring corporation, but this rule is
subject to several exceptions, one of which is when the acquirer
expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the transferring corporation's
liabilities.474 Determining whether such an assumption of liabilities
has occurred is merely a matter of contract interpretation-
something courts are well equipped to perform. This would ensure
that creditors are protected before the parties are granted
nonrecognition treatment.
B. Remove the A Reorganzation from the Code Altogether
Although replacing the statutory merger requirement with
common law requirements for mergers or consolidations would
471. See supra note 234.
472. See Hendricks, supra note 71, at 1217.
473. In the absence of a dissolution requirement, a statutory merger, for example, is
merely a sale of some of a corporation's assets (but not necessarily "substantially all") in
exchange for certain consideration, at least 50% of which is stock, although not necessarily
voting stock. See supra notes 380-85 and accompanying text. The remainder of the
corporation's assets conceivably can remain in the corporate solution and escape the
corporate-level and shareholder-level taxes imposed on complete liquidations. See I.R.C.
§ 331 (1994) (shareholder tax); I.R.C. § 336 (West Supp. 1998) (corporate tax); see also
William J. Turnier, Continuity of Interest-Its Application to Shareholders of the Acquiring
Corporation, 64 CAL. L. REV. 902, 916-20 (1976) (arguing that the continuity of interest
test is necessary to prevent tax avoidance that is possible when the target survives the
reorganization). But see Sandberg, supra note 69, at 107-08 & n.43 (arguing that
dissolution has no relevance for tax purposes).
474. See, e.g., Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280, 1289 (8th Cir. 1983).
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address the disparity in results for parties seeking A reorganization
status, it would not satisfy critics. The overall disparity among the
various reorganization alternatives would remain. Eliminating the A
reorganization from the Code altogether, however, would help
reduce the disparity caused by the A reorganization's status as "the
most lenient type of reorganization in terms of requirements that
must be satisfied."'47  While the conditions to A reorganization
treatment that develop in the absence of the statutory merger
requirement are likely to minimize this overall disparity, preserving
the A reorganization is clearly a second-best solution to the disparity
that exists between the state law and non-state law types of
reorganizations.
Removing the A reorganization has been proposed several times
before. In 1958, an America Law Institute Tax Project and an ABA
Subcommittee proposed to eliminate the A reorganization as a
separate manner of obtaining nonrecognition treatment:
(1) Two basic categories of tax-free unifying
corporation reorganizations should be recognized-asset
acquisitions and stock acquisitions. The rules for these
acquisitions should be essentially the same. Statutory
mergers and consolidations should be eliminated as a
separate category with different rules, but instead, should
be subsumed within the asset acquisition and specifically
mentioned as such in the statutory language.476
This recommendation was eventually submitted to the House Ways
475. 11 MERTENS, supra note 29, § 43.01; see also Joseph Curtis, Statutory Mergers Are
Tax-Favored, 6 TAX L. REV. 102, 103 (1950) ("The stringent requirement that the
transferor shall receive only voting stock, or at least 80 per cent of the voting stock of the
acquiring corporation, is not applicable to a statutory merger as it is in the case of a
merger not effected under state corporation laws."). Neither the "substantially all the
properties" requirement nor the "solely for voting stock" requirement apply to A
reorganizations, and continuity of interest has been found in mergers in which less than
40% of the consideration for the target stock consists of stock of the acquiring
corporation. See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935); see also
Johnson, supra note 8, at 352-65 (arguing that Congress should require a strong
"substantially all" test for A and B reorganizations, like the one required with C
reorganizations).
In the context of the decision whether to permit single-member LLC mergers to
qualify as A reorganizations, James Sowell, an attorney-adviser in the Treasury's Office of
Tax Legislative Counsel, asked "[h]ow easy do we want it to be to accomplish an A
reorganization? An A reorganization can be much more sale-like than other types of
reorganizations." Sheppard, supra note 351, at 763.
476. Surrey, supra note 10, at 28; see also Edward J. Greene, Proposed Definitional
Changes in Reorganizations, 14 TAX L. REV. 155, 156 (1959) ("The obvious aim [to
abolishing the A reorganization] is to achieve uniformity in an area where, other things
being equal, similar tax results should apply to corporations in similar situations.").
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and Means Committee by the "Subchapter C Advisory Group," a
collection of tax-centered organizations, but it was never adopted.477
A similar proposal resurfaced in the early 1980s culminating in the
preparation of a Senate Finance Committee report proposing the
introduction of the Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985.478 Noting the
seemingly arbitrary manner in which different requirements are
imposed on the A, B, and C reorganizations, the report concluded
that "[n]o policy justification can be found for these and other
distinctions."479  Thus, the report recommended eliminating the
multi-type reorganization system and replacing it with an elective
system in which parties to transactions deemed to be "qualified"
asset or stock acquisitions would be accorded carryover basis
treatment, and thus deferral, unless the parties chose to elect cost-
basis treatment.8 0 Under this proposal, statutory mergers or
consolidations, while potentially falling within the definition for the
"qualified asset acquisition" category described in the report, would
no longer be evaluated under a separate A reorganization category.4 '
During the consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress
directed Treasury to study the proposals outlined by the Senate
Finance Committee and report back on their desirability.4 sz As with
the earlier reform efforts, however, the basic structure of
reorganization provisions was never significantly altered.
The various proposals to collapse the reorganization provisions,
and thus eliminate the A reorganization, have never become law in
part because of the complexity of the suggested alternatives. The
elimination of the A reorganization alternative has generally been
proposed, not as a stand-alone measure, but as part of an overall
effort to reform the reorganization provisions. As one observer
complained when writing about the 1985 reform proposal, "these
proposals simply constitute one new complex system of corporate tax
being substituted for another. From this perspective, there is very
little to recommend them. At least the present system is generally
known and understood by practitioners. 483
477. See Subchapter C Advisory Group Report, Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 86th Cong. 553-62 (1959).
47& See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON THE
SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985 (Comm. Print 1985).
479. Id. at 38.
480. See id. at 50-51.
481. See id.
482. See Posin, supra note 13, at 665.
483. Id. at 668; see also William L. Cary, Reflections upon the American Law Institute
Tax Project and the Internal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium and Reappraisal, 60
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Even if proposals to eliminate the A reorganization are
separated from the larger reform efforts, they also face conceptual
and practical opposition. First, eliminating the A reorganization
faces practical opposition from participants to statutory mergers that
would not otherwise qualify as B or C reorganizations. The B
reorganization's zero tolerance for non-stock consideration and the C
reorganization's "substantially all the properties" requirement each
would serve to deny nonrecognition treatment to transactions that
would have formerly qualified as A reorganizations. While there
may be sound reasons for such an outcome, the exclusion of a pre-
existing exit strategy or the loosening of a current requirement would
necessitate political strength that may not be present on this issue.
Second, proposals to eliminate the A reorganization altogether
may never be fully embraced because of the commonly held belief
that a merger is the prototypical reorganization provision.
Transactions falling short of the common understanding of a merger
or consolidation therefore appear to require closer attention. The
expansion of the 1918 Act to grant nonrecognition treatment to stock
acquisitions was "the subject of heated debate" in Congress because
of the fear of some of the members that anything less than a merger
or consolidation was the equivalent of a taxable sale.4" More
recently, the American Law Institute concluded that, although the
underlying rationale was "debatable," a statutory merger should be
classified as a "prima facie" carryover-basis acquisition under its
proposed elective system because this best comported with taxpayer
expectations.' Thus, even the reformers have been cognizant of the
need to provide for the continued existence of the A reorganization
in some form or another in any modified system.
Perhaps the answer is that a non-state law dependent A
reorganization should be the only reorganization provision. When
Milton Sandberg addressed the disparities introduced by the original
adoption of the statutory merger requirement, he suggested that
Congress should "leav[e] the word 'statutory' out of Part (A), omit[]
Part (B), and leav[e] it to the courts to determine what constitute[s] a
non-statutory merger or consolidation," and he further noted that
"whatever the arguments against definition by the judiciary, they are
more than matched by the danger that the present system will result
COLUM. L. REv. 259, 260-61 (1960) (criticizing the complexity of the earlier reform
efforts); Skillman, supra note 65, at 392 (same).
484. Miller, supra note 230, at 193 & n.14 (citing 61 CONG. REC. 6560,6566 (1921)).
485. AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 8, at 42.
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in tax avoidance. 486 This alternative, however, is also likely to be
opposed as introducing an unnecessary element of complexity.
Although a single merger or consolidation standard would have the
virtue of eliminating the disparities caused by the myriad of statutory
requirements, it would lessen the predictability and certainty
available under the current system. Transactions such as stock-for-
stock or stock-for-assets transactions that have become mainstays of
modern mergers and acquisitions would suddenly be without
definition or standards. Unlike the merger and consolidation, that
have commonly accepted definitions and that have been the subject
of judicial interpretation, the stock-for-stock and stock-for-assets
reorganizations appear to be pure creatures of the Code, and as such
their definitions involve questions of policy. Realistically,
practitioners would follow the existing requirements pending the
development of authoritative judicial or administrative guidance, In
these circumstances, collapsing the reorganization provisions into a
modified version of the A reorganization is likely to be a painful
transition to a system not greatly improved from the present one.
C. Leave the Definition to the IRS and the Courts
The simplest solution to implement is to remove the word
"statutory" from § 368(a)(1)(A) and let the courts and the IRS
resolve the issue. As a practical matter, qualification as a merger
under state law would continue to serve as highly probative evidence
of the existence of a merger for tax purposes. However, eliminating
the requirement that mergers be effected pursuant to state law would
negate the notion that qualification under state law was either
necessary or sufficient for A reorganization treatment. The IRS
would attempt to provide guidance for the definition of the terms
"merger" and "consolidation" through the issuance of administrative
pronouncements, while the courts would monitor the outer
boundaries of the terms on a case-by-case basis. This flexible
approach structured around general principles was advocated by T.S.
Adams and the Treasury Department in 1924, but cast aside by
Congress in favor of the detailed treatment recommended by A.W.
Gregg in the Gregg Statement.4 7
Providing a common law definition for mergers and
486. Sandberg, supra note 69, at 117.
487. See Posin, supra note 31, at 1350; see also supra notes 284-89 (discussing the




consolidations would not be an unfamiliar task for the courts. Prior
to the enactment of a statutory merger requirement in 1934, courts
were often called upon to resolve disputes over whether a transaction
constituted a merger or consolidation for purposes of the
reorganization exemption in the Code.' As the Supreme Court in
Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner noted, "'[i]t must
be assumed that in adopting paragraph (h) Congress intended to use
the words 'merger' and 'consolidation' in their ordinary and accepted
meanings.' "9 Ascertaining those "ordinary and accepted meanings"
was therefore left to the courts. In Cortland Specialty Co. v.
Commissioner, for example, the Second Circuit culled its own
definitions of merger and consolidation from the common law
authority on the subject. According to the court:
A merger ordinarily is an absorption by one corporation of
the properties and franchises of another whose stock it has
acquired. The merged corporation ceases to exist, and the
merging corporation alone survives. A consolidation
involves a dissolution of the companies consolidating and a
transfer of corporate assets and franchises to a new
company. In each case interests of the stockholders and
creditors of any company which disappears remain and are
retained against the surviving or newly created company.49°
From an examination of the statutory authority on the subject,
the court concluded that the one characteristic that all of the state
merger statutes have in common is the intent "to continue the
interests of those owning enterprises, which have been merged or
consolidated, in another corporate form. '491  A cash sale of a
corporation's assets "without the retention of any interest by the
seller in the purchaser is quite outside the objects of merger and
consolidation statutes."4" In determining the "general purpose" of
contemporary state merger statutes, the court clearly had to ignore
488. See, e.g., Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935); Pinellas Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933); C.H. Mead Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 599, 609, 610 (1933); Thomas v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1341,
1344 (1929).
489. Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 469 (quoting Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner, 57 F.2d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1932)). While the Court in Pinellas approved of
the proposition quoted above, it concluded that the parenthetical clause modified the
ordinary and accepted meanings "so as to include some things which partake of the nature
of a merger or consolidation but are beyond the ordinary and commonly accepted
meaning of those words." Id. at 470.
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statutes in states such as Arkansas, California, Florida, Nevada, Ohio,
Tennessee, and Illinois.4 3 The merger provisions in those states to
varying degrees permitted the surviving corporation to distribute
cash, notes, bonds, or other obligations in lieu of its stock.494 Thus, by
ignoring or refusing to consider such authority, the court's refusal to
grant tax-free reorganization status to an exchange of property for
short-term promissory notes could only be based on its own
conclusion that "[s]uch a limitation [requiring a continuance of
interest on the part of the transferor in the properties transferred]
inheres in the conventional meaning of 'merger and consolidation,'
and is implicit in almost every line of section 203 [of the Revenue Act
of 1926] which we have quoted. 495 State merger statutes served as a
useful starting point for a court's own interpretation, but statutes that
conflicted with the consensus definition erected by the courts could
not sanitize transactions that failed to meet the common law
authority.
Moreover, since 1944 courts have used judicial doctrines such as
the continuity of interest requirement in determining when a merger
or consolidation effected pursuant to state law is also a statutory
merger for purposes of the reorganization provisions.496 The judicial
requirements were originally justified as protection against
parenthetical clause transactions that did not resemble mergers and
consolidations. As the Court noted in Minnesota Tea Co., the
requirement that the target corporation's shareholders retain a
"definite and material" or "substantial" continuing interest in the
transferred business enterprise "is necessary in order that the result
accomplished may genuinely partake of the nature of merger or
consolidation. ' 4 7 When applied to statutory mergers, such doctrines
became a judicial gloss on the meanings of merger and consolidation.
For example, "cash mergers," or mergers in which the only
consideration was cash, were permitted under the National Banking
Act and the Banking Law of the State of New York in the 1950s, but
493. See Comment, supra note 156, at 141 & n.48; Weiss, supra note 72, at 632-33.
494. See Comment, supra note 156, at 141 & n.48; Weiss, supra note 72, at 632-33.
495. Cortland Specialty Co., 60 F.2d at 940.
496. Since Roebling v. Commissioner and Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner,
courts have continued to reject any notion that qualification as a merger under state law is
both a necessary and sufficient prerequisite to tax deferral. See, e.g., Laure v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1087, 1102 (1978); American Bronze Corp. v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 1111, 1123 (1975); Scott v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 598, 603 (1967); see also supra
notes 297-302 (discussing Roebling); supra notes 311-19 (discussing Southwest Natural Gas
Co.).
497. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378,385 (1935).
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could not qualify as A reorganizations due to the application of the
continuity of interest requirement.49 In Paulsen v. Commissioner,499
the Supreme Court held that the merger of a stock savings and loan
association and a mutual savings and loan association failed the
continuity of interest requirement for A reorganizations despite
qualifying as a merger under Washington law.500 According to the
Court, the savings accounts and certificates of deposit of the mutual
savings and loan association were too debt-like to satisfy the
continuity of interest test even though they constituted the bank's
only form of equity. 0' In arriving at such a conclusion, the Court had
to determine the nature of the consideration and the effect of the
transaction-the same determination the State of Washington had to
make prior to issuing a certificate of merger under Washington law.51
In such cases, the only items required under state law that are not
addressed by the judicial doctrines themselves are purely ministerial
filing procedures503-items which surely could be replicated on the
federal level by the attachment of certain forms or statements of
intention to a taxpayer's annual return. In effect, because of the
common law requirements that such transactions have a business
purpose and maintain continuity of proprietary interest and business
enterprise, courts have been defining the meaning of the terms
"merger" and "consolidation" since shortly after the statutory merger
requirement was instituted.
Finally, leaving the task to the courts rather than to the states
does not necessarily mean that practitioners attempting to design a
tax-free merger or consolidation would be left adrift in a sea of
uncertainty. As with many substantive provisions of the Code that
are left undefined or in which local law concepts and definitions are
superseded by a general federal tax law understanding, 5°4 the IRS
498. See Donald McDonald & Josiah Willard, Tax Free Acquisitions and Distributions,
14 INST. ON FED. TAx'N 859, 860 n.2 (1956).
499. 469 U.S. 131 (1985).
500. See idI at 135-36. The fact that the continuity of interest test has been codified in
Treasury Regulations did not unduly prompt the Court's resolution of this case. The
Court quoted extensively from Minnesota Tea Co., LeTulle, Pinellas, and Nelson in
deciding whether the consideration offered satisfied the continuity of interest test. See,
e.g., id. at 136, 140-42.
501. See id. at 138-40.
502. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.11.010, 23B.11.060 (West 1994); State
ex rel. Carriger v. Campbell Food Mkts., Inc., 374 P.2d 435, 438 (Wash. 1962) (denying
statutory merger status for a transaction that was in reality a sale of stock).
503. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.11.010 (plan of merger); id. § 23B.11.030
(action on plan of merger); id. § 23B.11.050 (filing articles of merger).
504. See the phrase "trade or business," which is used at many points in the Code.
1999] 1399
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
would be free to issue administrative guidance that effectively
announces its litigation position on the subject. Actions taken in
conformity with IRS pronouncements are not often challenged and
therefore are not left to the uncertainty of the judicial process. In
fact, just this sort of administrative guidance was issued soon after the
enactment of the reorganization provisions. In 1920, Wayne
Johnson, Solicitor of Internal Revenue, issued an Opinion to address
the distinction between a merger and a consolidation for purposes of
determining the invested capital of the resulting corporation.505
Citing common law authority, the Johnson concluded that a
transaction between two corporations is a merger for federal income
tax purposes if one of the corporations "retains its corporate
existence and absorbs the other or others, which thereby lose their
corporate existence. A consolidation in a strict legal sense is effected
when a new corporation is created to take the place of the constituent
corporations, which are themselves dissolved in the process. '506
Because the New Jersey statute under which the transaction was
effected failed to make clear the distinction between the two,
administrative guidance was necessary to clarify the definition of
merger and consolidation for tax purposes.5 7 More recently, the IRS
issued similar guidance on the statutory merger requirement. In a
private letter ruling, the IRS addressed a taxpayer's question
regarding the tax characterization of a proposed acquisition of a
E.g., I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998); id. § 162; id. § 167(a)(1); id. § 469(c)(1)(A). An
example of the Code's explicit disregard for local law is in the definition of "real property"
for purposes of determining whether a real estate investment trust satisfies the
requirement that at least 75% of the value of its total assets consists of "real estate assets,"
defined to mean real property. Id. § 856(c)(4). According to the regulations issued
pursuant to § 856,
[iocal law definitions will not be controlling for purposes of determining the
meaning of the term "real property" as used in section 856 and the regulations
thereunder. The term includes, for example, the wiring in a building, plumbing
systems, central heating or central-air conditioning machinery, pipes or ducts,
elevators or escalators installed in the building, or other items which are
structural components of a building or other permanent structure. The term
does not include assets accessory to the operation of a business, such as
machinery, printing press, transportation equipment which is not a structural
component of the building, office equipment, refrigerators, individual air-
conditioning units, grocery counters, furnishings of a motel, hotel, or office
building, etc., even though such items may be termed fixtures under local law.
Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(d) (1998).
505. See Sol. Op. 4,2 C.B. 307,307-10 (1920).
506. Id at 307 (citing Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 150 F. 775, 787 (C.C.D.S.C.
1906), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Dunning, 166 F.
850 (4th Cir. 1908)).
507. See id. at 308.
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company through a reverse subsidiary merger followed immediately
by an upstream merger of the newly acquired target subsidiary into
the acquiring corporation. °08  The taxpayer represented to the IRS
that: (1) the upstream merger would otherwise qualify as a tax-free
liquidation of a wholly owned subsidiary under § 332; and (2) a direct
merger of the target into the acquiring corporation would qualify as a
valid A reorganization.5 9 Based on these representations, the IRS
ruled that the two transactions would be treated as one statutory
merger if they were found to constitute individual steps in an
integrated transaction.510 Despite the fact that the acquirer and the
target would not actually merge together under state law, the IRS
was willing to deem a state-law merger to have occurred. 51'
Thus, leaving the definition of merger or consolidation to the
IRS and the courts would resolve the A reorganization's internal
inequities without suffering from either the complexity or the
conceptual difficulties of the other alternatives. This modest solution
essentially acknowledges the preexisting judicial and administrative
role in the definition of the terms "merger and consolidation." The
innovation is to remove the limits to that interpretive role that have
contributed to the A reorganization's demise as a useful standard for
nonrecognition treatment.
CONCLUSION
Many reformers, both in academia and in the halls of Congress,
hold out the hope that the entire system of double taxation of
corporate income will someday be replaced by the integration of
corporate-shareholder income taxation.51z  Intermediate steps
designed to make the current system more desirable, such as the
expansion and simplification of nonrecognition treatment for
corporate reorganizations, may be rejected as a tool of quiescence
508. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-04-038 (Jan. 23, 1998).
509. See id.
510. See icL
511. Previously, the IRS had denied statutory merger treatment in the similar, but not
identical, situation of a forward subsidiary merger followed by a liquidation. See Rev. Rul.
72-405,1972-2 C.B. 217 (treating the merger as a C reorganization).
512. See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Taxing Corporate Income Once (or Hopefully Not at
All): A Practitioner's Comparison of the Treasury and ALI Integration Models, 47 TAx L.
REV. 509 (1992); Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax:
Lessons from the Past and a Proposal for the Future, 10 VA. TAX RaV. 237 (1990); George
K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TAX L. REV.
431 (1992).
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and as a distraction from more significant reform proposals."' i This
fact may account for some of the opposition to previous reform
efforts and may constitute the most controversial aspects of any
proposal to modify § 368(a)(1)(A) by eliminating the statutory
merger requirement. However, such opposition overstates the
connection between the tax-free reorganization provisions and the
taxation of corporate dividends and ironically serves to thwart the de
facto integration of business and individual income taxation.
The adoption of nonrecognition treatment for reorganizations
predates the adoption of a general tax on corporate dividends. 14
Two years after the adoption of the statutory merger requirement,
Congress began to tax individual shareholders on corporate
dividends, but even then the corporation was allowed a deduction for
the payment of such dividends, effectively elevating the shareholder's
return to compensate for the tax.515 It was not until 1939 that
Congress effectively eliminated the integration of the corporate
income tax. 6 Thus, the reorganization provisions and the statutory
merger requirement could not have been related to concerns over the
effects of the double taxation of corporate income. The two issues
are neither historically nor symbolically tied together. To the extent
that the reorganization provisions provide shareholders with a
method of deferring tax, it has never been premised on the size of the
tax due or the paucity of post-tax corporate income left to distribute.
Moreover, removal of the statutory merger requirement is an
important part of the de facto integration of business/investor
taxation begun with the check-the-box regulations. By permitting
non-corporate business entities, including limited liability companies,
to elect pass-through taxation, Congress effectively made integration
a choice for many non-publicly traded businesses. 7 As more and
513. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 8, at 1-4 (discussing the relationship
between many of the ALI proposals and the particular forms of general integration);
Renato Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisitions and
Distributions, 33 TAX LAW. 743, 746 (1980) (discussing the criticism that "the adoption of
Draft No. 2 might obstruct the enactment of a more complete integration system"). For
instance, when Treasury submitted its long-awaited study of the Subchapter C reform
proposals, it advocated general integration of the corporate-shareholder taxes, foregoing
entirely any discussion of the reorganization proposals. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 364-
65 & n.271.
514. Under the 1913 Act, corporate dividends were not subject to the normal tax,
although they were subject to the surtaxes imposed at higher marginal rates. See Tariff
Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167-68.
515. See Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 27,49 Stat. 1665, 1648.
516. See Taylor, supra note 512, at 241.
517. The gradual integration of the corporate tax is not uniformly applauded because it
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more individuals use such corporate-like pass-through entities to
conduct their business ventures,518 the integration issue may be
reduced to a choice based on shareholder return. Businesses that
continue to conduct their enterprises in corporate form will either
have to justify their status by greater returns or elect to be taxed as a
partnership. One manner in which the tax system continues to
interfere with this choice of entity decision, however, is the statutory
merger requirement. Investors generally seek at least two features in
an investment: (1) high current post-tax returns; and (2) the ability to
dispose of their investments and receive value in exchange. As to the
first feature, pass-through entities potentially offer higher returns
than C corporations because they avoid the entity-level tax to which
C corporations are subject. As to the second feature, however, the
non-publicly traded pass-through entity may still be at a disadvantage
because of the removal of one exit strategy-the tax-free
reorganization-that could permit an investor to maximize the value
he receives in an exchange. Entities that are not able to engage in
tax-free reorganizations with state law corporations because they are
not state law corporations themselves are thus less likely to attract
investment that would otherwise reward their pass-through status.
The removal of the statutory merger requirement is therefore
actually an important part of the incremental integration of
business/investor income taxation.
Finally, the removal of the statutory merger requirement is more
than a mere technical fix in the underbrush of a larger reform of
corporate taxation. It is symbolically connected with the check-the-
box regulations in de-linking the Code from the historical and
formalistic requirements of state law. This general trend toward the
"federalization" of the Code519 evidences an intent to base federal
decisions to tax on uniform criteria that are, whenever possible,
independent from non-tax local law concerns. For example, one of
the primary concerns involved in the decision to change from an
individual taxpaying unit system to a marital taxpaying unit system
also is accused of frustrating efforts toward elimination of the corporate tax altogether.
See Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability Companies, 12 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 13, 59 (1995); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst
Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 397 (1996); Ketema,
supra note 348, at 1675.
518. See RICHARD A. WESTIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BusINEss
ENTERPRISES 3 (1995).
519. This is not to be confused with the tax federalism that is discussed in the context
of state and local taxation. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at
Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895 (1992).
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was to reconcile differences in treatment between community
property and common law states. °20 Closer to home, the addition of
non-merger reorganizations was designed to unify the treatment of
mergers in states with and without merger statutes. Viewed in this
context, the removal of the statutory merger requirement is necessary
on grounds independent of those used to justify the reform of
corporate taxation. It is an attempt to lessen the Code's
anachronistic reliance on state corporation laws.
520. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1389, 1412-14 (1975); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 339,342-43 (1994).
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